
































































































































adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	 I	 will	 further	 discuss	 why	 goodwill	
accounting	 has	 been	 a	 controversial	 topic	 for	 decades,	 and,	 as	 background,	 I	 will	
describe	 the	 political	 process	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	
approach.	 I	 conclude	 the	 section	 with	 an	 analysis	 of	 whether	 the	 impairment-only	




The	 international	 adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach 1 	to	 goodwill	
accounting	in	the	early	2000’s	means	that	costs	of	corporate	acquisitions	are	subject	to	
significant	 discretion.	 Because	 of	 the	 unavailability	 of	 market	 prices	 for	 goodwill,	 its	
underlying	value	is	unverifiable	to	investors	and	auditors	upon	initial	recognition	and	in	
the	subsequent	periods	since	it	is	largely	based	on	managerial	expectations	(e.g.,	Watts,	




to	 the	 unspecific	 goodwill,	 and	 in	 the	 second	 stage	 avoids	 recognizing	 costs	 by	
incorrectly	 not	 impairing	 goodwill.2	An	 over-allocation	 to	 goodwill	 under	 the	 prior	
historical-cost	 regime,	 however,	 did	 not	 make	 it	 possible	 to	 opportunistically	 inflate	
future	earnings	because,	like	other	acquired	assets,	goodwill	was	amortized	over	time.3	
Hence,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 has	made	 it	 possible	 to	
reduce	the	’drag’	on	future	earnings	by	recognizing	fewer	costs	from	acquisitions,	which	
																																																								
















is	 only	 made	 possible	 by	 permitting	 discretion	 because	 the	 dissemination	 of	 private	
information	 is	 reduced	 if	 accounting	 choices	 are	 rigorously	 regulated	 by	 standards	
(Fields,	 Lys	 &	 Vincent,	 2001).	 By	 not	 permitting	 systematic	 yearly	 amortizations,	 the	
acquiring	firm,	under	the	impairment-only	approach,	is	able	to	signal	useful	information	
to	 investors	 about	 whether,	 for	 example,	 acquired	 synergies	 and	 superior	 earnings	
incorporated	 in	 goodwill	 are	 valid	 or	 impaired	 over	 time.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 an	 empirical	
question	whether	acquiring	firms	use	the	discretion	of	the	impairment-only	approach	to	
provide	 private	 information	 about	 the	 underlying	 economics	 of	 goodwill	 or	 to	
opportunistically	enhance	future	earnings	and	private	gains.	
Studies	 of	 how	 corporate	 acquisitions	 are	 accounted	 for	 are	 of	 great	 importance	
because	the	accounting	provides	information	about	a	significant	investment	entailing	a	
substantial	 reallocation	 of	 resources	 between	 and	 across	 firms,	 industries,	 and	
countries	 (Golubov,	 Petmezas	&	 Travlos,	 2013).	Well-executed	 corporate	 acquisitions	
can	 create	 substantial	 value	 for	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 since	 combined	business	 activities	
can	 create	 synergistic	 gains,	 such	 as	 increased	 operational	 efficiency.	 However,	 ill-
executed	 corporate	acquisitions	 can	be	among	 the	 costliest	mistakes	a	 firm	can	make	
(Betton,	Eckbo	&	Thorburn,	2009).	In	other	words,	the	acquiring	firm’s	accounting	for	
corporate	 acquisitions	 shapes	 the	 external	 parties’	 understanding	 of	 the	 underlying	
economics	of	an	acquisition.		
In	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 investigate	 whether	 the	 level	 of	 discretion	 affects	 goodwill	
accounting	 choices	and,	 thus,	 their	usefulness	 to	 investors.	 In	particular,	 I	 expect	 that	
goodwill	 accounting	 choices	 will	 provide	 a	 better	 representation	 of	 underlying	




in	 different	 settings	 through	 a	 collection	 of	 three	 papers.	 In	 particular,	 I	 explore	
whether	managers’	 incentives	 to	misuse	 the	 discretion	 by	 over-allocating	 to	 goodwill	
are	curbed	by	strong	controlling	owners.	Moreover,	by	comparing	the	impairment-only	
approach	 with	 more	 discretion	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach	 with	 less	 discretion,	 I	
explore	 whether	 the	 representational	 faithfulness	 of	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	
depends	on	the	level	of	discretion.	Finally,	I	explore	whether	accounting	choices	and	the	





The	 appropriate	 accounting	 method	 for	 corporate	 acquisitions	 has	 been	 a	
controversial	 topic	 for	 decades.	 Researchers	 and	 regulators	 have,	 in	 particular,	 been	
debating	 whether	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 capitalize	 the	 part	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 that	
exceeds	 the	 acquired	 book	 value	 of	 net	 assets	 (i.e.,	 the	 purchase	 premium)	 (Ding,	
Richard	 &	 Stolowy,	 2008).	 Traditionally,	 two	 methods	 were	 subject	 to	 debate:	 the	
purchase	 method4	and	 the	 pooling	 method.	 The	 main	 difference	 between	 them	 is	
whether	 the	purchase	premium	over	 the	book	 value	 of	 the	 acquired	 target	 firm’s	 net	
assets	is	recognized	on	the	balance	sheet	of	the	combined	entity.	The	purchase	method	
requires	that	any	purchase	premium	paid	with	cash	or	stock	should	be	allocated	to	the	
appropriate	 accounting	 items	 in	 the	 combined	 entity.	 Any	 unallocated	 unspecified	
residual	 of	 the	 purchase	 premium	 consisting	 of,	 for	 example	 future	 synergies,	 is	
normally	 recognized	 as	 goodwill.	 	 The	 pooling	method,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	mandated	
that	any	purchase	premium	paid	with	cash	or	stock	would	not	be	part	of	the	combined	
entity.	 When	 there	 is	 a	 cash	 payment,	 any	 excess	 payment	 is	 written	 off	 against	




the	 sum	of	 the	acquired	assets	 and	 liabilities,	 the	acquisition	method	views	 the	 target	 firm	as	a	whole.	
This	means,	for	example,	that	the	acquiring	firm	must	disclose	any	identified	contingencies	(e.g.,	lawsuits)	
in	 the	 target	 firm	at	 the	acquisition	date.	However,	 the	 impairment-only	approach	 is	applicable	 to	both	
methods,	 and	 acquired	 non-separable	 intangibles	 assets	with	 superior	 earnings,	 such	 as	 synergies,	 are	
recognized	 as	 goodwill.	 Because	 of	 the	 insignificance	 of	 the	 differences	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	






Although	 the	 choice	 of	 method,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 did	 not	 have	 any	 impact	 on	 the	
acquiring	 firm’s	 cash	 flows,	 it	 usually	 affected	 its	 current	 and	 future	 accounting	
earnings.5	An	 important	debate	on	 the	use	of	 the	appropriate	method	 for	acquisitions	













its	 own	 stock.	 Otherwise,	 the	 firm	 had	 to	 apply	 the	 purchase	 method.	 Despite	 these	
requirements,	the	opportunity	acquiring	firms	had	to	apply	either	the	pooling	method	
or	the	purchase	method	was	heavily	criticized.	In	the	U.S.,	the	Securities	and	Exchange	
Commission	 (SEC)	 expressed	 concerns	 about	opportunistic	 acquiring	 firms’	misuse	of	
the	 pooling	 method	 to	 inflate	 future	 accounting	 earnings	 (Ramanna,	 2015).	 In	 fact,	
mounting	 evidence	 suggested	 that	 acquiring	 firms,	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 “drag”	 on	
future	 earnings,	 deliberately	 destroyed	 shareholder	 value	 by	 implementing	 costly	
measures	 to	qualify	 the	acquisition	 for	 the	pooling	method	(e.g.,	Lys	&	Vincent,	1995;	
Ayers,	Lefanowicz	&	Robinson,	2002).6		
																																																								
5	The	 purchase	 method	 will	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 future	 earnings	 if	 all	 accounting	 items	 are	 amortized	
subsequent	 to	 the	 acquisition,	 or	 impaired.	However,	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 enables	 acquiring	
firms	to	delay	or	avoid	impairing	goodwill,	resulting	in	inflated	earnings.	
6	For	example,	AT&T	paid	an	additional	USD	325	million	of	 their	stock	 just	 to	qualify	 the	acquisition	of	
NCR	for	the	pooling	method	(e.g.,	Walter,	1999).	
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To	 address	 the	 concerns	 voiced	 by	 the	 SEC	 and	 other	 critics,	 the	 FASB,	 together	
with	the	 international	group	of	standard	setters	G4+1,	 initiated	a	process	of	exploring	
alternatives	 to	 the	 pooling	 method.	 The	 initial	 proposal	 was	 intended	 to	 address	
acquiring	firms’	misuse	of	the	pooling	option	by	only	permitting	the	purchase	method	
based	 on	 the	 historical-cost	 regime	 of	 yearly	 goodwill	 amortizations	 (FASB,	 1999).	
Hence,	goodwill	was	to	be	considered	an	asset	with	a	definite	economic	life	that	needs	
to	be	written-off	within	a	preset	period.	However,	 the	proposal	 to	abolish	 the	pooling	
method	attracted	much	criticism	from	prominent	business	 leaders,	who	argued	 in	 the	
U.S.	 Congress	 that	 the	 system	 offering	 a	 choice	 between	 the	 pooling	method	 and	 the	
purchase	method	had	ensured	“competitive	U.S.	capital	markets”	(Ramanna,	2015).	 In	
response	 to	 the	 criticism	 and	 pressure	 from	 the	 U.S.	 Congress,	 the	 FASB	 proposed	 a	
revised	 version	 of	 the	 purchase	method	 based	 solely	 on	 yearly	 goodwill-impairment	
tests.	 This	 won	 the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 pro-pooling	 firms	 (Ramanna,	 2008).	 In	 other	
words,	 Ramanna	 (2008)	 argues	 that	 the	 lobbying	 by	 pro-pooling	 groups	 resulted	 in	
standard	 setters	 changing	 their	 view	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 goodwill	 from	 an	 asset	 with	 a	




by	 the	 pooling	 method	 of	 reducing	 the	 ’drag’	 on	 future	 earnings	 (Ramanna,	 2015).	
Academics	and	practitioners	argue	that	the	impairment-only	approach	is	inappropriate	
in	 relation	 to	 resolving	 the	 consequences	 of	managers’	misuse	 of	 the	pooling	method	
due	to	the	nature	of	goodwill	(e.g.,	Ramanna,	2008;	Hlousek,	2002).	Because	there	are	
no	active	markets	to	verify	goodwill,	acquiring	firms	are	able	to	misuse	the	impairment	
test,	as	 they	did	with	the	pooling	method,	as	a	measure	to	reduce	the	 ’drag’	on	 future	
earnings	and	enhance	private	gains.8	Managers	with	earnings-based	compensation,	for	
example,	 misused	 the	 pooling	 option	 over	 the	 purchase	 option	 with	 yearly	
amortizations	in	order	to	enhance	their	bonuses	through	inflated	earnings	(e.g.,	Aboody,	
																																																								









under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 by	 over-allocating	 the	 purchase	 premium	 to	
goodwill.		
Thus,	by	over-allocating	the	purchase	price	to	goodwill	under	the	impairment-only	
approach,	 acquiring	 firms	 are	 able	 to	 continue	 (i)	 obscuring	 information	 about	 ill-




In	 essence,	 the	 main	 argument	 against	 allowing	 more	 discretion	 to	 goodwill	
accounting	 is	 that	 the	 accounting	 choices	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 depend	 on	 the	managers’	
willingness	 to	 correctly	 report	 underlying	 economic	 values.	 Because	 goodwill	 is	 not	
verifiable,	 it	 could	 potentially	 contain	 a	 number	 of	 components	 that	 do	 not	meet	 the	
criteria	 of	 an	 asset,	 or	 that	 should	 be	 part	 of	 another	 asset	 class.	 Johnson	&	 Petrone	
(1998)	 discuss	 the	 potential	 composition	 of	 goodwill	 by	 analyzing	 the	 purchase	
premium.	 According	 to	 them,	 the	 purchase	 premium	 can	 consist	 of	 the	 following	
components:	(1)	the	fair-value	revaluation	of	the	acquired	assets	of	the	target	firm;	(2)	
the	 fair	 value	 of	 identified	 assets	 not	 recognized	 by	 the	 target	 firm	 prior	 to	 the	
acquisition;	 (3)	 the	 fair	 value	 of	 the	 “going	 concern	 element”	 that	 comes	 from	 the	
synergies	of	combining	the	target	firm’s	assets	prior	to	the	acquisition,	which	could	be	
internally	 generated	 or	 acquired	 previously	 by	 the	 target	 firm;	 (4)	 the	 synergies	 that	
come	 from	combining	 the	acquiring	 firm’s	and	 the	 target	 firm’s	assets	and	businesses	
that	would	not	be	possible	 if	 the	 firms	were	stand-alone	entities;	 (5)	overvaluation	of	
the	 consideration	 paid,	 such	 as	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 own	 stock	 in	 an	 all-stock	
transaction;	and	(6)	overpayment	for	the	target	firm.	
Johnson	 &	 Petrone	 (1998)	 argue	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 abovementioned	
components	of	the	purchase	premium	in	goodwill	depends	on	two	general	perspectives.	
Under	 the	 top-down	 perspective,	 the	 whole	 purchase	 premium	 paid	 should	 be	
capitalized	 if	 the	corporate	acquisition	 in	 itself	qualifies	as	an	asset,	and,	 then,	broken	





evaluated.	 According	 to	 Johnson	 &	 Petrone	 (1998),	 under	 the	 latter	 perspective,	
goodwill	 should	 only	 consist	 of	 the	 “going-concern	 element”	 of	 the	 target	 firm	 and	
acquired	 synergies,	which	are	 the	only	 two	components	 that	qualify	 as	 assets.	This	 is	
because	these	two	components	are	not	part	of	any	other	assets	other	than	representing	
the	additional	 earnings	 from	combining	assets.	 In	particular,	 components	1	and	2	are	
either	 part	 of	 other	 assets	 or	 qualify	 as	 stand-alone	 assets,	 component	 5	 is	 a	
measurement	error,	 and	component	6	 represents	a	 loss.	Thus,	 “core”	goodwill	 should	
only	 comprise	 component	 3	 (i.e.,	 going-concern	 goodwill)	 and	 component	 4	 (i.e.,	 the	
combination	goodwill).	
While	prior	 standards	 for	goodwill	accounting	have	 to	a	 larger	extent	applied	 the	
top-down	 perspective	 (Johnson	 &	 Petrone,	 1998),	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
impairment-only	 approach	 introduced	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 bottom-up	 perspective	 of	
evaluating	the	acquired	components.	According	to	existing	international	standards	(i.e.,	
IFRS	 3	 and	 SFAS	 141),	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 is	 mandated	 through	 a	 set	 of	 detailed	
regulations	 to	 revalue	acquired	assets	and	 identify	any	new	assets	before	 recognizing	
goodwill.	 In	contrast	 to	 Johnson	&	Petrone	(1996),	however,	current	standards	define	
goodwill	as	an	asset	that	contains	future	economic	benefits	from	intangible	assets	that	
are	not	individually	identifiable,	which	would	include	more	components	than	acquired	






under	 the	 impairment-only	approach	would	enhance	goodwill’s	 reflection	of	acquired	
synergies	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 amortization	
approach	 permitted	 goodwill	 to	 represent	 the	 purchase	 premium	 to	 a	 larger	 extent,	
with	 little	or	no	evaluation	of	 the	acquired	components.	However,	goodwill	under	 the	
impairment-only	 approach	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 inflated	 by	 components	 that	 do	 not	
qualify	as	“core”	goodwill	compared	to	goodwill	under	the	amortization	approach.	This	
is	because,	under	 the	 impairment-only	approach,	 it	 is	only	possible	 to	enhance	 future	
																																																								
9	It	should	be	noted	that	non-separable	 intangible	assets	such	as	employees’	know-how	are	 likely	 to	be	
included	in	goodwill	under	prior	and	current	accounting	regimes.	
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earnings	 by	 over-allocating	 more	 components	 of	 the	 purchase	 premium	 to	 goodwill,	
which	 was	 not	 possible	 when	 goodwill	 was	 amortized	 over	 a	 preset	 period.	 The	
possibility	 of	 managing	 goodwill’s	 effect	 on	 earnings	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	means	 it	 is	 also	more	 lucrative	 for	managers	 to	overpay	 for	 the	 target	 firm	
(Bartov	 et	 al.,	 2018),	 suggesting	 that	 goodwill	 would	 contain	 a	 larger	 component	 of	
overpayment.	 In	 other	 words,	 goodwill’s	 representation	 of	 underlying	 economics	
relative	to	the	amortization	approach	depends	to	a	 large	extent	on	whether	managers	
use	 the	 discretion	 offered	 by	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 fairly,	 or	 misuse	 it	 to	





In	2001,	 the	FASB	was	 the	 first	 standard	setter	 to	 introduce	 the	 impairment-only	
approach.	In	2004,	the	IASB	followed	suit	by	requiring	at	least	yearly	impairment	tests	
for	goodwill	under	 IFRS.	 In	2005,	 the	EU	enacted	 the	new	standards	 for	all	European	
publicly	 listed	 firms.	 Despite	 the	 standard	 setters’	 implementation	 of	 detailed	
requirements	 for	 recognizing	 acquired	 intangible	 assets,	 goodwill	 balances	 have	
increased	significantly	as	a	result	of	the	adoption	of	the	impairment-only	approach	(e.g.,	
Li	&	 Sloan,	 2017),	 to	 become	 the	 largest	 single	 asset-item.	Wen	&	Burger	 (2015),	 for	
instance,	 report	 that	 about	 15%	 of	 U.S.	 firms’	 balance	 sheets	 constituted	 goodwill	
during	 the	 period	 2005–2013.	 Hamberg	 &	 Beisland	 (2014)	 report	 that	 goodwill	
balances	 relative	 to	 total	 assets	 increased	 from	8.2%	 to	 15.1%	 in	 Sweden	 during	 the	
period	2001–2010.	 For	Australian	 firms,	 Chalmers,	 Godfrey	&	Webster	 (2011)	 report	
similar	increases	in	the	proportion	of	goodwill	balances	(from	12.4%	of	total	assets	to	
19.6%),	and	decreases	in	goodwill	charges	(from	3.1%	to	1.3%).		
These	 findings	 either	 suggest	 that	 the	 opportunities	 to	 acquiring	 synergies	 have	
significantly	improved	over	time	or	that	goodwill	balances	were	heavily	affected	by	the	
implementation	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	 The	 latter	 explanation	 does	 not	
necessarily	 suggest,	 as	 critics	 argue,	 that	 the	 acquiring	 firms	 misuse	 the	 discretion	
offered	by	the	 impairment-only	approach	to	enhance	earnings	or	obscure	 information	
about	ill-executed	acquisitions.	It	could	also	be	the	case	that	the	previous	amortization	
approach	 suppressed	 goodwill	 balances	 through	 economically	 incorrect	 yearly	
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amortizations.	 In	order	 to	determine	which	of	 the	 two	explanations	 for	 the	 increased	
goodwill	balances	 is	more	 likely,	 I	 review	the	 literature	sequentially,	starting	with	the	
motives	driving	acquisitions.	Because	the	success	of	a	corporate	acquisition	in	the	form	
of	synergies	should	be	directly	related	to	the	valuation	of	initially	recognized	goodwill,	
it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 acquiring	 firms’	 initial	 motives	 for	 engaging	 in	
acquisitions.	 Then,	 I	 explore	 how	 these	 or	 other	 motives	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 goodwill	
accounting	choices.	 I	provide	a	short	 introduction	 to	each	part	of	goodwill	accounting	
and	 review	 how	 different	 motives	 affect	 accounting	 for	 goodwill	 at	 (i)	 the	 initial	
recognition	of	goodwill,	and	(ii)	the	subsequent	impairment	tests	of	goodwill.	Finally,	I	







synergy,	 hubris,	 and	 agency	 (Berkovitch	 &	 Narayanan,	 1993).	 The	 synergy	 theory	
contends	 that	 corporate	 acquisitions	 occur	 because	 the	 combination	 of	 firms	 yields	
higher	economic	value	than	the	sum	of	their	stand-alone	values	(e.g.,	Jensen	&	Ruback,	
1983;	Bradley,	Desai	&	Kim,	1988).	Synergy	can	come	from	(i)	operational	and	financial	
efficiencies	 (for	 example,	 by	 sharing	 overhead	 costs,	 attaining	 higher	 growth	 than	
stand-alone	 entities	would	 attain	 by	 themselves,	 and	 optimization	 of	 the	 distribution	
network),	(ii)	advantages	such	as	tax	efficiency,	and	(iii)	increased	market	power	(Seth,	
1990a,	1990b).	The	hubris	theory	contends	that	acquisitions	occur	with	the	intention	of	
creating	 synergy	 by	 combining	 two	 entities,	 but	 that	managers	mistakenly	 engage	 in	
acquisitions	with	no	or	limited	synergy	potential	(Roll,	1986).	The	agency	theory,	on	the	
other	hand,	 contends	 that	acquisitions	occur	because	 they	enhance	managers’	private	








managers	misuse	 the	discretion	offered	by	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 to	 enhance	
their	private	power	and	welfare	(i.e.,	agency	motives).	In	line	with	the	synergy	theory,	
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 studies	 have	 explored	 whether	 goodwill	 accounting	 reflects	 the	
managers’	 private	 information	 about	 estimated	 acquired	 synergies	 (i.e.,	 information	
motives).	 To	 my	 knowledge,	 no	 studies	 have	 explored	 goodwill	 accounting	 choices	
based	directly	on	the	hubris	theory.		
A	 significant	 body	 of	 research	 has	 investigated	 the	 synergy	 theory	 by	 exploring	






building”	 activities	 to	 enhance	 their	 power	 and	 prestige	 (Golubov	 et	 al.,	 2013).	
Managers	with	an	outstanding	track	record	tend	to	attribute	prior	success	in	M&As	to	
themselves,	 which	 consequently	 leads	 to	 overconfidence	 and	 poorer	 future	 deals	




find	 to	 be	 associated	with	 inflated	 goodwill	 balances.	 In	 sum,	 the	 literature	 does	 not	
provide	 substantial	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 the	 synergy	 motive	 is	 the	 main	 driver	
behind	the	documented	 increase	 in	goodwill	balances.	 In	other	words,	 there	are	more	
plausible	 explanations	 for	 the	 documented	 increased	 goodwill	 balances	 than	 just	
improved	 synergies.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 have,	 intentionally	 or	










manager	 to	 identify	 and	 re-measure	 the	 fair	 value	 of	 the	 assets	 and	 liabilities	 of	 the	
target	 firm,	 including	 contingent	 liabilities	 and	 internally	 generated	 intangible	 assets.	





can	 be	 misused,	 both	 SFAS	 141	 and	 IFRS	 3	 require	 far-reaching	 assessments	 to	
determine	whether	new	assets	have	been	acquired	as	well	as	in-depth	disclosures	about	
the	purchase	price	allocation	(PPA)	decision.	
Shalev	 (2009)	 was	 among	 the	 first	 to	 explore	 PPA	 disclosures	 under	 the	
impairment-only	 approach.	 Using	 U.S.	 data,	 he	 finds	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 withhold	











Vincent	 &	 Lys	 (2017)	 use	 stock	 market	 reactions	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firms	 with	 a	 long	
window	 around	 the	 announcement	 date	 for	 2,123	 completed	 acquisitions	 in	 order	 to	
																																																								
10	IFRS	10	stipulates	a	number	of	situations	when	the	acquiring	firm	is	 in	 full	control	of	 the	 target	 firm	
even	when	 the	 acquired	ownership	does	not	 exceed	50%,	making	 the	 acquiring	manager	mandated	 to	
apply	the	purchase	method.	
11	An	abnormal	proportion	of	 the	purchase	price	allocated	 to	goodwill	 is	measured	as	 the	residual	 (i.e.,	




document	 that	 1,252	 of	 the	 completed	 acquisitions	 indicate	 an	 “economic	 profit”	 and	
that	871	 indicate	 an	 “economic	 loss”.	Based	on	 this	 classification,	 they	 find	 that	 firms	
making	“economic	losses”	on	their	acquisitions	strategically	allocate	a	larger	proportion	
of	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill,	 suggesting	 that	 overpayments,	 based	 on	 agency	
motives,	are	allocated	to	goodwill.	However,	the	acquisitions	that	indicate	an	“economic	
profit”	are	positively	related	to	future	firm	performance,	suggesting	that	the	discretion	
offered	 by	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 is	 used,	 based	 on	 information	 motives,	 to	
enhance	the	usefulness	of	the	information	for	investors.		
Other	 studies	 have	 explored	 whether	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 impairment-only	
approach,	based	on	agency	motives,	 is	misused	when	 it	 is	potentially	beneficial	 to	 the	
CEO.	Shalev	et	al.	(2013)	conjecture	that	acquiring	firms	are	more	likely	to	over-allocate	
the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill	 if	 the	manager	 is	 likely	 to	 benefit	 privately	 from	 this.	
Using	a	sample	of	320	completed	acquisitions	in	the	U.S.,	they	find	that	acquiring	firms	
governed	by	managers	with	a	bonus	package	based	on	earnings	are	more	likely	to	over-
allocate	 the	purchase	price	 to	goodwill.	Detzen	&	Zülch	 (2012)	 replicate	 the	 study	by	
Shalev	et	al.	(2013)	in	a	European	setting.	Using	a	sample	of	123	completed	acquisitions	
by	 the	 firms	 in	 the	 Stoxx	 Europe	 600	 in	 2005–2008,	 they	 find	 that	 earnings-based	
bonuses	have	a	positive	impact	on	goodwill	recognition.	Because	goodwill	is	no	longer	
amortized,	 managers	 are	 able	 to	 enhance	 their	 earnings-based	 bonuses	 by	 over-
allocating	to	goodwill	and	then	avoiding	recognizing	any	impairment.		
Zhang	 &	 Zhang	 (2017)	 further	 investigate	 whether	 agency	 motives	 for	 over-
allocating	to	goodwill	when	bonuses	are	based	on	earnings	are	only	prevalent	under	the	
impairment-only	 approach.	 For	 the	 conjecture	 by	 Shalev	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 to	 hold,	 there	
should	 be	 no	 association	 between	 the	 allocation	 to	 goodwill	 and	 earnings-based	
bonuses	under	the	amortization	approach.	This	is	because	the	managers	were	not	able	
to	 use	 allocation	 to	 goodwill	 as	 a	 means	 of	 increasing	 post-acquisition	 earnings	 and	
bonuses	 due	 to	 mandatory	 yearly	 amortizations.	 Zhang	 &	 Zhang	 (2017)	 find	 that	
managerial	 earnings-based	 incentives	 are	 only	 related	 to	 excess	 allocation	 of	 the	
payment	to	goodwill	under	the	impairment-only	approach.	Thus,	their	finding	suggests	
that	 the	 increased	 goodwill	 balances	 are	 a	 result	 of	 agency	 motives	 and	 unfair	
application	of	 the	 impairment-only	approach.	Bugeja	&	Loyeung	 (2015)	also	 find	 that	
Australian	 firms	 increase	 their	 allocation	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill	 from	 the	
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shift	 from	 the	 amortization	 approach	 to	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 in	 IFRS.	 This	
increase	is	attributed	to	earnings-based	bonuses.	Moreover,	they	find	that	allocation	to	
goodwill	 is	 in	general	unrelated	 to	 the	underlying	economics	of	 the	 target	 firm.	Thus,	





However,	 when	 the	 managers’	 compensation	 is	 based	 on	 accounting	 earnings,	 the	













the	 guidance	 of	 the	 accounting	 standards.	 The	 procedure	 under	 U.S.	 GAAP	 and	 IFRS	
starts	from	different	levels	of	the	firm	when	determining	whether	goodwill	is	impaired,	
which	 could	 potentially	 lead	 to	 opposite	 impairment	 decisions	 concerning	 the	 exact	
same	event.	According	 to	SFAS	142,	 the	goodwill-impairment	procedure	contains	 two	
steps.12	Step	 one	 is	 a	 quantitative	 assessment	 that	 tests	 whether	 goodwill	 may	 be	
impaired	by	comparing	 the	net	 fair	value	of	 the	reporting	unit	 to	which	goodwill	was	
initially	 allocated	 with	 its	 carrying	 amount	 (i.e.,	 the	 book	 value	 of	 all	 assets).	 If	 the	
carrying	amount	exceeds	the	net	fair	value	(in	step	one),	the	firm	must,	as	a	second	step,	
																																																								
12 To reduce the level of complexity when testing goodwill for impairment, as of 2017, the FASB no longer 





exceeds	 the	 implied	 fair	 value	 of	 goodwill.	 The	 second	 step,	 when	 calculating	 the	
implied	 fair	 value	 of	 goodwill,	 resembles	 the	 purchase	 price	 allocation	 when	
determining	the	fair	value	of	 initially	recognized	goodwill.	According	to	IAS	36,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 the	 goodwill-impairment	 procedure	 contains	 only	 one	 step:	 goodwill	 is	
impaired	 if	 the	 carrying	amount	of	 the	 cash-generating	unit	 (CGU),	 to	which	goodwill	
was	allocated,	exceeds	its	recoverable	amount	(i.e.,	the	higher	of	fair	value	minus	costs	
to	sell	or	 its	value	 in	use).	Hence,	 the	single	step	of	 IAS	36	 is	quite	similar	 to	 the	 first	
step	of	SFAS	142.		
The	problem	with	the	first	step	under	U.S.	GAAP	and	the	single	step	under	IFRS	is	
that	 the	 evaluation	 of	 goodwill	 is	 based	 on	 fair-value	 estimates	 of	 several	 assets,	
liabilities,	and	units,	which	are	unlikely	to	be	comparable,	and	may	not	reflect	the	value	
of	goodwill	(Ramanna,	2015).	If,	for	instance,	other	assets	appreciate	in	value,	goodwill	
is	 not	 going	 to	 be	 impaired	 even	 if	 it	 is	 economically	 impaired.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	
other	assets	 sharply	depreciate	 in	value,	 the	 impairment	decision	may	differ	between	
U.S.	 GAAP	 and	 IFRS.	While	 IFRS	would	mandate	 the	 firm	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 (even	 if	
goodwill	 is	 not	 economically	 impaired),	 U.S.	 GAAP	mandates	 further	 investigation	 to	
evaluate	 whether	 goodwill	 is	 impaired.	 Thus,	 goodwill	 is	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 impaired	
based	on	 the	 fair	value	of	other	assets	under	U.S.	GAAP,	but	 the	second	step	provides	
discretion	 to	 not	 impair	 goodwill	 even	when	 all	 indicators	 at	 the	 reporting-unit	 level	
suggest	otherwise.	 In	other	words,	 the	 impairment	procedure	under	SFAS	142	can	be	
used	to	avoid	impairing	goodwill,	while	the	impairment	procedure	under	IAS	36	is	less	
precise	and	more	 likely	 to	 incorrectly	 impair	goodwill.	However,	because	most	assets	
normally	appreciate	 in	value,	 it	 is	more	likely	that	a	“cushion”	prevents	goodwill	 from	
being	timely	impaired	under	both	standards.		
A	large	body	of	research	has	investigated	the	motives	driving	impairment	and	non-
impairment	 decisions.	 In	 particular,	 these	 studies	 explore	 whether	 the	 impairment	
decision	 is	 motivated	 by	 the	 underlying	 economic	 value	 of	 goodwill	 or	 whether	 it	
reflects	other	motives.	Beatty	&	Weber	(2006)	use	the	adoption	year	of	the	impairment-
only	 approach	 in	 the	 U.S.	 to	 explore	 firms’	 motives	 when	 accounting	 for	 impaired	
goodwill.	 At	 that	 time,	 firms	were	 only	 permitted	 to	 either	 (i)	 recognize	 impairment	
losses	due	to	the	adoption	of	SFAS	142	through	the	income	statement	as	a	special	item,	
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or	 (ii)	 keep	 goodwill	 unimpaired	 in	 the	 balance	 sheet	 and,	 after	 the	 adoption	 year,	
recognize	any	impairments	through	the	 income	statement	as	an	operating	expense.	 In	
other	words,	it	was	possible	to	either	accelerate	impairments	through	a	below-the-line	
treatment,	 or	 postpone	 any	 impairment	 and	 risk	 future	write-offs	 through	 an	 above-
the-line	treatment	and	a	direct	impact	on	earnings.	Beatty	&	Weber	(2006)	identify	176	
firms	 that	 are	 likely	 to	write-off	 goodwill	 based	 on	when	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
market	and	the	book	value	of	equity	is	smaller	than	recorded	goodwill,	which	would	be	








Ramanna	 &	Watts	 (2012)	 identify	 124	 U.S.	 firms	with	 a	 high	 likelihood	 of	 impairing	
goodwill,	 measured	 as	 a	 book-to-market	 ratio	 of	 equity	 greater	 than	 1	 in	 two	
consecutive	 years	 during	 the	 period	 2003–2006.	 They	 find	 that	 these	 firms’	 goodwill	
impairments	are	driven	by	agency	rather	than	information	motives.	In	particular,	they	
find	 that	 firms	with	more	accounting-based	bonuses	and	 longer	CEO	 tenure	are	more	
likely	 to	 misuse	 the	 discretion	 by	 not	 impairing	 goodwill.	 AbuGhazaleh,	 Al-Hares	 &	
Roberts	(2011)	explore	528	UK	firms	with	goodwill	balances	during	the	first	two	years	
with	IFRS	(2005–2006),	of	which	there	were	109	firm-years	of	impairment	of	goodwill.	
Although	 agency	motives	 seem	 to	 drive	 the	 impairment	 decisions,	 they	 also	 find	 that	
goodwill	impairments	are	reasonable	given	the	firms’	economic	reality	(AbuGhazaleh	et	
al.,	 2011).	Hamberg,	Paananen	&	Novak,	 (2011)	explore	 the	determinants	of	 goodwill	
impairments	during	the	period	2001–2007	using	a	sample	of	180	listed	Swedish	firms	
with	 goodwill	 on	 their	 balance	 sheet	 upon	 the	 adoption	 of	 IFRS	 3,	 of	which	 43	 firms	
made	goodwill	impairments.	They	only	find	weak	evidence	that	agency	motives,	such	as	
entrenchment	 concerns,	 affect	 the	 goodwill-impairment	 decisions.	 In	 particular,	 they	
find	that	CEOs	with	long	tenure	are	less	likely	to	recognize	goodwill	impairments.		
Van	 de	 Poel,	 Maijoor	 &	 Vanstraelen	 (2009)	 use	 publicly	 listed	 firms	 from	 15	
Western	 European	 countries	 to	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 auditors	 and	 agency	 motivated	
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earnings	 management,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 legal	 environment,	 in	 accounting	 for	 goodwill	
under	IFRS.	They	find	that	the	likelihood	of	impairing	goodwill	increases	with	earnings	




in	 countries	 with	 weaker	 legal	 systems	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 relative	 to	
firms	domiciled	in	countries	with	a	stronger	legal	system.	Thus,	the	agency	motive	for	
misusing	 goodwill	 accounting	under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 is	 reduced	by	 the	
existence	of	a	higher	quality	governance	mechanism.		
However,	the	manager’s	decision	to	impair	goodwill	may	not	necessarily	be	a	fully	
rational	 action	 based	 on	 the	 agency	 motive	 of	 enhancing	 private	 welfare.	 Brochet	 &	
Welch	(2018)	 investigate	whether	 the	experience	gained	by	the	CEO	and	the	CFO	had	
any	 impact	 on	 the	 impairment	 decision	 in	 the	 U.S.	 during	 the	 period	 2002–2009.	 In	
particular,	 they	 categorize	 the	 managers’	 background	 based	 on	 experience	 of	 (1)	
corporate	 acquisitions,	 (2)	 investment	 banking,	 (3)	 management	 consulting,	 or	 (4)	
private	 equity	 and	 venture	 capital.	 Brochet	&	Welch	 (2018)	 document	 that	 CEOs	 and	
CFOs	with	prior	experience	of	corporate	acquisitions	are	more	likely	to	impair	goodwill,	
which	 is	 also	 more	 informative	 for	 investors.	 In	 another	 study,	 Shepardson	 (2013)	
builds	 on	 the	 conjecture	 that	 managerial	 decisions	 are	 influenced	 by	 imitation	 and	
learning	from	their	peers	(e.g.,	Chiu,	Teoh	&	Tian,	2012).	Using	a	sample	of	U.S.	firms	in	
the	 period	 2004–2009,	 she	 finds	 that	 firms	 are	more	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 if	 the	
members	of	the	audit	committee	are	interlocked	with	firms	that	have	recently	impaired	
goodwill,	and	this	pattern	is	more	pronounced	if	the	member	is	a	manager.	This	finding	
by	 Shepardson	 (2013)	 suggests	 that	 knowledge	 gained	 about	 goodwill	 impairment	
testing	from	the	interlocked	firm	is	transferred	to	the	focal	firm.	Overall,	these	findings	
suggest	 that	 the	 goodwill-impairment	 procedure	 requires	 experience	 and	 that	 the	
documented	increased	goodwill	balances	are	possibly	the	result	of	lack	of	experience	of	
corporate	acquisitions	and	of	relevant	accounting	practice.	 In	other	words,	 the	motive	
may	 be	 to	 provide	 accurate	 information,	 but	 the	manager	 lacks	 sufficient	 knowledge,	
which	could	to	some	extent	be	in	line	with	the	hubris	theory.		
Some	other	studies	have	explored	whether	the	deal	structure	of	the	acquisition	can	
explain	 future	 goodwill	 impairments.	 Based	 on	 Shleifer	 &	 Vishny’s	 (2003)	 conjecture	
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that	acquiring	firms,	when	possible,	prefer	paying	for	less	overvalued	target	firms	with	
overvalued	 stock,	 Gu	 &	 Lev	 (2011)	 explore	 whether	 impaired	 goodwill	 is	 related	 to	
overpriced	 targets.	 They	 use	 three	 proxies	 for	 overpriced	 target	 firms:	 (1)	 industry-
adjusted	 price-to-earnings,	 (2)	 the	 amount	 of	 discretionary	 accruals,	 and	 (3)	 the	
incidence	 of	 prior	 equity	 issues.	 Gu	 &	 Lev	 (2011)	 find	 that	 (i)	 the	 larger	 goodwill	
balances	under	the	impairment-only	approach	are	associated	with	stock	payments,	and	
(ii)	the	acquiring	firm	is	more	likely	to	impair	goodwill	from	the	overpriced	target	firms	
subsequent	 to	 the	completion	date.	For	example,	 the	ratio	of	goodwill	 impairments	 to	




In	 sum,	 research	 finds	 that	 a	 mix	 of	 motives	 and	 experience	 explains	 goodwill	
accounting	 choices	 from	 the	 initial	 recognition	 to	 the	 subsequent	 valuation	 in	 the	
impairment	 test.	 Critics	 claim	 that	 the	documented	 increased	goodwill	 balances	 are	 a	
result	of	inappropriate	use	of	discretion	under	the	impairment-only	approach.	Because	
the	 impairment	 testing	 is	 unverifiable,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 enhance	 earnings	 and	
accounting-based	 compensation	 by	 misusing	 goodwill	 accounting.	 Most	 studies	 that	
have	 explored	 whether	 agency	 motives	 affect	 the	 impairment	 decision	 find	 that	
managers	seem	to	avoid	timely	goodwill	impairments	when	their	bonuses	are	based	on	
earnings.	 This	 finding	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 conclusion	 by	 Shalev	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 that	
managers	 misuse	 the	 discretion	 offered	 by	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 to	 inflate	
goodwill	as	a	means	of	enhancing	future	earnings	and	bonuses.	While	managers	delay	
or	 avoid	 impairing	 goodwill	 for	 agency	 reasons,	 some	 studies	 find	 that	 a	 high-quality	
governance	mechanism,	such	as	Big4	auditors,	influences	managers	to	impair	goodwill	
in	a	timely	manner.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	these	conclusions	come	from	a	coarse	




The	 literature	 review	 also	 indicates	 that	 the	 impairment	 decision	 is	 not	 entirely	





associated	 with	 the	 impairment	 decision;	 impaired	 goodwill	 is	 more	 likely	 if	 the	
acquiring	 firm	 overpays	 for	 an	 acquisition.	 Hence,	 the	 main	 conclusion	 from	 the	
literature	is	that	managers	tend	to	misuse	the	impairment	decision	when	it	is	beneficial	
to	them,	but,	overall,	the	impairments	tend	to	be	driven	by	other	motives	and	can	reflect	





A	 key	 contention	 among	 standard	 setters	 is	 that	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	






about	 future	 performance	 has	 improved	 with	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	
approach.	Only	a	 few	studies	have	explored	goodwill’s	overall	ability	to	predict	 future	
performance	under	the	impairment-only	approach.		
Based	 on	 the	 standard	 setters’	 view,	 a	 few	 studies	 have	 investigated	 whether	
goodwill	is	able	to	predict	future	economic	performance	(e.g.,	SFAS	142,	p.7).	Yehuda	et	
al.	 (2017)	 find,	 for	 instance,	 that	 the	ability	of	 initially	 recognized	goodwill	 to	predict	
future	 performance	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 depends	 on	 whether	 the	
acquiring	 firm	overpaid	 for	 the	 target	 firm.	 In	 particular,	 they	 find	 that	 the	 acquiring	
firm’s	overpayment	for	the	target	firm	is	directly	linked	to	over-allocation	to	goodwill,	
which	 impairs	 goodwill’s	 ability	 to	 predict	 future	 economic	 performance.	 In	 contrast,	
when	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 engages	 in	 economically	 reasonable	 acquisitions,	 goodwill	 is	
able	 to	 predict	 future	 economic	 performance	 (Yehuda	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 In	 other	 words,	
goodwill	under	the	impairment-only	approach	can	provide	useful	information	as	well	as	
economically	insignificant	information.		
Jarva	 (2009)	 tests	 whether	 impaired	 goodwill	 is	 related	 to	 the	 firm’s	 future	
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economic	 performance,	 using	 a	 sample	 of	 327	 firm-years	 of	 impairments	 and	 9,960	
firm-years	of	non-impairments	in	the	U.S.	In	particular,	he	tests	the	association	between	
goodwill	 impairments	 and	 future	 operating	 cash	 flows,	 and	 finds	 an	 association	
between	 current	 goodwill	 impairments	 and	 lower	 future	 cash	 flows	 in	 t+1	 and	 t+2.	
Thus,	 Jarva’s	(2009)	findings	 indicate	that,	on	average,	managers	use	the	discretion	of	
the	 impairment-only	 approach	 to	 make	 financial	 statements	 more	 informative	 and	
relevant	 to	 investors.	However,	he	also	documents	 that	goodwill	 impairment	 tends	 to	
lag	the	economic	impairment.		
If	goodwill	under	the	impairment-only	approach	is	able	to	predict	future	economic	
performance,	 then	 the	 documented	 increased	 balances	 suggest	 that	 the	 amortization	
approach	 had	 economically	 suppressed	 goodwill.	 	 Lee	 (2011)	 investigates	 the	
relationship	 between	 aggregated	 goodwill	 balances	 and	 future	 cash	 flows	 for	 the	




that	are	more	 likely	 to	benefit	 from	managing	goodwill	based	on	either	high	 levels	of	
discretionary	accruals	or	whether	they	meet	or	beat	earnings	benchmarks.	He	finds	that	
the	association	between	goodwill	and	future	cash	flows	is	less	pronounced	when	firms	
are	more	 likely	 to	 benefit	 from	 inflated	 goodwill.	 In	 sum,	 the	 findings	 by	 Lee	 (2011)	
suggest	 that,	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 goodwill	 provides	 a	more	 faithful	
representation	of	the	underlying	economic	value	than	the	amortization	approach.		
Chalmers,	Clinch,	Godfrey	&	Wei	(2012)	explore	goodwill’s	ability	to	predict	future	
performance	 by	 analyzing	 the	 accuracy	 and	 dispersion	 of	 financial	 analysts’	 earnings	
forecasts	during	the	periods	when	the	amortization	approach	and	the	impairment-only	
approach	applied	in	Australia.	Using	a	sample	of	1,885	firm-years	with	426	unique	firms	
for	 the	 period	 1993–2007,	 they	 find	 a	 negative	 association	 between	 goodwill	 and	
forecast	 error	 and	 dispersion,	which	 is	more	 pronounced	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach.	According	to	Chalmers	et	al.	(2012),	this	finding	suggests	that	goodwill	under	
the	 impairment-only	 approach	 provides	 a	more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 underlying	
economics	(i.e.,	is	more	useful)	to	investors	relative	to	the	amortization	approach.		
Li,	 Shroff,	 Venkataraman	&	 Zhang	 (2011)	 explore	whether	 goodwill	 impairments	
provide	 more	 information	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	
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amortization	 approach.	 They	 use	 a	 sample	 of	 1,584	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 U.S.	
publicly	listed	firms	during	the	period	1996–2005.	They	find	that	for	the	whole	period,	
goodwill	impairments	reflect	managers’	inability	to	realize	expected	synergies.	That	is,	
recognized	 goodwill	 impairments	 are	 negatively	 associated	 with	 sales	 growth	 and	
operating	 income	 two	 years	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition.	 They	 conduct	
further	 tests	 and	 find	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 did	 not	
improve	the	ability	of	goodwill	impairments	to	predict	future	operating	performance.	Li	
&	 Sloan	 (2017)	 explore	 goodwill’s	 ability	 to	 predict	 return	 on	 assets	 (ROA),	 using	 an	
indicator	 variable	 for	 the	 period	 with	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	 They	 find,	 in	
contrast	to	Li	et	al.	(2011),	that	the	predictive	value	of	goodwill	impairments	under	the	
impairment-only	 approach	 is	 not	 significantly	 different	 from	 under	 the	 amortization	
approach.		
In	sum,	the	increased	goodwill	balances	could	be	a	result	of	the	abolishment	of	the	
amortization	 approach,	 which	 has	 kept	 goodwill	 balances	 economically	 suppressed.	
However,	 studies	also	show	that	 the	ability	of	goodwill	 impairments	 to	predict	 future	
performance	did	not	 improve	after	the	 introduction	of	 the	 impairment-only	approach,	
which	 suggests	 that	 goodwill	 does	not	 provide	useful	 information	 to	 investors.	A	 few	
studies	 have	 explored	 whether	 investors	 value	 goodwill	 balances	 under	 the	
impairment-only	 approach,	 using	 a	 value	 relevance	 specification.	 Aharony,	 Barniv	 &	
Falk	 (2010)	 find	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 under	 IFRS	 in	
Europe	 increased	 the	 value	 relevance	 of	 goodwill	 balances.	 In	 particular,	 their	 study	
shows	that	the	value	relevance	of	goodwill	balances	increased	most	in	countries	where	
the	 local	GAAP	was	 significantly	different	 from	 IFRS,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 impairment-
only	 approach	 improved	 the	 usefulness	 to	 investors.	 However,	 the	 results	 should	 be	
interpreted	with	care	because	most	local	GAAPs	in	Europe	permitted	firms	to	write-off	
goodwill	immediately	against	the	reserves,	making	any	inferences	about	the	difference	









In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 discuss	 how	 my	 three	 papers	 can	 add	 to	 the	 literature.	 In	
particular,	I	will	 identify	and	discuss	gaps	in	the	literature	and	describe	how	my	three	
papers	 can	 use	 new	 settings	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 goodwill	 accounting	




The	 literature	 has	 mainly	 focused	 on	 investigating	 the	 subsequent	 valuation	 of	
goodwill	 (i.e.,	 the	 impairment	 test),	 and	 it	 has	only	quite	 sparsely	 explored	 the	 initial	
PPA	 decisions	 concerning	 recognizing	 goodwill.	 However,	 the	 decision	 to	 impair	
goodwill	is	likely	to	be	endogenously	related	to	the	initial	recognition	of	goodwill	(e.g.,	




literature	 review	 in	 Section	 2	 is	 that	 managerial	 incentives	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	
accounting	 for	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	 This	 is	 despite	 the	 far-
reaching	requirements	of	the	standard	setters	as	regards	allocating	the	purchase	price	
to	other	assets	and	liabilities	before	goodwill.	However,	the	findings	are	usually	drawn	
from	 studies	 based	 on	 the	 U.S.	 setting,	 where	 the	 manager	 typically	 has	 significant	
power	 relative	 to	 the	 owners.	 Although	 strong	 family	 owners	 typically	 control	 most	
firms	 around	 the	 world	 (e.g.,	 Faccio	 &	 Lang,	 2002),	 the	 literature	 is	 quite	 sparse	 on	
goodwill	 accounting	 choices	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 strong	 controlling	 owners.	 Since	




manager	 to	 provide	 information	 about	 the	 underlying	 economics	 or	 whether	 they	
would	misuse	the	discretion	under	the	impairment-only	approach	at	the	expense	of	the	
other	owners.	 	 For	 instance,	 large	 controlling	 shareholders	with	 limited	ownership	 in	
cash	flow	rights	(e.g.,	dual	class	shares)	may	expropriate	minority	owners	by	partaking	
in	 suboptimal	 corporate	 acquisitions	 (La	 Porta,	 Lopez-de-Silanes	 &	 Shleifer,	 1999;	
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Claessens,	Djankov	&	Lang,	2000;	Faccio	&	Lang,	2002;	Dyck	&	Zingales,	2004).	In	other	
words,	 the	 PPA	 decision	 may	 not	 necessarily	 reflect	 agency	 motives	 of	 enhancing	
managers’	 private	 gains,	 but	 rather	 large	 shareholders’	 motives	 for	 the	 corporate	
acquisitions.	
The	 first	 paper	 (entitled:	 The	 Purchase	 Price	 Allocation	 Decision)	 explores	 the	




a	 suitable	 setting	 to	 study	 the	 impact	 of	 ownership	 structures	 because	 it	 is	 the	 only	
country	 found	 to	hold	a	 top-three	position	 in	 the	 categories:	one-share-one	vote;	cross	
holdings;	and	pyramids	(La	Porta	et	al.,	1999).	Moreover,	Sweden	has	among	the	highest	
ownership	 concentrations	 and	 separation	 of	 control	 from	 cash-flow	ownership	 in	 the	
corporate	world	 (Faccio	&	 Lang,	 2002;	 Institutional	 Shareholder	 Services,	 2007).	 The	
Swedish	institutional	context	is	different	from	the	U.S.	context.	Swedish	firms	have	one-
tier	board	structures,	where	managers	can	hold	no	more	than	one	board	position.13	But	
while	 management	 cannot	 control	 board	 decisions,	 Swedish	 firms	 are	 renowned	 for	
having	 active	 controlling	 owners.	 Frank	 &	 Hamberg	 (2018)	 document	 that	 family	
ownership	 is	 widespread	 in	 Sweden,	 as	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 Europe	 (e.g.,	 Maury,	 2006;	
Barontini	 &	 Caprio,	 2006),	 and	 that	 Swedish	 publicly	 listed	 firms	 often	 have	 non-
founding	 family	 owners	 with	 a	 long-term	 perspective.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Swedish	
corporate	 environment	 is	 known	 to	 be	 transparent.	 Leuz,	 Nanda	 &	 Wysocki	 (2003)	
document	 that	 accounting	 numbers	 are	 in	 general	 of	 high	 quality.	 In	 a	 global	
comparison,	La	Porta	et	al.	(1999)	find	that	Swedish	firms	provide	informative	annual	





international	 companies,	 a	 historical	 growth	 strategy	 has	 been	 to	 acquire	 firms	





found	 Swedish	 firms	 to	 be	 among	 the	 more	 active	 acquirers,	 being	 one	 of	 the	 top	
acquirers	 in	 Europe	 (e.g.,	 Detzen	 &	 Zülch,	 2012).	 Furthermore,	 the	 hand-collected	
sample	 consists	 of	 both	 listed	 and	private	 target	 firms,	which	 adds	more	 information	
about	 the	 PPA	 process,	 since	 the	 typical	 target	 firm	 is	 not	 publicly	 listed.	Most	 other	
studies	 have	 focused	 on	 publicly	 listed	 targets,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 Yehuda	 et	 al.	
(2017).	Martin	&	Shalev	(2016),	for	instance,	find	that	acquisitions	of	target	firms	with	
higher	 quality	 information	 are	 related	 to	 a	 higher	 economic	 surplus	 for	 the	 acquirer.	
Thus,	goodwill	is	presumably	of	higher	quality	and	predicts	acquired	synergies	better	if	
the	target	firm	is	publicly	listed.	Hence,	Sweden	is	also	a	suitable	setting	for	testing	the	
impact	 of	 economic	 factors	 such	 as	 acquisition	 experience	 and	 activities	 on	 the	 PPA	
decision	with	regard	to	large	publicly	listed	firms	and	small	private	target	firms.		
A	second	takeaway	from	the	literature	review	in	section	2	is	that	it	is	not	yet	clear	
whether	 goodwill	 accounting	 improved	 the	 usefulness	 to	 investors	 after	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	
approach.	 There	 are	 only	 a	 few	 studies	 exploring	 the	 differences	 in	 accounting	 for	
goodwill	 between	 the	 impairment-only	 and	 the	 amortization	 approaches,	 and	 these	
have	mainly	 been	 conducted	 in	 a	 U.S.	 setting	 (e.g.,	 Lee,	 2011;	 Zhang	&	 Zhang,	 2017).	
However,	 these	 studies	 suffer	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 U.S.	 firms	 could	 opportunistically	
choose	 between	 the	 pooling	 method	 and	 the	 amortization	 approach,	 making	 any	
comparison	 between	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 and	 the	 amortization	 approach	
potentially	biased.		
The	 literature	 has	 documented	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 misused	 the	 pooling	 option	
over	 the	 amortization	 approach	 in	 the	 U.S.	 and	 most	 of	 Europe	 (e.g.,	 Lys	 &	 Vincent,	
1995;	Ayers	et	al.,	2002).	MacDonald	(1997),	for	instance,	estimates	that	roughly	90%	
of	all	U.S.	 corporate	acquisitions	above	USD	100	million	were	accounted	 for	using	 the	
pooling	 method.	 This	 suggests	 that	 not	 recognizing	 goodwill	 was	 an	 opportunistic	
means	 of	 inflating	 earnings	 prior	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 impairment-only	
approach.	 Under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 an	 opportunistic	
application	of	the	standard	to	inflate	earnings	would	be	to	inflate	goodwill	(e.g.,	Shalev	
et	 al.,	 2013).	 Thus,	 it	 is	 quite	 likely	 that	 managers	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	
amortization	 approach	 for	 non-opportunistic	 reasons,	 while	 goodwill	 under	 the	
impairment-only	approach	is	inflated	for	opportunistic	reasons.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	
studies	 comparing	 goodwill	 between	 the	 two	 approaches	 should,	 ceteris	 paribus,	
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The	 second	 paper	 (entitled:	 Did	 the	 Adoption	 of	 the	 Impairment-Only	 Approach	
Enhance	 the	 Representational	 Faithfulness	 of	 Initially	 Recognized	 Goodwill?)	
investigates	 whether	 the	 initial	 recognition	 of	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	
performance,	as	argued	by	standard	setters	 (e.g.,	FASB,	1999).	 I	 address	 the	potential	
problem	of	self-selection	bias	in	prior	studies	by	using	the	Swedish	setting.	Sweden	is	a	
suitable	setting	to	test	whether	initially	recognized	goodwill	under	the	impairment-only	
approach	 provides	 a	more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 economic	 performance	
relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 This	 is	 because,	 prior	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	
impairment-only	approach,	Swedish	firms	did	not	opportunistically	misuse	the	pooling	
option.	In	the	Swedish	setting,	acquiring	firms	were	only	permitted	under	local	GAAP	to	
use	 the	 pooling	method	 for	 mergers	 of	 equals.	 Among	 Swedish	 publicly	 listed	 firms,	
very	 few	used	 the	pooling	method,	 and	all	 of	 them	were	domiciled	outside	 Sweden.	 I	
note	that	only	six	acquisitions	were	accounted	for	using	the	pooling	method	during	the	
period	 2001–2004.	 Thus,	 a	 majority	 of	 all	 acquisitions	 by	 Swedish	 acquiring	 firms	
applied	the	purchase	method	with	yearly	amortizations	rather	than	the	pooling	method	
under	Swedish	GAAP.15	The	Swedish	setting	is	thereby	suitable	for	evaluating	goodwill	
accounting	 choices	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	
approach.	
A	third	takeaway	from	the	literature	review	in	Section	2	is	that	goodwill	write-offs	
have	 significantly	 decreased	with	 the	 adoption	of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 and	
that	the	underlying	economic	factors	are	not	as	important	as	managerial	and	firm-level	
																																																								
14	However,	 as	 discussed	 in	 section	 2,	 goodwill	 balances	 can	 be	 economically	 suppressed	 by	 yearly	
amortizations.	








factors.	Most	 of	 the	 studies	 find	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	managers	 opportunistically	
delay	 the	 impairment	 of	 goodwill,	 suggesting	 that	 goodwill	 accounting	 under	 the	
impairment-only	 approach	 does	 not	 provide	 useful	 information	 for	 investors.	 In	
contrast,	Jarva	(2009)	argues	that	the	lag	between	goodwill	impairment	and	economic	
impairment	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	managerial	 opportunism.	 Other	 studies	 also	 find	
that,	 as	 opposed	 to	 managerial	 opportunism,	 the	 lack	 of	 experience	 of	 corporate	
acquisitions	 and	 accounting	 for	 goodwill	 could	 explain	 the	 lag	 (e.g.,	 Brochet	&	Welch	
2018;	Shepardson,	2011).		
However,	a	potential	explanation	for	the	lag	between	the	goodwill	impairment	and	
the	 economic	 impairment	 could	 be	 that	 a	 fair	 application	 of	 SFAS	 142	 delays	 the	
impairment-test	 of	 goodwill	 during	 periods	 of	 economic	 growth.	 This	 is	 possible	
because	the	impairment	test	under	SFAS	142	require	managers	to	only	test	goodwill	for	
impairment	 if	 the	reporting	unit	 to	which	goodwill	was	 initially	allocated	 is	 impaired.	
Thus,	 when	 other	 assets	 than	 goodwill	 of	 the	 reporting	 unit	 appreciate	 in	 value,	
goodwill	is	less	likely	to	be	tested	for	impairment.	In	other	words,	goodwill	accounting	
in	 the	 period	 subsequent	 to	 the	 initial	 recognition	 may	 only	 be	 useful	 for	 investors	
during	periods	of	diminishing	macroeconomic	outlook.	Another	argument	why	goodwill	
impairments	 may	 be	 more	 useful	 to	 investors	 in	 periods	 of	 diminishing	 growth	
opportunities	is	that	investors	are	more	inclined	to	scrutinize	the	firm,	which	makes	the	
manager	more	likely	to	report	underlying	economics	(Povel,	Singh	&	Winton,	2007).		
The	 third	 paper	 (entitled:	Does	 the	Usefulness	 of	 Fair-Value	Goodwill	 Accounting	
Depend	 on	 Industry-Specific	 Growth	 Opportunities?)	makes	 use	 of	 the	 U.S.	 setting	 to	
explore	 whether	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 firms	 with	 diminishing	 industry-specific	
growth	 opportunities	 provide	 more	 useful	 information	 to	 investors	 relative	 to	 firms	
with	 non-diminishing	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities.	 What	 makes	 the	 U.S.	
setting	interesting	is	that	the	impairment	test	of	goodwill	is	subject	to	more	discretion	
under	 U.S.	 GAAP	 than	 under	 IFRS	 because	 the	manager	 is	 permitted	 to	 evaluate	 the	
underlying	 economics	 of	 the	 actual	 goodwill	 instead	 of	 using	 impairment	 at	 the	
reporting	 unit	 level	 (Ramanna,	 2015). 16 	Moreover,	 the	 U.S.	 setting	 provides	 a	
sufficiently	large	sample	to	identify	firms	with	diminishing	and	non-diminishing	growth	
opportunities,	without	 being	 affected	by	 varying	 country-specific	 institutional	 factors.	
																																																								
16	The	 first	 two	 paragraphs	 of	 Section	 2.3	 contain	 a	 more	 in-depth	 discussion	 about	 the	 differences	
between	impairment	testing	procedures	under	U.S.	GAAP	and	IFRS.	
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In	 particular,	 the	 study	 makes	 use	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 during	 2007–2008	 and	 the	
European	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	 in	 2010	 to	 identify	 periods	 of	 diminishing	 growth	
opportunities	for	the	industry	sectors	banks	and	financial	institutions.	I	further	identify	
firms	in	the	industry	sectors	pharmaceuticals,	and	biotechnology	as	well	as	healthcare	





sources.	 The	 data	 collection	 for	 the	 paper	 on	 the	 usefulness	 of	 goodwill	 impairments	
during	periods	of	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	(i.e.,	the	third	paper)	has	been	
straightforward.	 All	 data	 come	 from	 the	 public	 data	 vendors	 Datastream	 and	
Worldscope.	In	particular,	I	have	collected	relevant	data	for	firms	listed	on	the	U.S.	stock	
markets	 and	 used	 the	 SEC’s	 EDGAR	 database	 to	 clean	 data	 points	 with	 unavailable	
information.		





















and	 simply	 entails	 comparing	 the	purchase	price	paid	with	 the	 revaluated	 assets	 and	
liabilities.	 However,	 if	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 attains	 less	 than	 100%	 ownership,	 the	 full	
goodwill	 method	 stipulates	 that	 purchase	 price	 allocation	 should	 be	 extrapolated	 to	
reflect	an	acquisition	of	100%	of	the	target	firm.	To	reach	an	extrapolated	price	for	the	
whole	 target	 firm,	 the	 acquiring	 manager	 must	 divide	 the	 purchase	 price	 by	 the	
acquired	 percentage	 share	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 net	 assets.	 In	 that	 case,	 initially	
recognized	goodwill	will	include	the	minority	owners’	part	of	the	revaluated	goodwill	in	
the	balance	sheet	of	the	acquiring	firm.	
Under	 the	 partial	 goodwill	 method,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 acquiring	manager	 is	
required	to	only	recognize	the	part	of	goodwill	that	reflects	the	actual	ownership	of	the	
target	firm	acquired,	meaning	that	minority	owners’	part	of	goodwill	is	not	revaluated	
or	 disclosed	 as	 it	 is	 under	 the	 full	 method.	 In	 particular,	 the	 acquiring	 manager	 is	













Accounting	 is	 about	 using	 judgment	 to	 provide	 a	more	 correct	 picture	 of	 a	 firm.	
However,	 a	 significant	 body	 of	 research	 provides	 evidence	 indicating	 that	 firms’	




value	 measures	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.18	In	
particular,	 they	 argued	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 would	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 private	
information	to	investors	about	the	acquisitions	regarding	the	value	of	the	target	and	the	
acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 such	 as	 synergies	 (e.g.,	 FASB,	 1999,	Watts,	
2003).	 Critics	 contend,	 in	 line	 with	 agency	 theory,	 that	 managerial	 discretion	 in	 the	
valuation	 of	 unverifiable	 accounting	 items,	 such	 as	 goodwill,	 is	 frequently	misused	 to	
enhance	private	gains	(e.g.,	Watts,	2003,	Shalev	et	al.,	2013).	
The	 three	 papers	 in	 this	 dissertation	 all	 investigate	whether	 goodwill	 accounting	
choices	depend	on	the	level	of	discretion.	A	significant	body	of	research	documents	that	
goodwill	 accounting	 choices	are	affected	by	misuse	of	 the	additional	discretion	under	
the	 impairment-only	 approach	 instead	 of	 providing	 insights	 about	 underlying	
economics.	These	studies	have	mainly	used	the	U.S.	setting	with	limited	involvement	of	




The	 first	 paper	 (entitled:	 The	 Purchase	 Price	 Allocation	 Decision)	 uses	 a	 hand-
collected	sample	of	1,112	PPA	disclosures	on	the	recognition	of	goodwill	under	IFRS	3	
to	 explore	whether	 the	PPA	decision	 is	 affected	by	 the	presence	of	 strong	 controlling	
owners	 and	 other	 economic	 determinants.	 To	 test	 whether	 large	 controlling	 family	
owners	are	able	to	curb	managers’	misuse	of	the	discretion	under	the	impairment-only	




family,	 (3)	 a	 test	 for	 excess	 price	 by	 taking	 the	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 the	 difference	
between	the	purchase	price	and	the	target	firm’s	book	value	of	equity,	(4)	an	indicator	
variable	that	takes	the	value	of	1	when	the	number	of	acquisitions	by	the	acquiring	firm	












finds	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 controlling	 owners	 curbs	 managers	 incentives	 to	 over-
allocate	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill.	 However,	 after	 controlling	 for	 ownership	
concentration	 and	 dual-class	 shares,	 analyses	 show	 that	 family-dominated	 firms	
allocate	a	larger	portion	of	the	purchase	price	from	smaller	deals	(below	SEK	8	million)	
to	goodwill.	However,	the	effect	of	controlling	families	disappears	when	dropping	small	
deals	 from	 the	 regression,	 which	 could	 be	 an	 indication	 that	 other	 owners	 are	more	
aware	 of	 the	 deal	 quality	 and	 the	 potential	 synergies	 of	 larger	 target	 firms.	 The	






may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 over-allocation	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill.	While	 large	
controlling	 family	 owners	 seem	 to	 curb	 managers’	 agency	 motives	 for	 misusing	 the	
discretion,	 they	 themselves	 appear	 to	 misuse	 discretionary	 goodwill	 accounting.	 The	
main	implication	of	these	findings	is	that	international	standard	setters	must	consider	
the	agency	conflict	between	different	types	of	owners,	in	addition	to	the	agency	conflict	
between	 the	management	 and	 the	owners,	 in	 fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting.	 In	other	
words,	 goodwill	 accounting	 under	 the	 impairment	 approach	 is	 not	 necessarily	 more	
useful	to	investors	when	large	controlling	family	owners	are	in	place.			
The	 second	 paper	 (entitled:	 Did	 the	 Adoption	 of	 the	 Impairment-Only	 Approach	
Enhance	 the	 Representational	 Faithfulness	 of	 Initially	 Recognized	 Goodwill?)	
investigates	 whether	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	
representation	 of	 the	 acquired	 economic	 performance	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 I	 do	 not	 expect	 initially	 recognized	
goodwill	 to	 provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	





goodwill,	 of	 which	 around	 850	 entailed	 acquiring	 a	 controlling	 stake	 of	 100%.	 	 I	
document	 that	 goodwill	 balances	 of	 Swedish	 publicly	 listed	 firms	 as	 a	 share	 of	 total	
assets	(equity)	changed	from	14.9%	(36.5%)	under	the	amortization	approach	to	22.7%	
(52.3%)	under	the	impairment-only	approach.	
To	 investigate	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 the	 second	 paper,	 I	 test	whether	 the	 interaction	
between	 IFRS	 and	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 is	 related	 to	 the	 acquired	 economic	
performance,	 which	 is	 approximated	 using	 four	 different	 economic	 measures	 that	
would	indicate	improved	superior	earnings.	The	first	two	measures	include	the	change	
from	t-1	to	t+1	(or	t+2)	around	the	completion	of	an	acquisition:	(1)	the	change	in	the	





with	any	of	 the	dependent	variables	 that	approximate	 the	 future	superior	earnings	of	
the	 four	 models.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	
relative	to	the	amortization	approach	did	not	provide	a	more	faithful	representation	of	
the	acquired	superior	economic	performance.	In	other	words,	the	additional	discretion	
offered	 by	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 did	 not	 improve	 the	 representational	
faithfulness	of	initially	recognized	goodwill.	
The	 findings	 of	 the	 second	 paper	 provide	 vital	 information	 to	 international	
standard	 setters	 in	 their	 evaluation	 of	 additional	 use	 of	 fair-value	 measures	 in	
accounting	 for	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	
amortization	 approach.	 The	 FASB	 has	 considered	 different	 alternatives	 to	 the	
impairment-only	 approach	 in	 their	 evaluation	 of	 the	 treatment	 of	 goodwill	 and	
intangible	 assets,	 including	 a	 possible	 reintroduction	 of	 the	 amortization	 approach	
(FASB,	2017).	Part	of	this	process	involves	evaluating	the	outcome	of	the	impairment-
only	approach	(Zhang	&	Zhang,	2017).	The	findings	of	the	second	paper	suggest	that	the	
additional	 discretion	 offered	 by	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 has	 not	 improved	 the	
representational	 faithfulness,	 while	 the	 literature	 suggests	 that	 the	 agency	 cost	 has	
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increased	 significantly.	 Thus,	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 probably	 does	 not	 provide	
more	useful	information	to	investors	under	the	impairment-only	approach.		
The	 third	 paper	 (entitled:	Does	 the	Usefulness	 of	 Fair-Value	Goodwill	 Accounting	
Depend	 on	 Industry-Specific	 Growth	 Opportunities?)	 investigates	 whether	 a	 firm’s	
industry-specific	growth	opportunities	affect	goodwill	accounting	choices	and,	thus,	the	
usefulness	 of	 information	 about	 goodwill	 for	 investors.	 In	 particular,	 I	 test	 whether	
firms	with	diminishing	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	are	more	likely	to	impair	
goodwill	 relative	 to	 firms	with	 non-diminishing	 growth	 opportunities.	 This	 setting	 is	
interesting	 because	 I	 expect	 that	 the	 macroeconomic	 environment	 will	 reduce	 the	
manager’s	 discretion	 to	 avoid	 impairing	 goodwill,	 and,	 thus,	 present	 the	 underlying	
economics.	There	are	two	reasons	why	I	expect	this	to	occur.	First,	 the	second	step	of	
the	goodwill-impairment	 test	 is	 less	 likely	 to	be	delayed	when	other	asset	 classes	are	
depreciating	 in	 value	 at	 the	 reporting	 unit	 level.	 Second,	 Povel	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 provide	
proof	that	accounting	information	improves	when	the	firm’s	macroeconomic	outlook	is	
in	 decline	 because	 of	 increased	 monitoring	 activities,	 which	 reduces	 the	 manager’s	
possibility	to	misuse	the	discretion.	Thus,	I	hypothesize	that	when	the	firm’s	industry-
specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 diminishing	 (1)	 the	 firm	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 impair	
goodwill,	and,	thus,	(2)	goodwill	impairments	provide	more	value-relevant	information	
to	 investors.	 In	 other	 words,	 I	 expect	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	 will	 provide	 useful	




made	 by	 777	 firm-years	 of	 banks/financial	 institutions	 and	 pharmaceuticals.	 The	
former	industry	should	be	more	affected	by	the	crisis,	whereas	the	latter	should	not	be	
affected	because	 of	 inelastic	 demand	 for	 their	 products	 and	 services	 (Myers	&	Howe,	
1997;	Harrington,	2012).	That	 is,	 I	expect	 that	banks	and	 financial	 institutions	will	be	
more	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 during	 the	 crisis,	 and	 that	 these	 impairments	 will	
provide	 more	 value-relevant	 information	 to	 inventors.	 Thus,	 the	 third	 paper	
investigates	 whether	 the	 usefulness	 of	 goodwill	 impairments	 depends	 on	 industry-
specific	growth	opportunities	by	exploring	(1)	whether	banks	and	financials	are	more	
likely	to	impair	goodwill	during	financial	crises,	and	(2)	whether	investors	value	them	
higher	 during	 periods	 when	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	
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diminishing.	 This	 is	 the	 only	 paper	 in	 the	 dissertation	 where	 I	 formally	 test	 the	
usefulness	 of	 goodwill	 accounting	 choices	 to	 investors	 thorough	 the	 value-relevance	
specification.	
In	the	empirical	analysis,	I	use	two	different	empirical	models.	For	the	first	research	




total	yearly	goodwill	 impairments	by	the	 firm.	The	variable	of	 interest	 in	 this	study	 is	
the	 interaction	between	(1)	 the	 indicator	variable	 that	 takes	 the	value	of	1	 if	 the	 firm	
belongs	 to	 the	 banking	 or	 financial	 sectors,	 and	 (2)	 the	 indicator	 variable	 for	 the	
financial	 crises.	 I	 also	 use	 control	 variables	 such	 as	 the	 firms’	 size,	 relative	 goodwill	
balances,	 earnings,	 book-to-market	 value	 of	 equity,	 and	 losses.	 I	 find	 no	 convincing	
evidence	 that	 firms	with	diminishing	 industry-specific	growth	opportunities	are	more	
likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill.	 This	 suggests	 that	 past	 studies’	 documentation	 of	 delayed	
goodwill	 impairments	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	 a	 fair	 application	 of	 SFAS	 142,	 as	 an	
overall	 improved	macroeconomic	 outlook	 is	 probably	not	 the	 reason	why	 the	 second	
step	of	impairing	goodwill	was	delayed.				
To	explore	the	second	research	question,	I	use	a	panel-data	specification	to	test	the	
value	 relevance	 of	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 firms	 with	 diminishing	 growth	
opportunities.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 change	 in	 abnormal	 stock	 return,	which	
has	been	adjusted	by	each	sector’s	value-weighted	index.	The	variables	of	 interest	are	
defined	 as	 a	 “three-way”	 interaction	 between	 (1)	 the	 change	 in	 goodwill	 impairment	
from	t-1	to	t,	(2)	an	indicator	variable	of	firms	belonging	to	banking	or	financial	sectors,	
and	 (3)	 an	 indicator	 variable	 for	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 I	 also	 control	 for	 goodwill	
impairments	 in	 general	 by	 all	 firms	 and	 different	 measures	 for	 earnings.	 I	 find	 that	
goodwill	impairments	by	firms	with	diminishing	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	
are	 positive	 and	 significantly	 associated	 with	 abnormal	 stock	 return,	 suggesting	 that	
investors	attach	more	weight	to	goodwill	impairments	under	these	conditions.	Thus,	the	
results	of	paper	three	indicate	(1)	that	delayed	goodwill	impairments	are	probably	not	a	
reflection	 of	 fair	 application	 of	 SFAS	 142,	 and	 (2)	 that	 the	 impairment	 of	 goodwill	 is	





The	 three	 papers	 in	 this	 dissertation	 indicate	 that	 the	 level	 of	 discretion	 affects	
goodwill	accounting	choices,	and,	thus	the	usefulness	of	information	about	goodwill	for	
investors.	 The	 empirical	 findings	 of	 these	 studies	 should	 provide	 useful	 input	 to	
international	 standard	 setters	 in	 their	 evaluation	 of	 the	 decision	 to	 allow	 fair-value	
measures	in	accounting	for	corporate	acquisitions	(e.g.,	FASB,	2017).	Paper	two	should	
be	 of	 particular	 interest	 as	 it	 provides	 insights	 into	 the	 treatment	 of	 goodwill	 under	
different	 levels	 of	 discretion,	 by	 comparing	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 to	 the	
amortization	 approach.	 However,	 paper	 two	 cannot	 by	 itself	 guide	 international	
standard	 setters	 on	 the	 optimal	 treatment,	 as	 its	main	 conclusion	 is	 that	 neither	 the	
impairment-only	 approach	 nor	 the	 amortization	 approach	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	
representation	of	acquired	future	economic	performance.	Thus,	this	finding	is	just	one	
input	that,	together	with	studies	on	the	potential	costs	of	the	impairment-only	approach	
and	 the	 amortization	 approach,	 could	 guide	 standard	 setters.	 While	 a	 return	 to	 the	




goodwill	 accounting,	 the	 benefits	 of	 reintroducing	 an	 increased	 level	 of	 accounting	
conservatism	using	a	goodwill-amortization	approach	is	worth	reconsidering.	
However,	 the	 findings	 in	paper	 three	 indicate	 that	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	
provides	useful	information	to	investors,	at	least	when	a	firm’s	industry-specific	growth	
opportunities	are	diminishing.	This	 could	be	 the	 result	of	misuse	of	 the	discretion,	or	
that	the	first	step	of	the	impairment	test	delays	the	second	step	of	testing	goodwill	for	
impairments.	 The	 first	 test	 in	 paper	 three	 finds	 an	 insignificant	 difference	 between	
impairments	 by	 firms	 with	 diminishing	 and	 firms	 with	 non-diminishing	 growth	
opportunities,	which	suggests	that	the	impairment	test	is	probably	misused.	However,	it	
could	also	be	 the	case	 that	pharmaceuticals	were	as	affected	by	 the	 financial	 crisis	as	
banks	and	financial	institutions	and	therefore	need	to	impair	goodwill.	In	other	words,	
the	only	certain	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	paper	three	is	that	the	impairment-
only	 approach	 can	 provide	 investors	 with	 useful	 information	 about	 the	 valuation	 of	
goodwill	balances	in	a	period	of	diminishing	growth	opportunities.	
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Overall,	 the	 potential	 implications	 of	 this	 study	 depend	 on	 what	 perspective	
standard	 setters	 prioritize.	 Papers	 one	 and	 two	 show	 some	 signs	 that	 the	 initial	
recognition	of	goodwill	under	the	impairment-only	approach	does	not	provide	a	more	
faithful	 representation,	 indicating	 that	 the	 amortization	 approach	 is	 preferable	 as	 the	
agency	 cost	 can	 be	 mitigated,	 while	 the	 usefulness	 to	 investors	 remains	 unaffected.	
However,	 goodwill	 balances	 will	 likely	 be	 economically	 suppressed	 under	 the	
amortization	approach,	as	the	yearly	amortizations	are	unlikely	to	reflect	the	economic	






















































































































































































































































Goodwill is a debated and criticized accounting item, but its origin; the purchase price allocation 
(PPA) decision, is largely unstudied. We hand-collect 1,112 PPA disclosures that apply IFRS 3 and 
document that acquisitions are frequent, material and they actually give rise to more goodwill than to 
revalued specific tangible and intangible assets together. We find that family firms are more prone to 
allocate the purchase price to goodwill than to specific assets and liabilities. In contrast to prior studies 
on the PPA decision, we find no indication that CEO bonus incentives should have any impact on the 
allocation of the purchase price to goodwill. These two findings indicate that strong controlling 
owners curb managers, while family owners might intentionally misuse the discretion of PPA 
decision. Furthermore, economic indicators such as acquisition uncertainty and experience affect the 
PPA decision. Interestingly, indicators used to study goodwill impairment decisions (e.g. purchase 
price in excess of the book value of acquired equity) are also important for discretionary PPA 
decisions. These findings suggest that the total level of discretion involved in the goodwill impairment 
decision has been underestimated in the literature. 
 
 







The	 accounting	 for	 goodwill	 has	 been	 extensively	 studied	 in	 the	 accounting	
literature.	However,	very	 little	 is	known	about	 its	origin:	 the	purchase	price	allocation	
(hereafter	 PPA)	 decision	 that	 is	 made	 in	 conjunction	 with	 corporate	 acquisitions.	
According	 to	 the	 International	 Financial	 Reporting	 Standards	 (IFRS)	 3,	 the	 difference	
between	the	purchase	price	paid	and	the	target	firm’s	equity	is	allocated	to	specific	and	
unspecific	assets	at	 the	 time	of	an	acquisition.	While	prior	studies	document	 that	CEO	
incentives	play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	PPA	decision	 to	 allocate	 the	purchase	price	 to	
goodwill	 (e.g.,	 Shalev,	 Zhang	 &	 Zhang,	 2013),	 no	 study	 has	 explored	 the	 role	 of	 the	









firms	 and	 the	 acquisitions	 themselves.	 For	 a	 sample	 of	 137	 PPA	 decisions,	 Zhang	 &	
Zhang	(2017)	find	that	both	economic	motives	and	a	CEO’s	personal	incentives	affect	the	
allocation	 to	 goodwill.	 This	 corresponds	 to	 findings	 in	 Shalev	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 that	 CEOs	





explore	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 PPA	 determinants.	 This	 is	 particularly	 important	 given	 that	
most	target	firms	are	privately	held.	
																																								 																				














goodwill	 should	measure	 synergies	 coming	 from	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 acquirer	 and	
the	target.	Critics	of	fair-valued	goodwill,	however,	argue	that	the	discretion	of	the	PPA	
decision	 is	 used	 opportunistically.	 Subsequent	 to	 the	 initial	 recognition,	 goodwill	





that	 59%	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 is	 allocated	 to	 goodwill.	 This	would	 be	 a	 reason	why	
goodwill	balances	are	 inflated	and	goodwill	 impairments	are	untimely	(e.g.	Li	&	Sloan,	




PPA	decision	 of	which	many	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 explored.	 In	 particular,	we	 argue	 that	
managerial	misbehaviors	are	contextual	and	can	be	curbed	by	controlling	owners.	There	
is	 no	 study	 of	 how	 ownership	 impacts	 the	 PPA	 decision.	 Powerful	 owners	 may	 curb	
managerial	 opportunism,	 but	 they	 may	 also	 hold	 similar	 opportunistic	 motives	 (e.g.	
Claessens,	 Djankov	 &	 Lang,	 2000).	 For	 instance,	 large	 controlling	 shareholders	 with	
																																								 																				
2	Prior	to	the	adoption	of	fair-value	goodwill	accounting	under	SFAS	142	and	IFRS	3,	accounting	standards	
did	 not	 require	 substantial	 disclosures	 on	 the	 acquired	 target	 firms	 and	 PPA	 decisions.	 Consequently,	
studies	on	the	PPA	decision	have	been	unfeasible	due	to	lack	of	data.		
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limited	 cash	 flow	 rights	 may	 expropriate	 non-controlling	 owners	 by	 partaking	 in	
suboptimal	acquisitions	 (Claessens	et	 al.,	 2000;	Faccio	&	Lang,	2002;	Dyck	&	Zingales,	
2004).	 Potentially,	 both	 controlling	 owners	 and	managers	 have	 incentives	 to	 use	 the	
PPA	decision	opportunistically.	
We	 use	 data	 on	 all	 public	 Swedish	 firms	 from	 2005	 to	 2013	 to	 explore	 the	 PPA	
decision.	 Swedish	 firms	 tend	 to	 have	 concentrated	 ownership	 (La	 Porta,	 Lopez-De-
Silanes	&	Shleifer,	1999;	Faccio	&	Lang,	2002)	and	many	firms	have	a	dual-class	share	
system	 (Faccio	 &	 Lang,	 2002).	 For	 this	 reason,	 we	 target	 ownership	 incentives	 in	
particular.	Because	Sweden	is	a	small	and	open	economy	with	many	large	international	
firms,	 corporate	 growth	 has	 often	 come	 through	 foreign	 acquisitions.	 In	 fact,	 prior	
studies	 show	 that	Swedish	 firms	are	among	 the	most	active	 in	 the	European	 takeover	
market	 (e.g.,	 Detzen	&	Zülch,	 2012;	 Francis,	Huang	&	Khurana,	 2016).	Hence,	 Sweden	
also	 makes	 a	 suitable	 setting	 to	 investigate	 the	 impact	 of	 economic	 factors,	 such	 as	
acquisition	uncertainty	and	experience,	on	the	PPA	decision.							
The	 final	 sample	 consists	 of	 2,214	 acquisitions	 reported	 in	 1,112	 unique	 PPA	
disclosures	 conducted	 by	 205	 unique	 acquiring	 firms;	 all	 collected	 from	1,772	 annual	
reports	of	all	publicly	listed	firms	domiciled	in	Sweden.	About	64.5	%	of	the	acquisitions	
were	 made	 outside	 of	 Sweden;	 in	 more	 than	 70	 different	 countries	 including	 all	 EU	
countries,	as	well	as	far-away	countries	 like	Nepal,	Kazakhstan,	Uruguay,	Namibia,	and	
the	UAE.	The	sample	is	significantly	larger	than	any	prior	PPA	study	because	we	include	
both	public	and	private	 target	 firms.	 In	 total,	 less	 than	 five	percent	of	 the	 target	 firms	
were	 publicly	 listed.	 Descriptive	 statistics	 show	 that	 the	 average	 purchase	 price	 is	
roughly	 four	 times	 the	 target	 firm’s	book	value	of	equity	and	53.6	%	of	 the	difference	
between	 the	 purchase	 price	 and	 the	 book	 value	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	 equity	 (hereafter	
excess	purchase	price)	is	allocated	to	goodwill.	These	figures	are	quite	similar	to	those	of	
Shalev	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 and	 Detzen	 &	 Zülch	 (2012).	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 value	 of	 allocated	
goodwill	 is	 more	 than	 twice	 the	 target	 firms’	 pre-acquisition	 book	 value	 of	 equity	
stresses	the	economic	significance	of	the	PPA	decision.	
The	propensity	to	allocate	the	purchase	purchase	price	to	goodwill	is	influenced	by	
several	 economic	 motives.	 First,	 it	 increases	 with	 a	 larger	 difference	 between	 the	
purchase	price	and	the	book	value	of	the	target	firm’s	equity	(i.e,	excess	purchase	price).	
This	 can	 be	 caused	 by	 a	 difficulty	 to	 relate	 large	 payments	 over	 the	 book	 value	 of	
acquired	 assets	 to	 specific	 assets,	 or	 potentially	 a	 desire	 to	 “disguise”	 overpayments.	
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Second,	the	propensity	is	higher	for	acquisitions	of	uncertain	target	firms.	This	suggests	
that	 incremental	 uncertainty	 is	 dealt	 with	 by	 choosing	 more	 discretion.	 Third,	 the	
propensity	 is	 lower	 for	experienced	acquirers.	This	 indicates	that	serial-acquirers	may	
have	become	better	able	to	attribute	the	purchase	price	to	specific	assets	and	liabilities.	
We	 further	 find	 that	 family	 ownership	 has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 goodwill	
allocation	 propensity,	 and	 it	 holds	 for	 controls	 of	 ownership	 concentration	 and	 dual-
class	shares.	The	result	is	not	significant	when	excluding	deals	below	SEK	8mn	(roughly	
USD	 1	 million).	 This	 is,	 however,	 not	 surprising	 since	 family-dominated	 firms	 are	
proportionately	more	involved	in	smaller	deals.	In	contrast	to	prior	studies	(e.g.	Shalev	
et	 al.,	 2013),	 we	 find	 no	 convincing	 evidence	 that	managerial	 incentives	 increase	 the	
propensity	 to	 allocate	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill.	 This	 suggests	 that	 managerial	
motives	 are	 not	 important	 when	 managers	 cannot	 exploit	 the	 discretion	 of	 goodwill	
allocation.	
Our	 study	 contributes	 to	 the	 existing	 literature	 in	 two	ways.	 First,	we	 add	 to	 the	
literature	on	initial	recognition	of	intangible	assets	by	exploring	whether	the	frequently	
studied	 goodwill	 write-down	 decisions	 stem	 from	 a	 subjective	 PPA	 decision	 process.	
Prior	literature	has	almost	entirely	focused	on	the	post-acquisition	valuation	of	goodwill	
under	 either	 SFAS	 141	 or	 IAS	 38	 (e.g.	 Ramanna	&	Watts,	 2012;	Hamberg	&	Beisland,	
2014;	Li	&	Sloan,	2017),	and	ignored	that	goodwill	 is	endogenously	determined	before	
any	impairment	test	is	conducted.	By	misusing	discretionary	fair-value	measurements	in	
the	 PPA	 process,	 an	 acquiring	 firm	 can	 alter	 the	 likelihood	 of	 reporting	 future	
amortizations	and	impairments.	We	show	that	most	of	the	purchase	price	is	allocated	to	
goodwill	 and	 that	 this	 allocation	 is	 significantly	 related	 to	 economic	 and	 ownership	
motives.	
Research	 on	 goodwill	 impairment	 tests	 is,	 by	 construction,	 conditional	 on	
recognized	 goodwill.	 Our	 findings	 show	 that	 the	 value	 of	 goodwill	 is	 endogenously	
determined	 by	 a	 number	 of	 firm-specific	 factors.	 Focusing	 on	 goodwill	 and	 the	
impairment	process	alone	underestimates	the	level	of	discretion	that	corporate	insiders,	
such	 as	managers	 and	 controlling	 owners,	 exercise	 in	 the	 accounting	 for	 goodwill.	 In	
specific,	we	show	that	a	number	of	goodwill	impairment	indicators	–	such	as	the	size	of	
the	excess	purchase	price	–	also	determine	the	PPA	decision	(cf.	Hayn	&	Hughes,	2006;	




strong	 control	 exercised	 by	 family	 owners	 is	 usually	 thought	 to	 curb	 managerial	
misbehaviors	and	have	net	positive	effects	on	the	creation	of	value	(Anderson	&	Reeb,	
2003).	 Although	 agency	 theory	 predicts	 fewer	 owner-manager	 conflicts,	 a	 controlling	
family	 may	 use	 entrenched	 managers	 to	 maximize	 their	 private	 benefits	 by	
expropriating	 benefits	 from	 non-controlling	 owners.	 	 In	 particular,	 this	 can	 happen	
when	families	possess	disproportionate	voting	rights	relative	to	cash	flow	rights,	which	
is	 the	 case	 in	 our	 Swedish	 sample.	 Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 family-controlled	 firms	
provide	 less	 transparent	 information;	possibly	because	this	 is	a	way	to	exercise	better	
control.	
The	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 contains	 the	 development	 of	 our	
research	hypotheses	on	the	motives	for	purchase	price	allocation	decisions.	In	Section	3	
we	discuss	methodological	considerations	surrounding	the	study	of	Swedish	firms’	PPA	





The	 implementation	 of	 IFRS	 3	 Business	 Combinations	 significantly	 changed	 the	
accounting	 for	business	combinations	 in	Europe.	Under	 the	new	regime,	 the	acquiring	
firm	is	required	at	the	acquisition	date	to	make	a	fair-value	reassessment	of	the	target	
firm’s	 identifiable	 tangible/intangible	 assets	 and	 liabilities	 by	 allocating	 the	 purchase	
price	 to	 specific	 accounting	 items.	 This	 process	 we	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 purchase	 price	
allocation	 (PPA)	decision.	When	 the	purchase	price	 exceeds	 the	 fair	 value	of	 acquired	
equity,	the	excess	part	is	booked	as	goodwill.	Because	most	assets	and	liabilities	of	the	
target	 firm	 lack	 observable	 prices	 from	 active	 markets,	 IFRS	 3	 provides	 significant	
discretion	 to	 management	 in	 the	 process	 of	 allocating	 the	 purchase	 price;	 the	 only	
constraint	being	that	the	fair	value	of	equity	cannot	exceed	the	purchase	price	paid	for	
the	target	firm.	
Because	 accounting	 choices	 associated	 with	 the	 PPA	 decision	 are	 largely	
unverifiable,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 opportunistically	 manage	 post-acquisition	 earnings	 by	
allocating	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 assets	 for	 which	 accounting	 rules	 are	 more	
discretionary.	 For	 two	 reasons,	 goodwill	 is	 such	 an	 asset.	 First,	 most	 tangible	 and	
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intangible	assets	are	expensed	on	a	 regular	basis	using	depreciation	and	amortization	
expenditures.	 Goodwill,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 an	 indefinite	 life	 and	 it	 is,	 therefore,	







A	 substantial	 body	 of	 empirical	 research	 documents	 problems	 with	 goodwill	
impairments.	 For	 example,	Hayn	&	Hughes	 (2006)	 suggest	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	
lag	 economic	 impairments	with	 as	much	 as	 three	 to	 four	 years.	 Acquiring	 firms	 even	
neglect	 to	 report	 economically	 impaired	 goodwill	 at	 the	 acquisition	 date	 (Yehuda,	
Vincent	&	Lys,	2017).	Beatty	&	Weber	(2006)	argue	that	the	decision	to	report	untimely	
goodwill	 impairments	 (primarily	 an	 excessive	 delay)	 mainly	 reflect	 equity	 market	
concerns	 and	 contracting	 incentives	 upon	 the	 initial	 adoption	 of	 SFAS	 142.	 Goodwill	
accounting	 has	 also	 been	 studied	 in	 a	 Swedish	 context.	 Hamberg,	 Paananen	 &	 Novak	
(2010)	find	that	firms,	opportunistically,	did	not	impair	goodwill	at	the	initial	adoption	




firms	 that	 capitalize	 proportionately	 more	 goodwill	 report	 higher	 post-acquisition	











unverifiable,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 control	 post-acquisition	 earnings.	 This	 discretion	 can	 be	
used	 opportunistically	 by	 the	 reporting	 party.	 Previous	 research	 has	 mainly	 been	
conducted	 in	 Anglo-Saxon	 corporate	 environments	where	 ownership	 has	 been	 rather	
dispersed.	 Zhang	 &	 Zhang	 (2017)	 study	 the	 change	 to	 discretionary	 and	 unverifiable	
fair-value	goodwill	measurements.	They	find	that	managerial	incentives	are	only	related	
to	the	allocation	to	goodwill	when	unverifiable	fair-value	measures	are	used.	Shalev	et	
al.	 (2013)	 document	 that	 CEOs	 allocate	 a	 greater	 portion	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	
goodwill	 when	 their	 compensation	 packages	 are	 based	 on	 variable	 non-equity	 based	
components	 (i.e.,	 earnings-based	 bonuses).	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Detzen	 &	 Zülch	 (2012)	
report	that	increased	CEO	cash	bonus	intensity	in	Europe	is	related	to	the	likelihood	of	
allocating	 the	purchase	price	 to	goodwill	under	 IFRS	3.	Bugeja	&	Loyeung	 (2015)	 find	
that	Australian	 firms	 increased	 their	allocation	of	 the	purchase	price	 to	goodwill	as	of	
the	shift	from	the	amortization	regime	to	the	fair	value	regime	of	IFRS	3.	
The	 aforementioned	 studies	 were	 conducted	 in	 corporate	 environments	 where	
ownership	 is	 dispersed;	 and	 as	 a	 consequence,	 top	 management	 was	 quite	 powerful	
while	the	owners	were	not.3	This	is	likely	to	be	important	for	the	research	expectations.	
A	 separation	 of	 ownership	 and	 control	 of	 corporate	 resources	 causes	 information	
asymmetries	between	owners	and	managers	(Jensen	&	Meckling,	1976).	Self-interested	
managers	are	then	likely	to	use	their	information	advantages	to	act	opportunistically.	In	
Anglo-Saxon	 countries,	 large	 firms	 are	 often	 widely	 held	 and	 controlled	 by	
comparatively	powerful	CEOs.	 In	addition,	most	widely	held	U.S.	 firms	have	CEOs	with	
dual	 responsibilities	as	chairman	of	 the	board,	providing	 them	with	significant	power.	
And,	 their	 compensation	packages	often	contain	 large	variable	 components.	These	are	





well-known	 that	most	public	 firms	around	 the	world	 are	directly	or	 indirectly	 family-
																																								 																				
3	 Detzen	 &	 Zülch	 (2012)	 use	 a	 sample	 of	 European	 acquiring	 firms,	 including	 Sweden.	 However,	 the	
ending	sample	of	123	acquisitions	is	dominated	by	the	UK	setting.		
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controlled	 (Faccio	 &	 Lang,	 2002).	 A	 controlling	 owner	 often	 has	 sufficient	 power	 to	
access	information	and	curb	managerial	misbehaviors.	But	with	the	increasing	power	of	
controlling	owners	 comes	a	 risk	 that	 the	 controlling	owner	exploits	 the	 rights	of	non-
controlling	 owners	 (Shleifer	 &	 Vishny,	 1986).	 For	 example,	 a	 large	 controlling	 owner	
with	 disproportionally	 large	 voting	 rights,	 relative	 to	 cash	 flow	 rights,	may	 choose	 to	
make	value-destructive	(or	forego	value-creating)	corporate	acquisitions	(La	Porta	et	al.,	
1999;	Claessens	et	al.,	2000;	Faccio	&	Lang,	2002;	Dyck	&	Zingales,	2004).	There	 is	an	
extensive	 literature	 on	 the	 association	 between	 ownership	 type	 and	 firm	 value.	
However,	there	are	only	a	few	studies	that	suggest	that	family	owners	expropriate	value	
(e.g.	 Bertrand,	 Mehta	 &	 Mullainathan,	 2002;	 Goa	 &	 Kling,	 2007),	 Anderson	 &	 Reeb	
(2003)	 and	 many	 others	 document	 a	 positive	 association	 between	 founding	 family	
ownership	and	performance.	
Regardless	 of	 whether	 controlling	 family	 owners	 create	 or	 destroy	 shareholder	
value,	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 they	 choose	 less	 transparent	 disclosure	
strategies.	 First,	 there	 are	 fewer	 incentives	 to	 disclose	 information	 when	 active	
ownership	 offers	 alternative	 information	 channels.	 Second,	 information	 can	 be	 used	
opportunistically	relative	to	other	stakeholders.	By	choosing	when,	what,	and	to	whom	
information	 is	disclosed	can	provide	advantages.	 In	 this	vein,	Fan	&	Wong	(2002)	 find	
that	 earnings	 management	 is	 more	 prevalent	 among	 firms	 with	 concentrated	
ownership.	
Thus,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 findings	 from	 a	 corporate	 institutional	 setting	
characterized	by	exceptionally	 large	U.S.	 firms	also	hold	for	other	 institutional	settings	
in	 the	 world	 such	 as	 the	 Swedish	 context.	 In	 Sweden,	 family	 ownership	 is	 the	 norm,	
controlling	owners	dominate	 the	board	of	directors,	 and	CEO	dual	 responsibilities	are	
prohibited	by	law.	Controlling	owners	might	curb	managerial	misbehaviors	and	instead	
influence	management	to	behave	in	the	controlling	owners’	best	interest.	Thus,	the	PPA	
decision	may	not	 reflect	 compensation	motives	 but	 family-control	motives.	Hence,	we	
conjecture	that:	





Agency	 theory	 predicts	 that	 the	 goodwill	 allocation	 propensity	 is	 influenced	 by	
conscious	 opportunistic	 behaviors;	 but	 in	 addition,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 also	 relate	 to	 non-
opportunistic	 economic	 motives.	 	 According	 to	 the	 hubris	 hypothesis	 (Roll,	 1986),	
acquisition	 decisions	 are	 influenced	 by	 management’s	 excessive	 confidence	 in	 their	
ability	to	create	value	and	synergies.	In	essence,	managers	believe	that	they	build	value	
through	acquisitions,	but	rather	they	pay	too	much;	and	as	a	consequence,	they	destroy	







H3:	 The	 goodwill	 allocation	propensity	 increases	with	 the	 amount	 of	 excess	purchase	
price.4	
We	 expect	 acquisition	 experience	 to	 influence	 the	 goodwill	 allocation	 propensity.	
Some	 firms	make	dozens	of	 acquisitions	annually	whereas	others	grow	 their	business	
largely	through	internal	investments.	Research	suggests	that	acquisition	experience	has	
a	positive	impact	on	acquisition	performance.	For	example,	experienced	acquiring	firms	
can	 be	 better	 at	 estimating	 potential	 synergies	 (Haleblian	 &	 Finkelstein,	 1999;	
McDonald,	Westphal	&	Graebner,	2008).	In	a	similar	fashion,	accounting	skills	are	likely	
to	develop	gradually	over	 time.	Any	allocation	of	 the	purchase	price	 to	 specific	 assets	
comes	from	a	thorough	understanding	of	how	to	allocate	the	value	of	future	operations	
to	 specific	 assets	 of	 the	 target	 firm.	Managers	with	 little	 acquisition	 experience	might	




(and	 identifying	 any	 new)	 acquired	 assets	 before	 concluding	 the	 acquired	 goodwill,	 it	 is	 not	 evident	










the	 target	 firm’s	 valuable	 resources,	 its	 markets	 and	 its	 accounting	 practices.	 For	
example,	 McNichols	 &	 Stubben	 (2015)	 find	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	
accounting	 information	 reduces	 acquisition	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 risk	 for	 the	 acquiring	
firm	to	overpay.	It	also	seems	as	acquirers	benefit	from	reduced	information	uncertainty	





We	 use	 the	 Swedish	 adoption	 of	 IFRS	 3	 in	 2005	 to	 investigate	 the	 PPA	 decision.	
















acquired	 and	 liabilities	 assumed	 at	 their	 acquisition-date	 fair	 values	 (IFRS	 3,	 §18).	 In	




and	 informative	 financial	 reports	 (La	 Porta	 et	 al.,	 1999).	 According	 to	 a	 recent	 global	
survey,	 the	 annual	 reports	 of	 Swedish	 firms	 are	 outstandingly	 informative	
(Reportwatch,	2017).	
Previous	studies	on	the	PPA	decision	have	predominantly	been	conducted	in	Anglo-
Saxon	 countries	where	many	 firms	have	dispersed	ownership	 and	 relatively	powerful	
management	 teams.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Swedish	 institutional	 setting	 is	 characterized	 by	
powerful	 controlling	 owners	 and	 fairly	weak	management	 teams.	 Sweden	 has	 among	
the	 highest	 ownership	 concentrations	 and	 separation	 of	 control	 from	 cash-flow	
ownership	 in	 the	 corporate	 world	 (Faccio	 &	 Lang,	 2002;	 Institutional	 Shareholder	
Services,	2007).	La	Porta	et	al.	(1999)	rank	Swedish	firms	at	a	top-three	position	in	the	
categories:	one-share-one	vote;	 cross	holdings;	 and	pyramids.	 Frank	&	Hamberg	 (2016)	
document	that	Sweden	is	a	typical	European	country	in	the	sense	that	family	ownership	
is	 widespread	 (cf.	 Maury,	 2006;	 Barontini	 &	 Caprio,	 2006).	 They	 find	 that	 owners	 of	
Swedish	firms	are	often	non-founding	family	owners	that	control	firms	through	publicly	
listed	 investment	 companies,	 and	 they	 have	 a	 long-term	 perspective.5	 In	 this	 setting,	
management	 teams	are	often	weaker,	partly	because	of	active	controlling	owners,	and	




The	 data	 covers	 purchase	 price	 allocations	 of	 all	 Swedish	 publicly	 listed	 firms	 in	
2005	to	2013.	We	view	acquisition	disclosures	as	separate	events,	and	thus	we	employ	
pooled	OLS	 regressions	 that	 focus	on	disclosure-level	data	and	with	 controls	 for	 firm-	
																																								 																				












UNCERTAINTYi	 +	 α6	 ACQ_CFRIGHT	 +	 α7	 ACQ_DVR	 +	 α8	 ACQ_OWNCON	 +	 α9	
OPTIONSi	 +	 α10	 TOTPAYi	 +	 α11	 NONCASHi	 +	 α12	 ACTIVITYi	 +	 α13	
PAST_GOODWILLi	 +	 α14	 ACQ_ROAi	 +	 α15	 ACQ_DEBTi	 +	 α16	 ACQ_LIQUIDi	 +	 α17	
TRGT_INTANGIBLEi	+	α18	TRGT_DEBTi	+	α19	TRGT_SIZEi	+	e							 (1)		
	
At	 the	 time	 of	 an	 acquisition,	 firms	 can	 recognize	 both	 goodwill	 and	 identifiable	
intangible	assets.	We	distinguish	between	goodwill	and	identifiable	intangibles	for	two	
reasons.	 First,	 the	 unspecific	 nature	 of	 goodwill	 makes	 it	 more	 susceptible	 to	
opportunistic	 post-recognition	 behaviors.	 Second,	 identifiable	 intangible	 assets	 are	







price	 to	 goodwill	 is	 not	 related	 to	 management’s	 performance-based	 compensation	
(BONUS)	in	a	setting	with	strong	controlling	owners.	We	follow	Shalev	et	al.	(2013)	and	
define	 BONUS	 as	 CEO	 bonus	 divided	 by	 CEO	 total	 pay.	 In	 the	 regression	 model,	 we	
expect	α1	to	be	statistically	not	significant	in	the	Swedish	institutional	setting.	To	control	
for	 inter-firm	 differences	 in	 the	 level	 of	 compensation,	 we	 control	 for	 total	 CEO	
compensation	(TOTPAY).	
According	to	hypothesis	H2,	we	expect	that	the	propensity	to	allocate	the	purchase	
price	 to	 goodwill	 increases	with	 family	 ownership	 (FAMILY).	 Family	 owners	 typically	
desire	 to	control	 the	 firm	 in	 the	 long-term,	we	expect	 that	 families	prefer	growing	 the	
firm	over,	for	example,	paying	dividends	to	non-controlling	owners.	This	policy	is	likely	
																																								 																				




to	 be	 associated	 with	 ill-executed	 deals,	 which	 suggest	 that	 family	 owners	 are	 more	
likely	 to	 allocate	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill	 to	 gain	 control	 over	 accounting	
information	through	its	unspecific	nature.	We	measure	FAMILY	with	a	dummy	taking	the	
value	of	1	when	 the	 largest	owner,	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	acquisition,	 is	 a	 family	and	zero	




more	that	 is	paid	above	the	book	value	of	 the	target	 firm’s	equity,	 the	more	 likely	 it	 is	
that	the	acquirer	overpays	and	is	less	able	to	explain	what	is	acquired.	Hence,	the	excess	
amount	becomes	goodwill.	 	We	measure	EXCESS_PRICE	as	the	natural	 logarithm	of	the	




to	 goodwill	 decreases	 with	 acquisition	 experience	 (EXPERIENCE).	 More	 experienced	
acquirers	are	 likely	 to	better	understand	 the	values	of	 specific	 resources	and	be	more	
capable	of	allocating	the	purchase	price	to	specific	resources.	We	measure	EXPERIENCE	
in	relative	terms.	That	is,	we	construct	a	dummy	variable	taking	the	value	of	1	when	the	
acquiring	 firm	made	more	 acquisitions	 than	 the	 average	 firm	 in	 its	 industry.	 In	 some	
empirical	tests,	we	include	a	measure	of	the	company’s	historical	willingness	to	allocate	




to	 goodwill	 increases	with	 acquisition	uncertainty	 (UNCERTAINTY).	Uncertainty	 about	
the	acquisition	arises	from	unfamiliarity	with	its	critical	resources,	markets	and	culture.	
We	measure	UNCERTAINTY	as	foreignness	with	a	dummy	taking	the	value	of	1	when	the	




deal-specific	 characteristics.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 target	 firm,	 we	 control	 for	 its	 pre-
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acquisition	 intangible	 assets	 (TRGT_INTANGIBLE),	 its	 pre-acquisition	 debt	
(TRGT_DEBT),	 and	 its	 relative	 size	 (TRGT_SIZE).	 Information	on	 the	 target	 firm	 comes	
from	mandatory	 disclosures	 in	 notes	 to	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 financial	 statements.	We	
include	TRGT_INTANGIBLE	 because	more	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	might	 be	 allocated	 to	
goodwill	 in	 intangible-intensive	 target	 firms.	 We	 measure	 TRGT_INTANGIBLE	 as	 the	
target	 firm’s	 total	 intangible	assets	scaled	with	 its	 total	assets	prior	 to	 the	acquisition.	
We	 include	 TRGT_DEBT	 to	 control	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 additional	 debt	 to	 the	 acquirer’s	







managerial	 overconfidence	 or	 that	 they	 provide	 private	 benefits	 to	 agents	 of	 the	
acquiring	firm.	We	measure	TRGT_SIZE	as	the	as	the	purchase	price	paid	for	the	target	
firm	scaled	with	the	market	value	of	the	acquiring	firm	at	the	time	of	the	acquisition.	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm,	 we	 control	 for	 its	 profitability	 (ACQ_ROA),	 its	
indebtedness	 (ACQ_DEBT)	 its	 liquidity	 (ACQ_LIQUID),	 its	 concentration	 of	 power	
(ACQ_OWNCONC)	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 dual	 classes	 of	 shares	 (ACQ_DVR).	 We	 include	
ACQ_ROA	 to	 control	 for	 differences	 in	 the	 acquirer’s	 capacity	 to	 withstand	 expenses	
associated	with	amortizations.	We	measure	ACQ_ROA	as	 the	acquiring	 firm’s	net	profit	
divided	 by	 its	 average	 total	 assets	 in	 the	 year	 prior	 to	 the	 acquisition.	 We	 include	
ACQ_DEBT	to	control	for	the	impact	of	debt	covenants	on	the	PPA	decision.	We	expect	a	
positive	 association	 between	 ACQ_DEBT	 and	 the	 propensity	 to	 allocate	 the	 purchase	
price	to	goodwill.	We	measure	ACQ_DEBT	as	total	debt	scaled	by	total	assets	in	the	year	
prior	 to	 the	 acquisition.	We	 include	 ACQ_LIQUID	 to	 further	 control	 for	 the	 acquirer’s	
capacity	 to	withstand	 expenses	 associated	with	 amortizations	 and	measure	 it	 as	 cash	
and	short-term	investments	scaled	with	total	assets	in	the	year	prior	to	the	acquisition.	
ACQ_OWNCONC	is	measured	as	the	largest	owner’s	percentage	of	voting	rights.	ACQ_DVR	
is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 taking	 the	 value	 of	 1	 when	 there	 are	 shares	 with	 differentiated	
voting	rights;	typically	A-	and	B-shares.	
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Finally,	 we	 include	 two	 deal-specific	 control	 variables:	 the	 level	 of	 trading	 in	 the	





database.	 Capital	 market	 information	 comes	 from	 the	 Thomson	 Reuters	 Datastream	
database,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 information	 on	 the	 value	 of	 traded	 shares	 ACTIVITY,	




as	 the	 compensation	 to	 the	 CEO	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm.	 Because	 both	 the	 number	 of	
acquisitions	 and	 the	 purchase	 price	 paid	 in	 acquisitions	 vary	 considerably	 between	
years,	we	include	untabulated	year-dummies	in	all	regression	analyses.	We	also	include	
firm-dummies	 to	control	 for	 the	serial	acquiring	 firms.	 In	 the	regression	modeling,	we	






that	 there	 are	 2,299	 available	 firm-years	 during	 the	 studied	period.	We	 exclude	 firms	
not	reporting	in	accordance	with	IFRS	(28	firm-years),	and	those	that	are	not	domiciled	
in	Sweden	(118	firm-years).	We	also	exclude	financially	oriented	firms	including	banks,	
insurance	 companies,	 real	 estate	 companies,	 and	 investment	 companies	 (371	 firm-
years).	 Only	 ten	 firm-year	 observations	 are	 excluded	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 data.	 These	




For	 all	 of	 these	 1,772	 firm-year	 observations,	 we	 manually	 search	 the	 annual	
reports	to	identify	acquisitions	where	the	acquiring	firm	has	reached	an	ownership	of	at	
least	50%	of	the	target	firm’s	shares.	As	shown	in	Panel	B	of	Table	1,	we	identify	1,418	
separate	 PPA	 disclosures	 containing	 information	 about	 2,660	 individual	 transactions	
where	the	acquiring	firm	has	reached	controlling	ownership	of	a	target	 firm.	For	all	of	
the	 PPA	 disclosures,	 we	 collect	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	 target	 firm	 and	 the	 deal	
characteristics.	As	we	do	this,	the	sample	size	decreases	further.		
First,	we	find	that	the	purchase	price	is	either	not	specified,	or	the	acquiring	firms	
report	 that	 it	 is	 zero	 (in	64	and	9	acquisitions,	 respectively).	 Second,	we	 find	 that	 the	
value	 of	 goodwill	 is	 either	 not	 specified	 or	 it	 is	 negative	 (101	 and	 21	 firm-years,	
respectively).	Overall,	we	 find	 that	 the	disclosures	on	purchase	price	allocations	differ	
substantially	between	acquiring	 firms;	 and	quite	often,	 vital	 information	 such	as	asset	
revaluations,	 are	 missing.	 For	 this	 reason,	 we	 exclude	 another	 132	 PPA	 disclosures,	
leading	to	our	final	sample	of	1,112	PPA	disclosures	containing	2,214	(1.99	acquisitions	
per	 firm-year)	 successful	 acquisitions	 where	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 reached	 controlling	
ownership.	 In	 our	 sample,	 263	 PPA	 disclosures	 comprise	 more	 than	 one	 successful	
acquisition.	In	the	sample,	one	acquiring	firm	(Securitas)	includes	the	largest	number	of	
32	successful	deal	transactions	in	one	PPA	disclosure	(not	tabulated).		
We	 emphasize,	 however,	 that	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 (Securitas),	 and	 other	 acquiring	
firms	 with	 multiple	 successful	 deals,	 always	 provide	 separate	 PPA	 disclosures	 for	
materially	 large	acquisitions.	As	shown	in	Table	1,	a	number	of	 the	PPA	disclosures	 in	
the	 early	 years	 lacked	 some	 of	 the	 necessary	 information.	 However,	 we	 find	 that	
purchase	prices	are	less	well	disclosed	in	2010	and	onwards.	In	total,	78.2	%	of	the	PPA	
disclosures	 contain	 enough	 disclosed	 information	 to	 be	 part	 of	 our	 sample.	 This	 high	
percentage	indicates	a	fairly	high	level	of	reliability.	
Panel	A	of	Table	2	provides	more	detailed	descriptive	statistics	on	the	final	sample	
of	 the	1,112	PPA	disclosures	 included	 in	 the	analyses.	These	disclosures	 relate	 to	690	
firm-years,	meaning	that	an	acquiring	firm	often	provides	more	than	one	PPA	disclosure	
in	 the	 same	 year.	 Throughout	 the	 entire	 sample	 period,	 there	 are	 PPA	 disclosures	 in	
38.9%	 of	 the	 firm-year	 observations.	 Similar	 to	 global	 statistics	 on	 merger	 and	







of	 the	acquisitions.	The	acquiring	 firms	do	not	 always	disclose	 the	nationality	of	 their	
acquisitions	 –	 especially	 when	 multiple	 acquisitions	 are	 bundled	 together	 –	 but	
untabulated	results	show	that	the	1,429	foreign	acquisitions	include	target	firms	from	at	
least	 73	 countries.	 Most	 of	 the	 PPA	 disclosures	 reflect	 the	 revaluations	 of	 a	 single	
acquisition	 (849	 observations)	 of	 the	 1,112	 PPA	 disclosures.	 We	 also	 note	 that	 the	
number	 of	 toehold	 acquisitions	 (i.e.	 when	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 owned	 shares	 prior	 to	
reaching	 the	 controlling	 stake	 of	 the	 target	 firm)	 is	 quite	 small	 and	 seemingly	
disappearing	with	time.	It	should	be	stressed	that	our	sample	consists	of	unique	data	on	
acquisitions	 of	 private	 firms;	 as	 opposed	 to	 prior	 PPA	 studies,	 only	 24	 of	 the	 1,112	
separately	reported	acquisitions	are	acquisitions	of	publicly	listed	firms.	Finally,	we	note	
that	 130	 (11.7	 %)	 PPA	 disclosures	 contain	 no	 allocation	 to	 goodwill	 and	 that	 the	
purchase	 price	 for	 128	 (11.5%)	 target	 firms	 is	 below	 USD	 1mn.8	 Panel	 B	 contains	
information	 on	 the	 sizes	 of	 acquisitions.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 our	 sample	 –	
consisting	 of	mainly	 privately	 held	 target	 firms	 –	 contains	 considerably	 smaller	 deals	







%	of	 the	 total	 sample	 of	 the	1,112	PPA	disclosures)	 containing	 information	 about	 the	
																																								 																				
8	In	addition,	the	sample	contains	132	observations	where	the	target	company	has	negative	equity	at	the	
time	of	 the	acquisition.	For	 this	reason,	 the	measure	TRGT_DEBT	can	be	 larger	 than	1	(i.e.,	 total	debt	 is	
larger	than	total	assets)	and	EXCESS_PRICE	can	be	negative	(i.e.,	there	is	negative	equity).	We	exclude	all	
acquisitions	 when	 there	 is	 no	 purchase	 price.	 All	 results	 are	 qualitatively	 similar	 when	 excluding	
acquisitions	of	firms	with	negative	equity.	
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target	 firms’	 initial	 book	 values	 and	 the	 fair-value	 reassessments.	 We	 note	 that	 the	
number	of	acquisitions	with	 full	disclosure	of	 fair-value	reassessments	decreases	with	






average	 purchase	 price	 paid	 for	 a	 target	 firm	 during	 the	 period	 is	 SEK	 526mn.	 The	
highest	 price	was	 paid	 in	 2007	 (SEK	 991mn),	 and	 the	 lowest	was	 paid	 in	 2010	 (SEK	
144mn).	The	average	target	firm	had	a	pre-acquisition	book	value	of	equity	(BVE)	of	SEK	
132mn,	with	an	average	high	of	SEK	263mn	in	2007,	and	an	average	low	of	SEK	39mn	in	
2010.	 Thus,	 the	 average	 acquisition	 was	 made	 with	 a	 market-to-book	 ratio	 of	 4.0:	
acquiring	firms	paid	on	average	four	times	the	target	firm’s	book	value	of	equity.	Table	3	
also	shows	that	firms	paid	the	highest	premium	for	target	firms	in	2005	with	a	market-











%	 (or	 more)	 for	 29%	 of	 the	 firm-year	 observations	 (untabulated)	 as	 many	 firms	
routinely	 allocate	 the	 entire	 excess	 purchase	 price	 (i.e.,	 100	 %)	 to	 goodwill.	









total	 assets	 have	 increased	 in	 the	 studied	 period,	 but	 only	 from	 2.5	 %	 to	 5.1	 %	





Table	 4	 presents	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 variables	 used	 in	 the	 regression	
analyses.	 The	 total	 sample	 is	 1,112	 observations	 of	 PPA	disclosures	 by	 publicly	 listed	
non-financial	Swedish	acquiring	firms	in	the	period	2005-2013.	The	dependent	variable	
GOODWILL	 displays	an	equal-weighted	average	value	of	0.591,	which	 is	 fairly	 close	 to	
the	value-weighted	average	shown	in	Table	2	(0.53).	Thus,	 for	the	average	acquisition,	












EXCESS_PRICE	 has	 a	 mean	 value	 of	 0.748,	 suggesting	 that	 25.2	 %	 of	 the	 excess	




above-average	 number	 of	 acquisitions	within	 its	 industry	 year,	 and	we	 find	 that	 only	
21.9	%	acquiring	 firms	are	 involved	 in	serial-acquisitions	over	 the	years.	We	 find	 that	
UNCERTAINTY	 is	 62.2	%	 of	 the	 transaction	 deals,	meaning	 that	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	
acquisitions	are	made	outside	of	Sweden.9		
Among	the	other	independent	variables,	ACQ_OWNCONC	with	a	mean	of	33.4	%	(and	
a	median	 of	 29.7	%)	 suggests	 that	 the	 controlling	 owner	 on	 average	 hold	 about	 one-
third	 of	 the	 voting	 rights	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm.	 This,	 together	 with	 the	 low	 standard	
deviation	of	17.7,	suggests	that	strong	owner(s)	are	in	control	of	the	Swedish	acquiring	
firms.	 We	 also	 note	 that	 the	 lowest	 ownership	 level	 is	 5.1	 %,	 clearly	 indicating	 few	
Swedish	 acquiring	 firms	 have	 dispersed	 ownership.	 Furthermore,	 we	 observe	 that	






Table	 5	 presents	 pairwise	 correlations	 for	 the	 sample	 used	 in	 the	 regression	
analyses.	In	Column	1,	we	find	that	excess	purchase	price	(EXCESS_PRICE)	is	positively	
correlated	with	foreign	acquisitions	(UNCERTAINTY),	the	acquiring	firms’	past	goodwill	
allocation	 (PAST_GOODWILL)	 the	 target	 firm’s	 book	 value	 of	 intangibles	
(TRGT_INTANGIBLE)	 and	 the	 book	 value	 of	 debt	 (TRGT_DEBT).	 These	 correlations	
indicate	that	the	acquiring	firm	pays	a	higher	excess	purchase	price,	relative	to	the	book	
																																								 																				
9	This	 is	 slightly	 lower	 than	 the	 reported	Foreign	acquisitions	 (%)	of	65	%	 in	Table	2.	The	difference	 is	
caused	 by	 different	 sample	 restrictions	 in	 the	 main	 regression	 analyses	 where	 all	 deals	 have	 to	 be	
confirmed	non-Swedish.	
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value,	 when	 the	 target	 firm	 is	 domiciled	 outside	 of	 Sweden,	 it	 is	 more	 intangible	
intensive,	 and	 more	 indebted.	 An	 acquiring	 firm’s	 goodwill	 allocations	 propensity	




In	 Column	 2,	 we	 find	 that	 more	 uncertain	 acquisitions	 (UNCERTAINTY)	 are	
positively	 correlated	with	 family	 acquiring	 firms	 (FAMILY)	 and	 the	 target	 firm’s	 book	
value	 of	 intangibles	 (TRGT_INTANGIB).	 However,	 foreign	 acquisitions	 (UNCERTAINTY)	
are	 negatively	 correlated	 with	 the	 acquiring	 intensive	 firms’	 past	 experience	
(EXPERIENCE),	 cash	 flow	 rights	 (CF_RIGHTS),	 non-cash	 payments	 (NONCASH)	 and	 the	
target	firm’s	relative	size	to	the	acquiring	firm	(TRGT_SIZE).	Overall,	these	correlations	
indicate	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 governed	 by	 a	 family	 are	 more	 prone	 to	 successfully	
complete	a	deal	with	a	target	firm	outside	of	Sweden.	However,	acquiring	firms	with	an	
above-average	 acquisition	experience	 and	owners	with	more	 cash	 flow	 rights	 are	 less	
interested	in	acquiring	target	firms	outside	of	Sweden.	
Column	 3,	 displays	 that	 intensive	 acquiring	 firms	 (EXPERIENCE)	 are	 positively	
correlated	 with	 differentiated	 voting	 rights	 (ACQ_DVR),	 options	 (OPTIONS),	 and	 the	
acquiring	firm’s	return	on	assets	(ACQ_ROA).	EXPERIENCE	 is	also	negatively	correlated	
with	cash	flow	rights	(CF_RIGHTS),	variable	compensation	(BONUS),	non-cash	payment	
(NONCASH),	 and	 the	 target	 firm’s	 level	 of	 book	 value	 intangibles	 (TRGT_INTANGIB).	
Thus,	acquiring	 intensive	 firms	seem	to	be	affected	by	 the	governance	of	 the	 firm,	but	
there	is	not	a	uniform	direction;	earnings-based	compensation	is	positively	related	with	
above	 average	 acquisitions,	 while	 overall	 variable	 compensations	 are	 negatively	
correlated	with	above	average	acquisition	intensity.			
In	 Column	 4,	 family	 firms	 (FAMILY)	 are	 positively	 correlated	 with	 ownership	
concentration	 (ACQ_OWNCON),	 differentiated	 voting	 rights	 (ACQ_DVR),	 the	 acquiring	
firm’s	 past	 experience	 with	 goodwill	 (PAST_GOODWILL),	 and	 acquirer’s	 level	 of	 debt	
(ACQ_DEBT).	FAMILY	is	also	negatively	correlated	with	the	CEO’s	total	salary	(TOTPAY),	
the	 market	 activity	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 (ACTIVITY),	 and	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 pre-




also	more	prone	 to	use	goodwill	 in	 the	PPA	process,	and	 less	prone	 to	pay	 their	CEOs	
high	 salaries.	 Finally,	 in	 column	 8	 in	 Table	 5,	 the	 variable	 compensation	 (BONUS)	
correlates	 positively	 with	 non-cash	 payments	 (NONCASH),	 and	 negatively	 with	 the	
existence	 of	 CEO	 option	 plans	 (OPTIONS),	 the	 CEO’s	 total	 salary	 (TOTPAY),	 and	 the	
acquiring	 firm’s	 level	 of	 debt	 (ACQ_DEBT).	 Overall,	 this	 suggests	 that	 CEOs	with	more	




Table	 6	 presents	 the	 results	 from	 the	 main	 analyses	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	
propensity	 to	 allocate	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill.	 Specifically,	 we	 present	 results	
from	 univariate	 regressions	 (see	 column	Univariate	 in	 Table	 6),	 and	 five	multivariate	
models	(see	columns	1-5	in	Table	6).	Model	1	is	our	baseline	model,	and	Models	2	and	3	
come	 with	 slight	 differences	 in	 the	 specification	 of	 the	 control	 variables	 related	 to	
ownership	structures.	Models	4	and	5	both	hold	the	same	specification	as	Model	1,	but	
are	 restricted	 to	 only	 include	 PPA	 disclosures	 of	 purchase	 price	 payments	 above	 the	
threshold	of	SEK	8mn	(i.e.,	Model	4),	which	is	common	in	the	M&A	literature	to	reduce	







Starting	with	 the	managerial	motives	 and	 the	 PPA	decision,	we	 find	BONUS	 to	 be	
consistently	 unrelated	 with	 the	 allocation	 of	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill,	 with	 the	





purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill.	 Thus,	we	 find	 support	 for	 the	 first	 hypothesis,	 suggesting	
that	managers’	 impact	 on	 the	 PPA	 decision	 is	 limited	 in	 our	 institutional	 setting.	We	
attribute	 this	 to	 three	 important	 differences	 between	 the	 U.S.	 (Anglo-Saxon)	 and	 the	
Swedish	 institutional	settings.	First,	managers	 in	Sweden	are	by	the	Corporate	Act	not	
allowed	 to	 take	on	a	 leading	role	on	 the	corporate	board.	Second,	 the	Swedish	boards	
are	 dominated	 by	 active	 owners	 and	 it	 is	more	 likely	 that	 CEOs	 act	 in	 their	 interests.	
Third,	 CEOs	 of	 Swedish	 firms	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 benefit	 from	 controlling	 profit	 using	




to	 goodwill	 for	 all	model	 specifications,	 suggesting	 that	 family-owned	 acquiring	 firms	
allocate	more	 to	 goodwill.	 The	 only	 exceptions	 are	when	we	 exclude	 deals	 below	 the	
threshold	 of	 SEK	8mn	 (i.e.,	Model	 4)	 and	 reduce	 the	 sample	 to	 only	 those	disclosures	
that	contain	one	deal	(i.e.,	Model	5).	This	is	probably	because	family-dominated	Swedish	
firms	 are	behind	most	 of	 the	 small	 deals	 in	 the	 sample.	Overall,	 the	 family	 firm	effect	
appears	to	be	robust	to	controls	for	other	ownership	structures.	Regardless	of	whether	





Altogether,	 the	 results	 indicate	 that	 strong	 controlling	 owners,	 such	 as	 families,	
eliminate	 managerial	 incentives	 to	 misuse	 unverifiable	 fair-value	 measures,	 reducing	
the	 agency	 conflict	 between	 managers	 and	 owners.	 However,	 the	 agency	 conflict	
between	controlling	and	non-controlling	owners	might	be	problematic	given	that	strong	
family	owners	allocate	more	of	the	purchase	price	to	goodwill.	Prior	studies	on	the	PPA	
decision	 focus	 on	 Anglo-Saxon	 settings	 with	 considerably	 larger	 acquirers.	 Thus,	 we	
provide	 evidence	 that	 managerial	 incentives	 may	 not	 prevail,	 but	 instead,	 they	 are	
context-specific.	
In	 support	 of	 the	 third	 hypothesis,	 we	 find	 that	 EXCESS_PRICE	 has	 a	 positive	
significant	 association	with	 the	 propensity	 to	 allocate	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill.	
When	 the	 acquiring	 firm	pays	 a	higher	 excess	purchase	price	 (i.e,	 a	 premium)	 for	 the	
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target	firm,	it	is	more	likely	to	allocate	a	larger	portion	of	the	purchase	price	to	goodwill.	
Although	 the	 argument	 could	 be	 that	 excess	 purchase	 price	 is	 due	 to	 resources	 not	
possible	to	capitalize,	it	is	more	likely,	based	on	prior	findings	in	the	M&A	literature,	that	
managers	 allocate	 larger	 excess	 purchase	 price	 payments	 to	 goodwill	 because	 they	





There	 is	 also	 support	 for	 the	 fourth	 hypothesis.	 EXPERIENCE	 has	 a	 significant	
negative	coefficient	in	all	six	regression	models.	This	suggests	that	serial-acquirers	learn	
how	 to	 attribute	 purchase	 prices	 to	 specific	 assets	 and	 liabilities.	 In	 addition,	 Table	 5	
reports	 that	 the	 correlation	 between	EXPERIENCE	 and	EXCESS_PRICE	 is	 negative	 and	
statistically	 significant.	 This	 suggests	 that	 serial-acquirers	 are	 also	 paying	 less	 excess	
purchase	price	for	their	acquisition	targets.	However,	only	a	few	firms	are	experienced	
acquirers.	Perhaps	using	knowledge	from	experienced	third-parties,	 including	auditing	
firms	 and	 investment	 banks,	 could	 increase	 the	 proportion	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	
allocated	to	non-goodwill	items.	
We	 also	 find,	 in	 support	 of	 the	 fifth	 hypothesis,	 that	 UNCERTAINTY	 is	 positively	
associated	 with	 the	 allocation	 of	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill	 over	 all	 model	
specifications.	 Acquiring	 firms	 seem	 to	 counteract	 the	 higher	 level	 of	 uncertainty	 in	
foreign	 acquisitions	 with	 a	 proportionately	 larger	 allocation	 to	 unspecific	 goodwill	
instead	of	specific	assets.	Allocating	more	to	goodwill	might	be	an	option-of-last-resort,	
but	it	raises	the	question	of	whether	acquiring	firms	perhaps	should	devote	more	time	
to	 learn	 about	 their	 foreign	 acquisition	 strategies.	 Similar	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	





findings	 in	 the	 corporate	 finance	 literature	 that	 firms	 paying	with	 non-cash	 are	more	






fact,	 this	 variable	 has	 the	highest	 t-stat	 of	 all	 independent	 variables;	 thus	 indicating	 a	
strong	serial	dependence	in	the	PPA	decision.	In	the	analysis,	this	variable	is	statistically	
significant,	but	dropping	it	has	no	material	effect	on	any	of	the	test	variables	 in	any	of	
















more	 relevant	 information.	 Empirical	 studies	 show	 that	 goodwill	 has	 increased	 in	
relative	 importance	 (as	 well	 as	 in	 absolute	 value)	 over	 the	 years	 with	 fair-value	
measurements	(Ramanna	&	Watts,	2012).		In	the	Swedish	institutional	setting,	goodwill	
as	a	percentage	of	total	assets	increased	from	12.8%	to	19.2%	with	the	implementation	











based	 on	 prior	 literature	 and	 the	 Swedish	 institutional	 setting.	 We	 find	 that	 family	
ownership	increases	the	level	of	purchase	price	allocated	to	goodwill.	Furthermore,	and	
in	 contrast	 to	 prior	 studies	 on	 the	 PPA	 decision	 (Shalev	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Detzen	&	 Zülch,	
2012;	Zhang	&	Zhang,	2017),	we	 find	 that	 the	CEOs’	 compensation	 is	unrelated	 to	 the	
allocation	of	 the	purchase	price	 to	 goodwill.	These	 two	 findings	 suggest	 that	 although	
the	agency	conflict	between	owners	and	management	 is	curbed,	 the	controlling	 family	











literature	 on	 recognized	 intangible	 assets	 by	 exploring	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 initial	
valuation	 of	 goodwill.	 Our	 findings	 clearly	 indicate	 that	 the	 book	 value	 of	 goodwill	 is	
endogenously	determined	before	any	impairment	test	 is	conducted.	Second,	we	add	to	
the	literature	on	agency	conflicts.	In	particular,	we	show	that	the	discretion	of	fair-value	
measurements	 may	 not	 just	 reflect	 managers’	 opportunistic	 motives,	 but	 also	 family	
owners’	opportunistic	motives.	Thus,	 it	should	be	stressed	that	 the	appropriateness	of	
fair-value	 measures	 depends	 on	 the	 institutional	 setting.	 Third,	 our	 findings	 have	
implications	 for	research	on	recognized	goodwill.	Focusing	on	the	 impairment	process	
alone	may	underestimate	the	amount	of	discretion	managers	can	exercise	in	accounting	
for	 goodwill.	 We	 show	 that	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 found	 to	 determine	 goodwill	
impairments	also	determine	the	allocation	of	the	purchase	price	to	goodwill.	Our	study	
should	 be	 of	 interest	 for	 international	 standard	 setters	 as	 it	 provides	 evidence	 that	
	 27	
controlling	 family	owners	have	an	 impact	on	 the	PPA	decision	 in	a	 setting	 relevant	 to	
international	accounting	policy.		
We	encourage	more	research	on	purchase	price	allocation	decisions.	 In	particular,	
we	 need	 to	 further	 explore	 the	motives	 driving	 the	 PPA	 decisions,	 and	 how	 different	
institutional	settings	may	relate	to	the	use	of	fair-value	measures.	Moreover,	we	need	to	
understand	potential	 remedies	 that	 can	 lower	 corporate	 insiders’	 (i.e.	management	or	
controlling	 owners)	 propensity	 to	 overallocate	 to	 goodwill,	 as	 well	 as	 advance	 our	
understanding	about	the	 factors	 incentivizing	high-quality	disclosures	about	corporate	
acquisitions	 in	 terms	 of	 payment	 and	 the	 underlying	 acquired	 businesses.	 A	 possible	




















































































































Table 1 - Sample Description	
                          
      2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
                          
Panel A: Sample Selection 
	
                  
Initial sample: 266 268 267 256 251 242 249 249 251 2,299 
  Non-IFRS reporting firms 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 28 
  Other foreign firms 13 12 13 12 12 13 14 15 14 118 
  Financial firms* 42 45 46 45 41 38 38 36 40 371 
  Missing data 3 2 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 10 
Number of included sample firm-years 205 206 202 196 193 188 194 194 194 1,772 
                          
Panel B: Sample of PPA Disclosures 
	
                  
Total number of PPA disclosures: 160 180 228 192 107 134 154 147 116 1,418 
  Missing price 3 6 4 7 4 11 10 12 7 64 
  Zero price   2 0 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 9 
  Missing GW (but not price) 13 20 15 14 3 7 4 13 12 101 
  Negative goodwill identified 4 5 3 2 3 4 0 0 0 21 
  Other disclosure missing 22 18 22 13 17 14 5 12 9 132 
Number of studied PPA disclosures 120 136 187 156 81 102 133 109 88 1,112 
Table 1 shows the sample selection of this paper. Panel A reports the initial sample of publically listed firm years available on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) in 
the period 2005-2013, and the exclusions of unsuitable firms, leading to the final sample of 1,772 publically listed firm-years. Panel B reports the total number of PPA 
disclosures identified after going through the annual reports of the 1,1772 sample firm-years in the period 2005-2013, and the exclusion of PPA disclosures not containing 
price goodwill and/or other relevant information to conduct the study, leading to a final sample of 1,112 PPA disclosures.   
* Financial firms include banks, insurance companies, real estate companies, and investment companies. 
	
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics for the PPA Sample	
                        
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
                        
Panel A: PPA Disclosure Details                     
Number of PPA disclosures 120 136 187 156 81 102 133 109 88 1112 
Firms reporting acquisitions (#) 85 88 102 85 57 65 74 73 61 690 
Firms reporting acquisitions (%) 41.50% 42.70% 50.50% 43.40% 29.50% 34.60% 38.10% 37.60% 31.40% 38.90% 
Number of acquisitions (#) 221 244 379 349 155 187 269 237 173 2214 
Foreign acquisitions (#) 78 94 125 108 60 68 109 78 75 795 
Foreign acquisitions (%) 65.00% 69.10% 66.80% 69.20% 74.10% 66.70% 82.00% 71.60% 85.20% 72.20%  
Foreign acquisitions (# firms) 152 153 217 212 98 110 195 158 134 1429 
Single disclosures (#) 89 106 148 121 60 81 103 76 65 849 
Single disclosures (%) 74.20% 77.90% 79.10% 77.60% 74.10% 79.40% 77.40% 69.70% 73.90% 76.35%  
Toehold acquisitions (#) 23 14 19 15 12 12 6 7 3 111 
Toehold acquisitions (%) 19.20% 10.30% 10.20% 9.60% 14.80% 11.80% 4.50% 6.40% 3.40% 9.98%  
Public firms (#) 2 1 8 2 0 1 6 2 2 24 
Public firms (%) 1.70% 0.70% 4.30% 1.30% 0.00% 1.00% 4.50% 1.80% 2.30% 2.16%  
                        
Panel B: Acquisition Deal Values 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Purchase price (total) 51,327 60,191 169,330 41,810 32,207 47,981 60,888 71,005 53,534 588,272 
Purchase price (avg) 428 443 906 268 398 470 458 651 608  514 
Price to TotA (avg) 19.50% 15.20% 13.50% 6.40% 5.00% 7.60% 6.20% 9.80% 7.70% 10.1%  
                        
Panel C: Goodwill 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Goodwill (total) 32,693 21,201 98,205 24,455 14,014 29,194 32,170 30,100 33,500 315,530 
Goodwill (avg) 272 156 525 157 173 286 242 276 381  274 
Goodwill / Price (avg) 63.70% 35.20% 58.00% 58.50% 43.50% 60.80% 52.80% 42.40% 62.60% 53.10% 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the PPA sample on the disclosure details, the purchase price (deal value), and the amount of purchase price allocated to 
goodwill, in panel A, B, and C, respectively. All items are reported in total (#), average (avg) and relative (%) terms. 
	
	
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of PPA Revaluations 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
                      
PPA disclosures with revaluations 95 112 163 131 71 53 64 44 32 765 
Purchase price (avg) 510 430 991 281 436 144 376 480 744 526 
Acquired BVE (avg) 48 90 263 100 99 39 62 162 310 132 
Market-Book (avg) 10.6 4.8 3.8 2.8 4.4 3.7 6.1 3 2.4 4 
                      
Excess purchase price (avg) 462 341 728 181 337 105 314 318 434 395 
Revalued (avg) 133 195 146 12 149 27 80 108 10 107 
Classified as goodwill (avg) 329 146 582 169 188 78 234 210 424 287 
Goodwill_% 71.20% 42.70% 79.90% 93.40% 55.70% 74.60% 74.50% 65.90% 97.70% 72.80% 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the sample consisting of PPA disclosures with full information on the historical values and the revaluations of the target 
firm’s important accounting items, including assets, liabilities, equity and goodwill. Acquired BVE (avg) is average target firm’s book equity (i.e, the value of 
equity) at the acquisition date. Market-Book (avg) is the average book value of equity to the purchase price paid. Excess purchase price is the part of the purchase 
price paid over the book value of target firm’s equity. Revalued (avg) is the part of the excess purchase price that is allocated to other accounting items than 
goodwill (i.e., Classified as goodwill (avg)), which takes the residual value of excess purchase price after revaluation. Goodwill _% is the average percent of 
excess purchase price allocated to goodwill.   
	
 
Table 4 – Summary Statistics 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  Mean  Median Std. Dev. Min.  Max. N 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Dependent Variable             
GOODWILL 0.591 0.596 0.392 0.000 2.125 1,112 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Variables of Interest             
BONUS 0.331 0.244 0.450 0 5 1,112 
FAMILY   0.749 1.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 1,112 
EXCESS_PRICE  0.748 0.601 0.867 -11.500 12.300 1,112 
EXPERIENCE 0.219 0.000 0.414 0.000 1.000 1,112 
UNCERTAINTY 0.622 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 1,112 
              
Control Variables             
ACQ_OWNCON 0.334 0.297 0.177 0.051 0.893 1,112 
OPTIONS 0.190 0.000 0.392 0.000 1.000 1,112 
TOTPAY 10.5 5.848 44.26 0.861 1460.2 1,112 
NONCASH 0.093 0.000 0.233 -0.279 1.000 1,112 
ACTIVITY 0.835 0.576 0.848 0.000 7.838 1,112 
PAST_GOODWILL  -1.650 -1.372 1.245 -7.691 1.439 1,112 
ACQ_ROA  0.063 0.066 0.111 -0.740 1.179 1,112 
ACQ_DEBT  0.562 0.592 0.163 0.048 1.252 1,112 
ACQ_ LIQUID 0.101 0.074 0.112 0.000 0.943 1,112 
TRGT_INTANGIBLES 0.288 0.230 0.278 -.0714 1.558 1,112 
TRGT_DEBT  0.563 0.394 2.258 -4.207 67.000 1,112 
TRGT_SIZE  0.074 0.021 0.157 0.000 2.377 1,112 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 4 shows the mean, median, standard deviation and the minimum and maximum value of the most relevant 
variables in the empirical model(s) of this paper. The dependent variable GOODWILL is the PPA-reported goodwill 
divided by the paid purchase price.  
The explanatory variables : BONUS is the CEO’s variable compensation scaled by the value of the fixed compensation 
at the end of the year; FAMILY is an indicator variable taking the value of one when the largest owner of the acquiring 
firm is a family; EXCESS_PRICE, which we measure as the natural logarithm of the difference between the purchase 
price and the target firm’s book value of equity; EXPERIENCE is an indicator variable for the acquiring firms involved 
in acquisitions its industry average on a yearly basis; UNCERTAINTY is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
the target firm is domiciled outside of Sweden. 
Control variables: ACQ_CFRIGHT is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the largest owner; 
ACQ_OWNCON is the percentage of voting rights owned by the largest owner; ACQ_DVR is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if the acquiring firm has multiple classes shares; OPTIONS is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one if the CEO own stock options; TOTPAY is the CEO’s total compensation; NONCASH is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 when the acquiring firm does not pay the entire amount of the purchase price in cash; 
ACTIVITY is the level of trading in the acquiring firm as the value of all shares traded divided with the average market 
capitalization during the accounting period; PAST_GOODWILL is the acquiring firm’s book value of goodwill divided 
by beginning of the year total assets; ACQ_ROA is the acquiring firm’s net profit divided by its average total assets in 
the year prior to the acquisition; ACQ_DEBT is the acquiring firm’s the total debt divided by total assets in the year prior 
to the acquisition; ACQ_LIQUID is the acquiring firm’s amount of cash and short-term investments divided by total 
assets in the year prior to the acquisition; TRGT_INTANGIBLE is the target firm’s intangible assets scaled by the total 
assets of the target firm prior to the acquisition; TRGT_DEBT is the target firm’s total debt scaled by the total assets of 
the target firm prior to the acquisition; TRGT_SIZE is the bid price of the target firm relative to the market value of the 
acquiring firm at the time of the acquisition.  
Table 5 – Pairwise Correlation Matrix  
Variables		   (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	 (13)	 (14)	 (15)	 (16)	 (17)	 (18)	
EXCESS_PRICE (1) 
                  
UNCERTAINTY (2) 0.069**  
                 
EXPERIENCE (3) -0.0426  -0.179***  
                
FAMILY (4) 0.001  0.080***  -0.039  
               
ACQ_OWNCON (5) -0.036  0.017  0.000  0.157***  
              
ACQ_CFRIGHT (6) -0.044  -0.117***  -0.053* -0.070**  0.707***  
             
ACQ_DVR (7) 0.006 0.095***  0.084***  0.369*** 0.370***  -0.177***  
            
BONUS (8) 0.047  -0.027  -0.053* -0.007 0.014  0.008  0.068** 
            
OPTIONS (9) -0.037  0.036  0.054* -0.000   0.036  -0.082***  0.118*** -0.057*  
          
TOTPAY (10)  0.015  0.013  -0.007  -0.056* 0.006  -0.028  0.010  -0.211***  0.011  
          
NONCASH (11) 0.028 -0.196***  -0.049* -0.011  -0.118***  0.006  -0.139*** 0.064**  -0.021 -0.051* 
         
ACTIVITY (12) 0.042  0.127***  0.010  -0.082*** -0.230*** -0.336***  0.013  0.035  0.0108 0.061**  -0.067**  
        
PAST_GOODWILL (13) 0.125***  0.106***  0.021 0.133*** -0.168***  -0.246*** -0.030  -0.026  -0.104*** -0.022  0.022  0.033 
       
ACQ_ROA (14) -0.036  -0.020  0.066** -0.002  0.071**  -0.009  0.129*** -0.033  0.006 0.023 -0.089***  0.031  -0.088***  
      
ACQ_DEBT (15) 0.007 0.137***   0.018  0.125*** -0.056* -0.250*** 0.125*** -0.054*  0.020  0.099***  -0.134***  0.156***  0.055*  -0.013  
     
ACQ_LIQUID (16) -0.016  -0.015  -0.045 -0.105***  -0.116*** -0.070**  -0.039 -0.006  0.034  -0.006  0.119***  -0.016   -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.368***  
    
TRGT_INTANGIB (17) 0.118***  0.086***  -0.070**  0.016  -0.104*** -0.099***  0.034   0.021  0.024  0.049  -0.034  0.115***  0.177*** 0.057* 0.008  0.085***  
   
TRGT_DEBT (18) 0.208*** -0.039 -0.041  0.041  -0.010  0.010  0.046  0.038  -0.034  -0.007  0.105*** -0.006  0.008  -0.003  -0.019  -0.024  -0.071** 
  
TRGT_SIZE (19) -0.007  -0.073**  -0.027  -0.008 -0.074**  0.012  -0.106*** 0.027  -0.012 -0.034 0.249***  0.007  -0.011  -0.054* -0.080*** 0.054*  0.042  -0.030  
   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	
Table 5 shows the pairwise correlations for independent variables. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Section 3.2 
Research Design and Variable Definitions, and summarized in Tables 4 and 6.  













       
BONUS 0.011 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.002 -0.016** -0.013 
 (0.0125) (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0107) (0.0081) (0.0088) 
FAMILY 0.064** 0.047** 0.050** 0.063*** 0.015 0.004 
 (0.0270) (0.0221) (0.0212) (0.0218) (0.0179) (0.0225) 
EXCESS_PRICE 0.242*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.238*** 0.425*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0454) (0.0456) (0.0458) (0.0670) (0.0710) 
EXPERIENCE -0.091*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.357** 
 (0.0283) (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0198) (0.0224) (0.158) 
UNCERTAINTY 0.085*** 0.044** 0.046** 0.053*** 0.032* 0.050** 
 (0.0241) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0194) (0.0167) (0.0212) 
ACQ_CFRIGHT -0.342*** -0.197***  -0.298*** -0.092 0.012 
 (0.0828) (0.0716)  (0.0709) (0.0566) (0.0726) 
ACQ_DVR 0.006 -0.018  -0.032 -0.009 -0.016 
 (0.0238) (0.0213)  (0.0211) (0.0169) (0.0192) 
ACQ_OWNCON -0.167**  -0.103*    
 (0.0661)  (0.0567)    
OPTIONS -0.061** -0.032 -0.027 -0.049** -0.014 0.012 
 (0.0299) (0.0243) (0.0238) (0.0245) (0.0194) (0.0260) 
TOTPAY 0.029** 0.00004  0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00001 
 (0.0137) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
NONCASH 0.101** 0.085** 0.084** 0.097** 0.035 0.049 
 (0.0504) (0.0400) (0.0402) (0.0400) (0.0354) (0.0367) 
ACTIVITY 0.038*** 0.028** 0.033*** 0.026** 0.024** 0.028** 
 (0.0138) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0102) (0.0111) 
PAST_GOODWILL 0.064*** 0.042*** 0.046***  0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0083) (0.0082)  (0.0078) (0.0086) 
ACQ_ROA 0.101 0.289*** 0.298*** 0.254*** 0.249*** 0.254*** 
 (0.1051) (0.0962) (0.0972) (0.0957) (0.0725) (0.0720) 
ACQ_DEBT 0.061 -0.024 0.005 -0.048 -0.115* -0.178*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0683) (0.0677) (0.0681) (0.0619) (0.0643) 
ACQ_LIQUID -0.138 -0.002 0.0213 -0.060 0.0042 -0.006 
 (0.1052) (0.0891) (0.0888) (0.0869) (0.0754) (0.0795) 
TRGT_INTANGIBLE -0.114*** -0.265*** -0.269*** -0.236*** -0.243*** -0.184*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0412) (0.0423) (0.0392) 
TRGT_DEBT 0.032*** 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.167* 0.403*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0871) (0.0502) 
TRGT_SIZE -0.018 -0.002 -0.005 -0.013 0.020 0.017 
 (0.0751) (0.0512) (0.0515) (0.0496) (0.0468) (0.0614) 
Constant - 0.564*** 0.521*** 0.525*** 0.392*** 0.304*** 
  (0.0812) (0.0766) (0.0806) (0.0650) (0.0707) 
       
Observations 1,112 1,112 1,112 1,112 984 727 
Adj. R-square - 0.360 0.359 0.347 0.544 0.623 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the univariate and multivariate regression. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized on both axes at 
the one-percent level.  The dependent variable GOODWILL is the PPA-reported goodwill divided by the paid purchase price.  
The explanatory variables: BONUS is the CEO’s variable compensation scaled by the value of the fixed compensation at the 
end of the year; FAMILY is an indicator variable taking the value of one when the largest owner of the acquiring firm is a family; 
EXCESS_PRICE, which we measure as the natural logarithm of the difference between the purchase price and the target firm’s 
book value of equity; EXPERIENCE is an indicator variable for the acquiring firms involved in acquisitions its industry average 
on a yearly basis; UNCERTAINTY is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the target firm is domiciled outside of 
Sweden. 
Control variables: ACQ_CFRIGHT is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the largest owner; ACQ_OWNCON is 
the percentage of voting rights owned by the largest owner; ACQ_DVR is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the 
acquiring firm has multiple classes shares; OPTIONS is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the CEO own stock 
options; TOTPAY is the CEO’s total compensation; NONCASH is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when the acquiring 
firm does not pay the entire amount of the purchase price in cash; ACTIVITY is the level of trading in the acquiring firm as the 
value of all shares traded divided with the average market capitalization during the accounting period; PAST_GOODWILL is the 
acquiring firm’s book value of goodwill divided by beginning of the year total assets; ACQ_ROA is the acquiring firm’s net 
profit divided by its average total assets in the year prior to the acquisition; ACQ_DEBT is the acquiring firm’s the total debt 
divided by total assets in the year prior to the acquisition; ACQ_LIQUID is the acquiring firm’s amount of cash and short-term 
investments divided by total assets in the year prior to the acquisition; TRGT_INTANGIBLE is the target firm’s intangible assets 
scaled by the total assets of the target firm prior to the acquisition; TRGT_DEBT is the target firm’s total debt scaled by the total 
assets of the target firm prior to the acquisition; TRGT_SIZE is the bid price of the target firm relative to the market value of the 















































This study investigates whether initially recognized goodwill under the impairment-only approach 
provides a more faithful representation of acquired superior economic performance relative to the 
amortization approach. While standard setters promulgate the impairment-only approach with 
additional fair-value measures to provide a better representation of underlying economics, it has been 
suggested in the literature that discretionary goodwill accounting can be misused to inflate future 
earnings. While some studies suggest that, under the impairment-only approach, goodwill balances 
provide a better representation of future cash flows, I argue that the opposite may apply to initially 
recognized goodwill. This is because it is not possible to misuse initially recognized goodwill as a 
means of inflating future earnings under the amortization approach. Using hand-collected data from a 
Swedish setting, I test and find that initially recognized goodwill under the impairment-only approach 
does not provide a more faithful representation of acquired superior economic performance relative to 
the amortization approach. This suggests that the additional managerial discretion offered by the 














For	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 international	 standard	 setters	 have	 promulgated	 fair-
value	 accounting	 over	 historical-cost	 accounting	 to	 enhance	 the	 representational	
faithfulness	 of	 the	 economic	 reality	 (e.g.,	 FASB,	 2004;	 SEC,	 2003).	 Based	 on	 this	 new	
order,	 current	 international	 standards	 for	 goodwill	 accounting	 mandate	 yearly	
impairment	 tests	 instead	 of	 yearly	 systematic	 amortizations.	 However,	 the	 discretion	
offered	 by	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 can	 be	misused	 by	 inflating	 goodwill	 upon	
initial	 recognition	 in	 order	 to	 inflate	 future	 earnings	 (Watts,	 2003;	 Shalev,	 Zhang	 &	
Zhang,	 2013).	 This	 criticism	 suggests	 that	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 does	 not	
faithfully	 represent	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance,	 as	 it	 can	 include	 other	
acquired	 asset	 classes,	 and	 overpayments.	 Under	 the	 amortization	 approach,	 on	 the	
other	 hand,	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 cannot	 be	 misused	 as	 a	 means	 of	 inflating	
future	 earnings	 because,	 like	 all	 other	 acquired	 assets,	 it	 is	 amortized	 over	 time,	
suggesting	 that	 goodwill	 will	 probably	 not	 be	 inflated.	 In	 other	 words,	 when	 the	
subsequent	valuation	does	not	provide	for	any	discretion,	initially	recognized	goodwill	
could	 provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	




only	 approach	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	
performance	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 This	 is	 because	 Ramanna	 (2008)	
suggests	 that	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 was	 introduced	 to	 accommodate	 the	
interests	of	lobby	groups	instead	of	adopting	the	“more	suitable”	amortization	approach	
(Ramanna,	 2015).	 While	 standard	 setters	 favor	 the	 purchase	 method	 based	 on	
impairment	tests,	academics	and	practitioners	have	been	more	critical	and	tend	to	favor	
the	 purchase	 method	 based	 on	 yearly	 amortizations	 (e.g.,	 Ramanna,	 2015).	 In	
particular,	 critics	 argue	 that	 the	 additional	 discretion	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	
provides	 for	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 managers	 to	 inflate	 earnings	 by	 over-allocating	
overpayments	and	other	acquired	assets	to	goodwill,	because	managerial	consequences	
are	 unlikely.	 This	 is	 possible	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 because	 the	





2003;	 Hlousek,	 2002).	 Hence,	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 is	 able	 to	 inflate	 future	 earnings	 by	
over-allocating	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill	 and	 then,	 in	 the	 subsequent	 period,	
avoiding	 impairing	 it.	 While	 the	 value	 of	 goodwill	 is	 also	 unverifiable	 under	 the	




To	 the	 best	 of	 my	 knowledge,	 no	 prior	 studies	 have	 explored	 whether	 initially	
recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	
representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 than	 the	 amortization	
approach.	 Thus,	 I	 intend	 to	 add	 to	 the	 literature	 by	 investigating	 whether	 initially	
recognized	 goodwill’s	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 is	




most	 international	 settings	 prior	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	
Swedish	Generally	Accepted	Accounting	Principles	(GAAP)	permitted	acquiring	firms	to	
apply	 either	 the	 pooling	 method	 or	 the	 purchase	 method	 with	 yearly	 goodwill	




acquisition	 for	 the	 pooling	 option	 was	 disadvantageous	 for	 Swedish	 firms	 in	 the	
international	 competition	 for	 corporate	 control	 (Schuster,	 2002).	 Thus,	 the	
methodological	 advantage	 of	 using	 the	 Swedish	 setting	 is	 that	 initially	 recognized	
goodwill	under	the	purchase	option	with	yearly	amortizations	is	not	likely	to	be	biased	













which	 (if	 any)	 approach	 is	 better	 suited	 to	 providing	 a	 faithful	 representation	 of	
acquired	superior	economic	performance.		
I	 start	 the	 empirical	 investigation	 by	 manually	 reviewing	 2,555	 publicly	 listed	
Swedish	 firms’	annual	 reports	 for	 the	period	2001–2013,	 identifying	1,264	 firm-years	
with	 reported	 acquired	 goodwill.2	I	 collect	 data	 on	 firm-level	 information	 about	 the	
purchase	 price,	 the	 proportion	 of	 it	 allocated	 to	 goodwill,	 and	 any	 divestments	 of	
goodwill.	I	document	that	publicly	listed	Swedish	firms	in	the	period	2001-13	acquired	
target	firms	for	a	total	of	SEK	941.8	billion,	and	allocated	SEK	553.7	billion	(58.8%)	to	
goodwill,	 ranging	 from	 SEK	 0.1million	 to	 SEK	 30.5	 billion.	 I	 employ	 data	 from	
COMPUSTAT	 Global	 to	 construct	 my	 four	 empirical	 models	 approximating	 acquired	
superior	economic	performance,	including	(i)	return	on	assets	(ROA),	(ii)	sales	growth,	
(iii)	 stock	 return,	 and	 (iv)	 Tobin’s	 q.	 In	 particular,	 I	 estimate	 the	 first	 two	measures	
based	on	the	change	around	a	window	before	and	after	completion	of	 the	acquisition,	
and	the	latter	two	measures	are	estimated	one	year	after	completion.		After	controlling	
for	 a	 number	 of	 known	 factors	 that	 affect	 the	 success	 of	 an	 acquisition,	 I	 find	 that	
initially	 recognized	goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	does	not	provide	a	
more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 future	 economic	 performance	 relative	 to	 the	
amortization	 approach.	 Specifically,	 I	 find	 that	 the	 interaction	 between	 initially	
recognized	goodwill	and	the	impairment-only	approach	(i.e.,	the	variable	of	interest)	is	
not	 statistically	 significantly	 associated	 with	 the	 four	 measures	 in	 any	 of	 the	 four	
models.	 Thus,	 I	 conclude	 that	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 does	 not	 provide	
additional	 information	 about	 acquired	 superior	 economic	performance	 relative	 to	 the	
amortization	approach.	
This	study	contributes	to	the	literature	in	several	ways.	Overall,	it	contributes	to	the	
literature	 on	 the	 initial	 recognition	 of	 intangible	 assets.	 While	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
studies	 on	 goodwill	 accounting	 have	 explored	 the	 implications	 of	 impairment	 testing	
(e.g.,	Beatty	&	Weber,	2006;	Ramanna,	2008;	Ramanna	&	Watts,	2012),	 relatively	 few	
studies	 have	 investigated	 its	 initial	 recognition.	 By	 focusing	 solely	 on	 managerial	
																																																								









goodwill	 were	 conducted.	 For	 example,	 Shalev	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 find	 that	 acquiring	
managers	in	the	U.S.	are	more	likely	to	over-allocate	to	goodwill	under	the	impairment-
only	 approach	 when	 their	 bonuses	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 impairment	 decision	 through	
accounting	earnings.	Moreover,	Zhang	&	Zhang	(2015)	show	that	the	finding	by	Shalev	
et	 al.	 (2013)	 is	 only	 true	 when	 goodwill	 is	 recognized	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach,	 but	 not	 under	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 Thus,	 goodwill	 is	 probably	
recognized	endogenously	so	 that	managers	can	enhance	 future	earnings	and	bonuses.	
This	 study	 explores	 whether,	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach,	 the	 potential	
endogenous	 over-allocation	 to	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 has	
consequences	 for	 its	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance.	 If	
managers	 misuse	 initial	 recognition	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 enhance	 future	 earnings,	 goodwill	
should	provide	 a	 less	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	performance	under	
the	impairment-only	approach	than	under	the	amortization	approach.	
This	 study	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 small	 but	 growing	 literature	 investigating	
whether	 goodwill	 is	 a	 valid	 predictor	 of	 acquired	 superior	 performance	 under	 the	
impairment-only	 approach.	 Yehuda,	 Vincent	 &	 Lys	 (2017)	 show	 that	 the	 relationship	
between	initially	recognized	goodwill	and	future	economic	performance	depends	on	the	
success	 of	 the	 individual	 acquisition.	When	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 over-allocates	 because	
the	 acquisition	 was	 an	 economic	 loss,	 goodwill	 is	 negatively	 related	 to	 acquired	




is	 misused	 when	 it	 is	 palatable	 for	 the	 acquiring	 manager.	 This	 study	 complements	
Yehuda	et	al.	 (2017)	by	 testing	whether	 initially	 recognized	goodwill’s	 representation	
(or	 prediction)	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 was	 hampered	 by	 the	
additional	discretion	of	the	impairment-only	approach.			
To	my	knowledge,	only	one	study	has	explored	whether	goodwill	provides	a	more	
faithful	 representation	 of	 future	 economic	 performance	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	than	under	the	amortization	approach.	Lee	(2011)	explores	whether	goodwill	






that	 the	 ability	 of	 goodwill	 balances	 to	predict	 future	 cash	 flows	 is	more	pronounced	
under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 than	 under	 the	 amortization	 approach,	 which	
indicates	a	more	faithful	representation	of	the	underlying	economics.		
This	 study	 adds	 new	 insights	 into	 goodwill’s	 representation	 of	 future	 economic	
performance.	 I	 focus	on	 the	 initial	 recognition	of	goodwill	 as	opposed	 to	 the	goodwill	
balances,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 exploring	 goodwill’s	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	
economic	performance	upon	the	completion	of	an	acquisition.	The	main	reason	why	it	is	
important	 to	 separate	 the	 studies	 of	 the	 initial	 recognition	 of	 goodwill	 and	 goodwill	





impairment-only	 approach.	 However,	 and	 as	 discussed,	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	
can	only	be	misused	under	 the	 impairment-only	approach	 to	enhance	 future	earnings	
and	bonuses.	Hence,	initially	recognized	goodwill	under	the	amortization	approach	may	
provide	a	more	faithful	representation	of	future	acquired	economic	performance,	while	
goodwill	 balances	 will	 over	 time	 be	 suppressed	 and,	 thus,	 do	 not	 provide	 a	 faithful	
representation	of	the	underlying	economics.		
This	study	also	adds	new	insights	for	international	standard	setters	on	whether	the	
impairment-only	 approach	 to	 accounting	 for	 goodwill	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	
representation	of	the	underlying	economics.	Because	this	study	is	better	able	to	address	
the	potential	self-selection	bias	of	goodwill	accounting	under	the	amortization	approach	
because	 it	 uses	 Swedish	 data,	 the	 results	 of	 this	 study	 should	 be	 more	 reliable.	 My	
results	indicate	that	initially	recognized	goodwill	under	the	impairment-only	approach	




costs	 of	 implementing	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	prior	 two-option	






The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 In	 section	 2,	 I	 start	 by	
providing	 the	 relevant	 background	 and	 then	 develop	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 this	 study.	 In	





An	 acquiring	 firm	 is	mandated	 to	 apply	 the	 purchase	method	when	 the	 attained	
ownership	of	 a	 target	 firm	exceeds	50%.3	The	procedure	 typically	 starts	by	allocating	





Jensen	&	 Ruback,	 1983;	 Bradley,	 Desai	 &	 Kim,	 1988).	 This	 additional	 value	 of	 future	
superior	earnings	can	come	from	(i)	operational	and	financial	efficiencies	(for	example,	
by	 sharing	 overhead	 costs,	 attaining	 higher	 growth	 than	 stand-alone	 entities	 would	
attain	 by	 themselves,	 and	 optimization	 of	 the	 distribution	 network),	 (ii)	 advantages	
such	as	tax	efficiency,	and	(iii)	increased	market	power	(Seth,	1990a,	1990b).	However,	
accounting	standards	have	traditionally	permitted	the	inclusion	of	more	components	in	
goodwill	 than	acquired	synergies,	 including	other	unidentifiable	 intangible	assets	 that	
provide	 future	 superior	 earnings,	 such	 as	branding	 and	 reputation	 (e.g.,	 FASB,	 1999).	




explain	 the	 composition	 of	 goodwill,	 and	 thus	 its	 potential	 to	 faithfully	 represent	
acquired	superior	economic	performance.	Under	the	’top-down’	perspective,	goodwill	is	
viewed	purely	as	a	residual	of	the	purchase	price	minus	the	book	value	of	acquired	net	








overpayment,	 and	 any	 unrecognized	 and/or	 upward	 revaluation	 of	 the	 target	 firm’s	
other	 assets.	 This	 suggests	 that	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 is	 not	 able	 to	 faithfully	
represent	 the	acquired	superior	economic	performance.	The	 “bottom-up”	perspective,	
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 views	 goodwill	 as	 an	 asset	 in	 itself.	 That	 is,	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 is	
expected	 to	 value	 the	 goodwill	 as	 an	 asset,	 and	 to	 only	 include	 synergies	 from	 the	
acquisition.	All	other	items	such	as	overpayment	and	upward	revaluation	of	the	target’s	
initial	 assets	 should	 not	 be	 included	 in	 goodwill.	 In	 other	words,	 initially	 recognized	
goodwill	should	fully	represent	the	acquired	superior	economic	performance.		
While	 standard	 setters	 have	 traditionally	mixed	 these	 two	 perspectives,	 until	 the	
adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 goodwill	 accounting	 has	 emphasized	 the	
“top-down”	 perspective	 (Johnson	 &	 Petrone,	 1998).	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	
impairment-only	approach	under	International	Financial	Reporting	standards	(IFRS)	3	
provided	 further	 guidance	 on	 the	 identification	 of	 acquired	 intangible	 assets	 before	
determining	 goodwill	 compared	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach	 under	 International	
Accounting	Standards	(IAS)	22.	Hence,	under	 the	 impairment-only	approach,	goodwill	
should	 provide	 a	 better	 representation	 of	 future	 economic	 performance	 because	 it	
should	 contain	 fewer	 non-synergistic	 components	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	
approach.		
Critics	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 contend	 that	 the	
discretion	that	can	be	exercised	in	the	subsequent	valuation	of	goodwill	can	have	real	
consequences	 for	 the	 initial	 recognition	 of	 goodwill.	 Because	 the	 impairment	 test	 is	
subject	 to	managers’	 expectations	 and	 assumptions	 about	 the	 future,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
inflate	future	earnings	by	initially	inflating	goodwill	(e.g.,	Hlousek,	2002;	Watts,	2003).	
The	 reason	 why	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 can	 be	 misused	 to	 inflate	 initially	
recognized	 goodwill	 is	 that	 it	 is	 unverifiable	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 active	market	 prices.	
Thus,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 inflate	 future	 earnings	 by	 over-allocating	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	
goodwill	 instead	 of	 to	 other	 amortizable	 assets,	 and	 then	 avoiding	 any	 impairments	
(Watts,	 2003).	 Critics	 therefore	 implicitly	 argue	 that	 the	 amortization	 approach	 is	 a	
more	efficient	means	of	reducing	any	incentives	to	over-allocate	to	goodwill	because	it	
is	 not	 possible	 to	 inflate	 future	 earnings	 since	 all	 acquired	 assets	 are	 amortized	 over	
time	 (Ramanna,	 2015).	 Goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 can	 therefore	
include	more	 components	 than	 acquired	 synergies,	 and	 even	 overpayments.	 In	 other	





faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 because	 it	 is	 not	
advantageous	to	over-allocate	the	purchase	price	to	goodwill.	
Hence,	 whether	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	
representation	of	acquired	superior	economic	performance	under	the	impairment-only	
approach	depends	on	whether	 the	standard	 is	 fairly	applied	or	misused.	Yehuda	et	al.	
(2017)	show	that	acquiring	 firms	can	both	misuse	 the	 impairment-only	approach	and	
provide	economically	relevant	information,	depending	on	the	success	of	the	acquisition.	
Specifically,	 they	 report	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 with	 “economic	 losses”	 allocate	 a	
significantly	 larger	proportion	of	 the	purchase	price	 to	 goodwill,	 relative	 to	 acquiring	
firms	 with	 “economic	 profits”,	4	suggesting	 misuse	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	
However,	 they	also	 show	 that,	 in	59%	of	 their	 sample	of	 completed	acquisitions	with	
“economic	profits”,	 goodwill	 is	 positively	 correlated	with	 future	 economic	profit.	 This	
suggests	 that	 non-opportunistic	 acquiring	 firms	 provide	 relevant	 information	 to	
investors.	 However,	 these	 two	 findings	 do	 not	 provide	 any	 guidance	 on	whether	 the	
accounting	 for	 goodwill	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 future	 economic	
performance	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	
approach.				
Lee	 (2011)	 investigates	 whether	 goodwill	 balances	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	 provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 future	 cash	 flows	 relative	 to	 the	
amortization	 approach.	 In	particular,	 he	 explores	 goodwill	 balances’	 ability	 to	predict	
future	 cash	 flows	under	 the	 amortization	 and	 the	 impairment-only	 approaches	 in	 the	
U.S.,	comparing	the	periods	1996–1998	to	2004–2006.	He	finds	that	goodwill	balances’	
ability	 to	 predict	 future	 cash	 flows	 is	 more	 pronounced	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach,	 suggesting	 that	 goodwill	 balances	 with	 additional	 fair-value	 measures	
provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 the	 underlying	 economics.	 This	 finding	 is	
likely	related	to	the	fact	that	systematic	amortizations	are	by	construction	not	intended	
to	reflect	the	underlying	economics	of	goodwill	after	its	initial	recognition.	That	is,	the	
amortization	 approach	 tends	 to	 economically	 suppress	 goodwill	 balances	 over	 time.	
The	 impairment-only	approach,	on	 the	other	hand,	permits	 the	manager	 to	 signal	 the	
underlying	economic	value	of	the	goodwill	balances	by	using	impairment	tests	(Watts,	
																																																								
4	Yehuda	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 define	 the	 concepts	 ”economic	 profit”	 (”economic	 loss”)	 based	 on	 positive	







more	 faithful	representation	of	 future	economic	performance	over	time	as	 long	as	 the	
underlying	economic	value	of	goodwill	does	not	systematically	depreciate.	
However,	under	 the	amortization	approach,	 initially	recognized	goodwill	may	still	
provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 presentation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	
relative	to	the	impairment-only	approach.	This	is	because	it	is	more	likely	that	acquiring	
managers	 will	 misuse	 the	 initial	 recognition	 of	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	in	order	to	obscure	overpayments.	It	is	therefore	important	to	understand	the	
acquiring	 manager’s	 intention	 by	 exploring	 how	 the	 underlying	 motives	 for	 an	
acquisition	 can	 affect	 goodwill-accounting	 choices.	 While	 corporate	 acquisitions	 are	
typically	motivated	by	synergies	(e.g.,	Jensen	&	Ruback,	1983;	Bradley	et	al.,	1988),	two	
other	theories	in	the	literature	contend	that	acquiring	managers	never	fully	realize	the	
synergies	 (Berkovitch	 &	 Narayanan,	 1993).	 The	 agency	 theory	 contends	 that	
acquisitions	 occur	 because	 managers	 want	 to	 enhance	 their	 own	 power	 and	
remuneration	 (Jensen,	 1986).	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 argued	 that,	 since	 the	 manager’s	
compensation	 is	 typically	 geared	 towards	 the	 size	 of	 the	 firm,	 it	 is	more	 attractive	 to	
expand	the	firm	at	any	cost	(Jensen,	1986).	That	is,	the	acquiring	manager’s	interest	is	
not	 necessarily	 aligned	 with	 the	 shareholders’	 interest	 in	 synergy	 gains	 when	
undertaking	 an	 acquisition.	 The	 hubris	 theory,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 contends	 that	
managers	do	not	use	acquisitions	as	an	instrument	to	strengthen	their	own	power	and	
remuneration	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 shareholders.	 Instead,	 by	 undertaking	 an	
acquisition,	managers	intend	to	create	synergistic	gains,	but	they	tend	to	fail	because	of	
excessive	confidence	in	their	ability	to	create	additional	value	(Roll,	1986).		
The	 assumption	 that	 managers,	 intentionally	 or	 unintentionally,	 do	 not	 realize	
synergies	 and	 superior	 earnings	 suggests	 that	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 will	 not	
provide	a	faithful	representation	of	acquired	superior	economic	performance.	However,	
if	 acquiring	managers	 inflate	 goodwill	 in	 the	 belief	 that	 they	 are	 able	 to	 realize	more	
synergies	than	economically	possible,	as	the	hubris	theory	suggests,	goodwill	should	be	
inflated	both	during	the	periods	with	the	amortization	approach	and	during	the	periods	
with	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	 If	 managers	 opportunistically	 misuse	 the	
accounting	system	and	acquisitions	to	enhance	their	own	power,	as	the	agency	theory	
suggests,	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 inflated	 under	 the	





initial	 recognition	 of	 goodwill	 find,	 in	 line	 with	 agency	 theory,	 that	 opportunistic	
acquiring	 firms	 only	 misuse	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	 Bartov,	
Cheng	&	Wu	(2018),	for	example,	document	a	significant	increase	in	overpayments	for	
corporate	acquisitions	after	 the	adoption	of	 the	 impairment-only	approach	 in	 the	U.S,	




Overall,	 these	 arguments	 suggest	 that	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	
impairment-only	 approach	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 misused	 by	 opportunistic	 acquiring	
managers.	Therefore,	I	will	test	the	following	hypothesis	stated	in	the	alternative	form:						
Initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 does	 not	





To	 explore	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill’s	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	
economic	performance,	I	employ	data	from	the	Swedish	institutional	setting.	Sweden	is	
one	of	few	settings	were	acquiring	managers	did	not	have	the	option	to	choose	“freely”	
between	 the	 purchase	 method	 with	 yearly	 amortizations	 and	 the	 pooling	 method,	
during	the	period	prior	to	the	adoption	of	impairment-only	approach.	Although	Swedish	
GAAP	 was	 based	 on	 IAS	 22,	 its	 application	 was	 much	 stricter	 and	 only	 permitted	
Swedish	firms	to	apply	the	pooling	option	to	mergers	of	equals.5	In	the	U.S.	and	most	of	
Europe,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 acquiring	 firms	 could	 relatively	 easily	 offset	 goodwill	
directly	 against	 reserves,	 by	misusing	 the	 pooling	 option	 (e.g.,	 Lys	 &	 Vincent,	 1995).	
																																																								
5	Most	 of	 the	 Swedish	 listed	 merging	 firms	 that	 reported	 that	 they	 applied	 the	 pooling	 method	 were	
domiciled	 in	Finland.	Finnish	GAAP	applied	more	 flexible	 requirements	as	 regards	a	deal	qualifying	 for	
pooling	 accounting.	 Examples	 of	major	 reporting	 of	 pooling	 deals	 between	 Finnish	 and	 Swedish	 firms	
include	the	merger	between	Tieto	and	Enator,	and	the	merger	between	Fazer	and	Cloetta.	There	are	also	
examples	 of	 how	 Finnish	 acquiring	 firms	 restructured	 the	 target	 in	 order	 to	 later	 qualify	 the	 deal	 for	
pooling,	a	practice	that	was	strictly	prohibited	under	Swedish	GAAP.	By	only	including	the	Swedish	listed	











recognized,	 since	 the	pooling	option	was	misused.	However,	Bartov	 et	 al.	 (2018)	 find	
that	 acquiring	 firms	 inflate	 the	 initial	 recognition	 of	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-
only	 approach	 when	 they	 overpaid	 to	 reach	 the	 same	 outcome.	 As	 a	 consequence,	
goodwill	 in	 most	 other	 settings	 is	 not	 directly	 comparable	 before	 and	 after	 the	
introduction	of	the	impairment-only	approach.	The	Swedish	setting	is	able	to	overcome	
these	concerns.	
Until	 2005,	 Swedish	 GAAP	mandated	 firms	 to	 apply	 either	 the	 purchase	method	
with	yearly	amortizations	or	the	pooling	method.	Because	of	the	strict	requirements	of	
Swedish	GAAP	as	regards	an	acquisition	qualifying	for	pooling,	I	document	that	only	six	
deals	 were	 reported	 as	 using	 pooling	 accounting.	 In	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 completed	
acquisitions,	 Swedish	 acquiring	 firms	 applied	 the	 purchase	 method,	 with	 systematic	
goodwill	amortizations	over	a	period	that	typically	could	not	exceed	20	years	(RR	1:96).	
However,	if	the	acquiring	firm	could	provide	convincing	evidence	that	future	synergies	
from	 the	 acquisition	 could	 be	 sustained	 for	 a	 longer	 period	 than	 20	 years,	 it	 was	




to	 comply	with	 the	 impairment-only	approach	of	 IFRS	3	and	 IAS	36.	This	 change	had	
two	major	effects	on	goodwill	 accounting.	First,	 the	excess	payment	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
target	 firm’s	 book	 value	 of	 net	 assets	 should	 to	 a	 larger	 extent	 be	 allocated	 to	 other	
assets	of	the	target	firm	before	being	allocated	to	goodwill.	 In	other	words,	relative	to	
Swedish	 GAAP	 goodwill	 and	 all	 else	 being	 equal,	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	










In	 2009,	 IFRS	 3	 underwent	 a	 number	 of	 revisions	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 making	






the	 non-controlling	 owners	 as	 if	 they	 had	 acquired	 100%.	 Because	 the	 different	
applications	of	the	full	method	and	partial	method	will	have	a	real	effect	on	the	size	of	
goodwill,	 which	 will	 likely	 bias	 the	 study,	 I	 will	 only	 include	 initially	 recognized	
goodwill	 from	acquisitions	with	an	attained	ownership	of	100%	for	 the	whole	period.	




I	use	 four	different	empirical	models	 to	 test	whether	 initially	recognized	goodwill	
provides	 a	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 under	
the	 impairment-only	 approach	 vs.	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 The	 overall	 empirical	
strategy	 is	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 reflects	








acquiring	 firm’s	 post-acquisition	 Tobin’s	 q.	 Thus,	 I	 use	 these	 four	 proxies	 to	 evaluate	
whether	the	allocation	of	purchase	premium	to	goodwill	(i.e.,	 the	 initial	recognition	of	






correct	 estimation	 of	 future	 acquired	 economic	 performance	 would	 strengthen	 the	
association	with	the	four	proxies.	











ΔROAt-1;	t+1		 =	 industry-mean-adjusted	 ROA	 (EBITDA	 divided	 by	 lagged	 total	 assets)	




1)	 two	 years	 after	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition	 minus	 industry-mean-
adjusted	 ROA	 one	 year	 before	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition		
(COMPUSTAT	Global).	Industry	is	defined	as	1-digit	SIC	code;	
GDWL_PPAt		 =	 goodwill	 resulting	 from	 the	materially	most	 significant	 transaction	 of	








ΔSALEt;t+1	or	 t+1,	 t+2	 =	 change	 in	 acquiring	 firm’s	 sales	 one	 year	 after	 completion	 of	 the	





MTBt-1		 =	 acquiring	 firm’s	market-to-book	 ratio	 of	 equity	 at	 the	 end	 of	 year	 t-1	
(COMPUSTAT	Global);	




6	Prior	studies	have	measured	ROA	 in	year	t-1	as	 the	asset-weighted	ROA	of	 the	acquiring	 firm	and	the	




















a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach.	 Coefficient	 α1	
measures	 the	 association	 of	 the	 amortization	 approach	with	 the	 change	 in	 operating	
performance	 from	pre-	 to	 post-completion	 of	 the	 acquisition.	 Coefficient	 α2	measures	
the	 difference	 in	 operating	 performance	 between	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 and	
the	 amortization	 approach	when	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 is	 zero.7	I	 also	 conduct	
analyses	for	the	change	in	operating	performance	in	a	larger	time	window	spanning	the	
period	between	year	 t-1	 and	year	 t+2	because	 the	realization	of	 future	 synergies	may	
take	time	(e.g.,	Goodman,	Neamtiu,	Shroff	&	White,	2013).	
I	control	for	several	factors	that	are	likely	to	have	an	impact	on	the	acquiring	firm’s	
change	 in	 operating	 performance,	 including	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 acquisition	
(Materialityt),	 acquiring	 firm	 size	 (SIZEt-1),	 change	 in	 sales	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm	
(ΔSALE),	news	affecting	the	acquiring	firm’s	value	over	time	t	(and	t+1	for	ΔROAt-1;	t+2)	
(ΔROAt-1;	ΔROAt+1),	 market-to-book	 ratio	 of	 equity	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 (MTBt-1),	 the	
acquiring	 firm’s	 leverage	 (LEVt-1),	 level	 of	 industry-adjusted	ROA	 in	 year	 t-1	 (ROAt-1),	
change	 in	 industry-adjusted	 ROA	 prior	 to	 the	 acquisition	 (ΔROAt-2;	 t+q),	 amount	 of	
goodwill	 in	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 balance	 sheet	 at	 t-1	 (GDWL_Act-1).	 The	 model	 also	
controls	for	industry	and	year	fixed	effects.	
																																																								
7	Because	 the	 reported	acquired	goodwill	 is	mainly	different	 from	0	 in	 the	 sample,	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	









the	 test	where	 future	 synergies	 are	measured	 in	 terms	 of	 sales	 growth,	 I	 employ	 the	
following	OLS	model:			
	
ΔSALEt-1;	 t+1	 or	 ΔSALEt-1;	 t+2	 =	 β0	 +	 β1GDWL_PPAt	 +	 β2IFRSt	 +	 β3GDWL_PPAt	 *	 IFRSt	 +	
β4Materialityt	+	β5SIZEt-1	+	β6RETt	+	β7RETt+1	+	β8MTBt-1	+	β9LEVt-1	+	
β10ROAt-1	 +	 β11ΔSALEt-2;	 t-1	 +	 β12GDWL_Act-1	 +	 Year	 fixed	 effects	 +	





in	 the	 year	 prior	 to	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition	 scaled	 by	 the	
acquiring	firm’s	lagged	total	assets	(COMPUSTAT	Global);	
ΔSALEt-1;	t+2		 =	sales	two	years	following	the	completion	of	the	acquisition	minus	sales	
in	 the	 year	 prior	 to	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition	 scaled	 by	 the	
acquiring	firm’s	lagged	total	assets	(COMPUSTAT	Global);	
ΔSALEt-2;	t-1		 =	sales	one	year	prior	to	the	completion	of	the	acquisition	minus	sales	two	




initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 versus	 under	 the	
amortization	 approach	 with	 future	 sales	 growth	 following	 the	 completion	 of	 an	
acquisition.	 A	 positive	 β3	 would	 indicate	 that,	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach,	
initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 is	 incrementally	
















+	 δ5SIZEt+1	 +	 δ6MTBt+1	 +	 δ7LEVt+1	 +	 δ8ROAt+1	 +	 δ9ΔROAt;	t+1	 +	 Year	





RETt+1		 =	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 stock	 return	 one	 year	 after	 completion	 of	 the	
transaction	(COMPUSTAT	Global);	
ARETt+1		 =	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 stock	 return	 one	 year	 after	 completion	 of	 the	
transaction	minus	the	average	stock	return	of	the	COMPUSTAT	firms	for	the	
same	year	(COMPUSTAT	Global);	
ΔROAt;t+1		 =	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 change	 in	 ROA	 (EBITDA	 divided	 by	 its	 lagged	 total	
assets)	in	year	t+1	(COMPUSTAT	Global).	
	
The	main	coefficient	of	 interest	 is	δ3,	which	measures	 the	 incremental	association	
under	the	impairment-only	approach,	relative	to	the	amortization	approach,	with	future	
stock	 returns	 in	 the	 year	 following	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition.	 A	 positively	
estimated	 δ3	would	 indicate	 that	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-
only	 approach,	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach,	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	
representation	of	acquired	future	economic	performance	in	the	form	of	increased	stock	
market	value.	If	δ3	is	negative	or	insignificant,	then	initially	recognized	goodwill	under	
the	 impairment-only	 approach	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	
acquired	 future	 superior	 economic	 performance.	 I	 also	 include	 a	 number	 of	 controls	
that	are	likely	to	affect	the	acquiring	firm’s	stock	market	returns,	including	relative	size	




Lastly,	 I	 explore	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 association	 between	 initially	 recognized	
goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach,	










TQt+1	 or	 TQaltt+1	 =	 	 λ0	 +	 λ1	 GDWL_PPAt	 +	 λ2	 IFRSt	 +	 λ3	 GDWL_PPAt	 *	 IFRSt	 +	 λ4	
Materialityt	+	λ5	SIZEt+1	+	λ6	ΔSALEt;t+1	+	λ7	LEVt+1	+	λ8	ROAt+1	+	λ9	
CAPEXt+1	+	λ10	GDWL_Act-1	+	λ11	TQt-1	+	Year	fixed	effects	+	Industry	














The	main	coefficient	of	 interest	 is	λ3,	which	measures	 the	 incremental	association	
under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach,	with	 the	
acquiring	firm’s	Tobin’s	q	one	year	after	the	completion	of	the	acquisition.	Since	Tobi’s	q	
is	 a	measure	 of	 synergies	 that	 come	 from	 combining	 the	 assets,	 a	 ratio	 value	 over	 1	
indicates	that	the	combination	of	assets	provides	synergistic	value.	A	positive	λ3	would	
indicate	that,	relative	to	the	amortization	approach,	initially	recognized	goodwill	under	
the	 impairment-only	 approach	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	
Tobin’s	 q.	 However,	 a	 negative	 or	 insignificant	 λ3	 indicates	 that	 initially	 recognized	
goodwill	 is	 not	 able	 to	 faithfully	 represent	 future	 acquired	 economic	 performance	 of	
superior	 earnings	 in	 the	 form	 of	 improved	 synergies.	 I	 also	 control	 for	 a	 number	 of	
factors	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 impact	 Tobin’s	 q,	 including	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 acquisition	
(Materialityt),	which	may	negatively	affect	Tobin’s	q	since	a	 larger	purchase	price	will	
increase	 the	 denominator	 of	 Tobin’s	 q;	 acquiring	 firm	 size	 (SIZEt-1),	 change	 in	 sales	
(ΔSALE),	 acquiring	 firm	 leverage	 (LEVt-1),	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	 operating	 performance	
(ROAt+1),	capital	expenditures	(CAPEXt+1),	amount	of	goodwill	in	the	acquirer’s	balance	














Swedish	 listed	 firm-years	 in	 the	 period	 2001–13.	 I	 exclude	 firms	 not	 reporting	
according	to	IFRS	in	2005-13,	as	well	as	financial	firms.	I	lose	some	additional	firm-year	
observations	 because	 of	 unavailable	 data	 in	 COMPUSTAT	 Global.	 In	 total,	 I	 obtain	 a	
sample	 of	 2,555	 firm-years	 and	 manually	 review	 the	 annual	 reports	 to	 identify	








yearly	 total	was	 SEK	175.5	 billion	 (in	 2007),	 and	 the	 lowest	was	 SEK	34.4	 billion	 (in	
2009).	Cash	 is	 the	predominant	payment	type	 in	almost	all	years.8	Moreover,	 the	total	
initially	recognized	goodwill	for	the	whole	period	was	SEK	445.7	billion,	with	a	high	of	
SEK	103.6	billion	in	2007	and	a	low	of	SEK	14.5bn	in	2009.	The	total	goodwill	write-off	
during	 the	 period	 was	 SEK	 136.7	 billion,	 and	 the	 largest	 write-offs	 were	 during	 the	
period	 when	 yearly	 amortizations	 and	 impairment	 tests	 were	 carried	 out	 (i.e.,	 the	
amortization	approach).	However,	the	impairments	seem	to	be	quite	similar	under	the	
amortization	 approach	 (the	 years	 2001–04)	 and	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 (the	
years	2005–13).	Total	impairment	was	SEK	72.1	billion	during	the	period,	with	a	high	of	
SEK	13.4	 billion	 and	 a	 low	of	 SEK	491	million.	 The	 total	 goodwill	 balances	were	 SEK	
4,307.8	 billion	 during	 the	 period,	 and	 they	 steadily	 increased	 from	 around	 SEK	 200	
















Reported	goodwill	 impairments	are	usually	between	 two	and	 five	percent	of	goodwill	
balances,	except	for	in	2001	and	2011	when	they	were	19.9%	and	18.9%,	respectively.	
Panel	 C	 in	 Table	 2	 reports	 that	 1,040	 firm-years	 have	 involved	 at	 least	 one	
acquisition	 leading	to	a	controlling	stake	higher	than	50%;	850	firm-years	 involved	at	
least	 one	 deal	 with	 a	 controlling	 stake	 of	 100%.9	The	 average	 deal	 value	 (i.e.,	 the	
purchase	 price)	was	 SEK	 751	million	 during	 the	 period,	with	 a	 yearly	 variation	 from	
SEK	390	million	in	2002	to	SEK	1,639	million	in	2007.	The	average	cash	payment	was	
SEK	 592	 million	 (about	 78.8%	 of	 the	 total	 payment)	 during	 the	 period.	 Average	
acquired	goodwill	was	SEK	409	million	during	the	period	2001–13,	with	a	high	of	SEK	






the	period	2001-13.	 I	winsorize	 each	 continuous	 variable	 at	 its	 first	 and	ninety-ninth	
percentiles.	 The	 average	 (median)	 purchase	 price	 for	 the	 whole	 period	 is	 SEK	 754	
million		(SEK	82.5	million).	The	completed	acquisitions	are	economically	significant	as	
the	mean	(median)	 is	13%	(4%)	of	 the	acquiring	 firm’s	 lagged	total	assets.	More	than	
two-thirds	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firms	 accounted	 for	 recognized	 goodwill	 using	 the	
impairment-only	 approach	 of	 IFRS.	 The	 mean	 (median)	 change	 in	 industry-adjusted	
ROA	from	the	year	prior	to	and	the	year	following	the	completion	of	the	acquisition	is	
0.00	 (0.00).	 The	 mean	 (median)	 change	 in	 sales	 from	 the	 year	 prior	 to	 the	 year	
following	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition	 is	 32%	 (16%).	 In	 the	 year	 following	 the	
















firms	 tend	 to	 pay	more	 for	 acquisitions	 during	 the	 period	 with	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	(median	difference	of	Purchase_Pricet	is	significantly	positive),	but	deals	tend	





for	 an	 acquisition	 but	 allocate	 less	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill	 suggests	 that	
goodwill	under	IFRS	3	provides	a	more	faithful	representation	of	the	acquired	superior	
earnings.	 Under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach,	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 has,	 after	 the	
recognition	of	goodwill,	higher	profitability	(the	median	of	ROAt-1;	t+1	 is	significant	and	
positive),	 and	 the	 typical	 sales	 growth	 is	 higher	 although	mean	 value	 is	 lower	 (mean	
difference	is	negative	and	significant,	while	the	median	difference	value	is	positive	and	
significant).	 The	 acquiring	 firms	 using	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 have	 lower	
adjusted	 stock	 returns	 (ARET	 and	 RET	 are	 negative	 and	 significant),	 which	 could	





Moreover,	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 the	 acquiring	 firm,	 after	 the	
recognition	 of	 goodwill,	 has	 a	 higher	 capital	 expenditure	 (the	 median	 difference	 of	
CAPEXt+1	 is	 significant	 and	 positive)	 and	 is	 typically	 larger	 in	 size	 prior	 to	 the	








impairment-only	 approach	 typically	 had	 higher	 market-to-book	 ratio	 and	 higher	
leverage	 (median	 difference	 of	 MTBt-1	 and	 LEVt-1	 are	 significantly	 positive),	 but	 the	




In	 contrast	 to	 the	 analyses	 of	 the	 descriptive	 data,	 all	 regression	 analyses	 of	 this	





goodwill.	 This	 makes	 it	 impossible	 to	 conduct	 the	 regression	 analyses	 using	 stock	
return	data	because	the	acquisition	dates	for	all	materially	less	significant	deals	are	not	




Table	5	presents	 the	 regression	estimates	of	Model	1,	which	 tests	 the	association	
between	initially	recognized	goodwill	and	future	operating	performance	(ΔROA).	Model	
1a	uses	 changes	 in	 the	acquiring	 firm’s	performance	one	year	after	 the	 completion	of	
the	 acquisition	 (ΔROAt-1;t+1),	 while	 Model	 1b	 uses	 changes	 in	 the	 acquiring	 firm’s	
performance	 two	 years	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition	 (ΔROAt-1;t+2).	 Starting	
with	 Model	 1a,	 the	 analysis	 shows	 that	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	
impairment-only	approach	(GDWL_PPA*IFRS)	 is	positively	associated	with	the	change	
in	the	return	on	assets	relative	to	initially	recognized	goodwill	under	the	amortization	
approach	 (t-stat:	 1.69).	 Initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 during	 the	 whole	 period	
(GDWL_PPA)	and	the	IFRS	accounting	standard	(IFRS)	are	both	negatively	related	to	the	
change	in	return	on	assets.	Overall,	 these	results	suggest	that	the	acquiring	manager’s	










only	 approach.	 However,	 this	 result	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 Moreover,	 Stock	
returns	(RET)	are	positively	associated	with	the	change	in	ROA	(ΔROA),	as	well	as	the	
industry-adjusted	 change	 in	 ROA.	 Total	 goodwill	 balances	 prior	 to	 the	 completed	
acquisition	(GDWL_Ac)	are	negative	 in	 the	 latter	regression	model	 in	Table	5.	 In	sum,	
only	model	1a	indicates	that	initially	recognized	goodwill	is	able	to	predict	the	acquired	





Table	6	presents	 the	 regression	estimates	of	Model	2,	which	 tests	 the	association	
between	initially	recognized	goodwill	and	future	superior	earnings	in	the	form	of	sales	
growth.	Model	2a	uses	changes	in	the	acquiring	firm’s	sales	performance	one	year	after	
the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition	 (ΔSALEt-1;	 t+1),	 while	 Model	 2b	 uses	 changes	 in	 the	
acquiring	 firm’s	 sales	 performance	 two	 years	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 acquisition	
(ΔSALEt-1;	t+2).	 Although	 the	 association	 between	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	
approach	(GDWL_PPA)	and	future	sales	growth	(ΔSALE)	is	positive,	it	is	not	statistically	
















that	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	does	not	 have	
any	relation	to	the	stock	market’s	perception	of	acquired	future	synergies.	In	particular,	
the	 proportion	 allocated	 to	 goodwill	 (GDWL_PPAt)	 and	 the	 proportion	 allocated	 to	
goodwill	under	 the	 impairment-only	approach	 (GDWL_PPA*IFRSt)	are	not	 statistically	
significant	 in	 either	 model	 specification.	 Moreover,	 the	 market-to-book	 value	 equity	
ratio	 (MTB),	 the	 acquirer’s	 leverage	 (LEV),	 and	 return	 on	 assets	 (ROA)	 are	 positively	
associated	with	 stock	 returns	 for	both	 specifications.	Overall,	 these	 results	 are	 in	 line	
with	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 sales	 growth	 model	 (see	 Table	 6),	 suggesting	 that	 initially	
recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 more	





Table	8	presents	 the	 regression	estimates	of	Model	4,	which	 tests	 the	association	
between	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 and	 Tobin’s	 q.	 Once	 again,	 both	 regression	
estimates	of	Model	4	indicate	that	initially	recognized	goodwill	under	the	impairment-
only	 approach	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	
economic	 performance	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 In	 particular,	 the	
allocation	 to	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 (GDWL_PPA*IFRSt)	 is	 not	
statistically	significant.	In	fact,	the	proportion	allocated	to	goodwill	(GDWL_PPAt)	is	not	
statistically	significant.	Overall,	these	findings	suggest	that	the	allocation	does	not	have	
any	association	with	 the	acquirer’s	post-acquisition	Tobin’s	q.	 I	 also	 further	note	 that	
the	significance	of	the	acquisition	(Materialityt),	and	past	goodwill	balances	(GDWL_Act-
1)	 all	 have	 a	 negative	 association	 with	 the	 acquirer’s	 post-acquisition	 Tobin’s	 q.	 The	
change	 in	 sales	 (ΔSALEt;t+1)	 and	 pre-acquisition	 Tobin’s	 q	 (TQt-1)	 are	 positively	
associated	 with	 the	 post-acquisition	 Tobin’s	 q.	 In	 other	 words,	 initially	 recognized	











positively	 associated	 with	 one	 of	 the	 proxies	 for	 acquired	 superior	 economic	
performance	of	superior	earnings	–	 the	ROA	measure.	However,	 this	 result	could	also	
interact	with	the	fact	that	managers	potentially	misuse	the	adoption	of	IFRS	in	general	
by	managing	 earnings.	 Paananen	 (2008),	 for	 example,	 reports	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 the	
financial	 reporting	 in	 Sweden,	 measured	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 smoothing	 of	 earnings,	
decreased	 in	 the	 years	 following	 the	 adoption	 of	 IFRS.	 Moreover,	 Bens,	 Goodman	 &	
Neamtiu	 (2012)	 find	 that	 acquiring	 managers	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 manage	 short-term	
performance	when	expected	synergies	are	 lower	 in	order	 to	avoid	CEO	turnover.	 It	 is	
possible	that	the	quality	of	the	acquisition	during	the	IFRS	period	is	lower	because	the	




reflects	 the	 future	 return	 on	 assets	 (ROA)	 may	 be	 due	 to	 more	 income-increasing	
earnings	 management	 during	 the	 IFRS	 period.	 Moreover,	 Lee	 (2011)	 suggests	 that	
managers’	 incentives	 to	 manage	 goodwill	 accounting	 choices	 can	 be	 measured	 by	 a	
higher	 level	of	discretionary	accruals.	To	address	 this	 concern,	 I	 re-estimate	model	1,	









based	 on	 industry	 classifications.	 Moreover,	 the	 size	 of	 listed	 Swedish	 firms	 within	





















drops	 because	 of	 unavailable	 data	 required	 to	 construct	 the	 discretionary	 accruals	
(ΔDACC)	 for	 some	 firms	 over	 time,	 which	 could	 be	 a	 reason	 why	 the	 relation	 from	
model	 1a	 in	Table	 5	Operating	Performance	 disappears.	 To	 control	 for	 this,	 I	 drop	 all	
observations	 in	 model	 1a	 with	 missing	 discretionary	 accruals	 and	 retest	 these	
observations	without	the	variable	discretionary	accruals	(ΔDACC).	Untabulated	results	








so	 far	 only	 drawn	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 amortization	 and	 the	 impairment-only	
approaches.	 During	 the	 period	 2005–13,	 however,	 the	 latter	 approach	 has	 been	
governed	by	IFRS	3	and	a	revised	version	of	the	IFRS	3(Revised).		






excess	 payment	 exceeding	 the	 target’s	 net	 assets	 that	 could	not	 be	 allocated	 to	 other	
assets	ended	up	as	goodwill.	However,	with	the	revised	version	of	IFRS	3	in	2009,	the	
international	 Accounting	 Standards	 Board	 (IASB)	 intended	 to	 make	 the	 criteria	 for	
allocation	to	goodwill	more	stringent.	For	example,	the	transaction	cost	should	now	be	
expensed,	instead	of	being	recognized	as	goodwill,	as	under	IFRS	3.	Moreover,	acquiring	
firms	 are	 required	 to	 report	 the	 fair-value	 provision	 of	 any	 contracted	 contingent	
payments	(e.g.,	earnouts)	as	long	as	the	contingency	is	recognizable,	probable,	and	can	
be	 reliably	 measured.	 Any	 upward	 revaluation	 of	 contingent	 payments	 is	 no	 longer	
permitted	to	be	recognized	as	goodwill,	but	should	be	expensed.	In	sum,	these	changes	
should	 make	 goodwill	 even	 more	 accurate	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 acquired	 economic	
performance	in	the	form	of	future	synergies.	That	is,	initially	allocated	goodwill	should	
provide	a	more	faithful	representation	of	acquired	superior	economic	performance.	
To	 avoid	 drawing	 any	 conclusions	 about	 the	 initial	 years’	 implementation	 of	 the	
impairment-only	approach	compared	 to	 the	well-established	amortization	approach,	 I	
test	the	amortization	approach	on	both	the	2006–09	period,	and	the	2011–13	period.	I	
also	compare	goodwill’s	representation	of	acquired	future	economic	performance	in	the	
2006–09	 period	 and	 the	 2011–13	 period.	 The	 results	 are	 qualitatively	 unchanged	 by	
using	different	time	periods	and	comparing	different	versions	of	IFRS	3.	That	is,	initially	
recognized	 goodwill	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 with	 more	
discretion	or	guidance	under	different	standards.		
Another	 concern	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 addressed	 is	 that	 models	 1	 and	 2	 include	





initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 Swedish	GAAP.	 I	 find	 no	 significant	 change	 in	 the	
overall	 results.	 Moreover,	 I	 test	 whether	 longer	 windows	 (three	 and	 four	 years)	 for	
models	1	and	2	could	change	the	results	of	the	study.	This	is	because	the	realization	of	
synergies	 could	 potentially	 take	 longer	 than	 one	 or	 two	 years.	 However,	 the	 longer	
window	does	not	change	the	main	conclusions	of	the	study.	
I	also	test	whether	the	size	of	the	acquisition	and	initially	recognized	goodwill	has	













In	 this	 paper,	 I	 investigate	 whether	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	
impairment-only	approach	provides	a	more	faithful	representation	of	acquired	superior	
economic	 performance	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	 approach.	 In	 particular,	 I	 test	
whether	initially	recognized	goodwill	better	represents	the	acquired	superior	economic	
performance	after	 the	adoption	of	 the	 impairment-only	approach	relative	 to	 the	prior	
amortization	 approach.	Although	goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	gives	
the	 acquiring	managers	 a	 channel	 to	 communicate	 private	 information,	 opportunistic	
managers	 may	 also	 misuse	 the	 additional	 discretion	 to	 inflate	 future	 earnings	 by	
inflating	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill.	 The	 previous	 amortization	 approach	 only	
provided	 for	 very	 limited	 managerial	 discretion	 when	 carrying	 out	 the	 subsequent	
valuation,	 and	 in	 Sweden,	 it	 was	 only	 related	 to	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 number	 of	
years	 the	 goodwill	 would	 be	 amortized.	 Hence,	 the	 amortization	 approach	 did	 not	
provide	discretion	that	would	incentivize	managers	to	over-allocate	the	purchase	price	
to	goodwill	in	order	to	manage	future	earnings.		
In	 other	 words,	 the	 acquiring	 firms’	 initial	 recognition	 of	 goodwill	 may	 more	
faithfully	 represent	 the	 underlying	 economics	 of	 the	 acquired	 superior	 economic	
performance	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	
approach.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 since	 the	 subsequent	 valuation	 of	 goodwill	 through	
impairment	 testing	 provides	 significant	 discretion	 to	 reduce	 the	 “drag”	 on	 future	
earnings	 by	 over-allocating	 the	 purchase	 price	 to	 goodwill,	 it	 might	 not	 faithfully	
represent	 the	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance.	 Based	 on	 agency	 theory	 and	








recognized	 goodwill	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 more	
faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 relative	 to	 the	
amortization	approach.			
Using	 four	 models	 with	 different	 proxies	 for	 acquired	 superior	 economic	
performance,	I	find,	overall,	that	the	implementation	of	the	impairment-only	approach	
did	 not	 improve	 initially	 recognized	 goodwill’s	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	
economic	 performance.	 Only	 the	 model	 estimating	 the	 relationship	 between	 initially	
allocated	 goodwill	 and	 the	 change	 in	 profitability	 (ROA)	 indicates	 positive	 and	
significant	results.	However,	when	adjusting	for	the	possibility	that	acquiring	managers	
also	 manage	 earnings	 by	 including	 discretionary	 accruals,	 I	 no	 longer	 find	 any	
relationship	between	initially	recognized	goodwill	and	change	in	return	on	assets.	Other	
models	 that	 include	 the	 relationship	between	 initially	 recognized	goodwill	 and	 future	
sales,	 stock	 return,	 and	 Tobin’s	 q	 all	 indicate	 that	 the	 faithful	 representation	 of	
underlying	economics	has	not	 improved	under	 the	 impairment-only	approach.	Thus,	 I	
conclude	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 did	 not	 improve	 the	
faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	 performance	 relative	 to	 the	
amortization	approach.	
To	 my	 knowledge,	 this	 is	 the	 first	 study	 to	 explore	 whether	 initially	 recognized	
goodwill	 provides	 a	 more	 faithful	 representation	 of	 acquired	 superior	 economic	
performance	 under	 the	 impairment-only	 approach	 relative	 to	 the	 amortization	
approach.	This	study	contributes	to	the	literature	on	initially	recognized	assets	and	the	
growing	literature	evaluating	goodwill	accounting	under	different	accounting	methods.	
The	 clear	methodological	 strength	 of	 this	 study	 is	 its	 use	 of	 the	 Swedish	 institutional	
setting.	 Sweden	 is	 one	 of	 few	 settings	 where	 the	 impairment-only	 and	 amortization	
approaches	 can	 be	 compared	 without	 being	 affected	 by	 self-selection	 biases	 due	 to	
misuse	of	the	pooling	option.	Hence,	the	findings	of	this	study	should	be	of	 interest	to	
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
	









# of Listed Firms on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 291 288 273 269 266 268 267 256 251 242 249 249 251 3,420 
	
	
(-) Firms not domiciled in Sweden 13 13 14 17 16 15 17 15 15 16 18 19 18 206 
	
	
(-) Non-IFRS reporting firms 2005-2013          -         -         -         - 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 28 
	
	
(-) Financial firms  49 47 44 41 42 45 46 45 41 38 38 36 40 552 
	
	
(-) Not Merged with COMPUSTAT Global 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 5 
	
	
(-) Observations with missing values  13 10 10 9 2 4 2 1 1 7 5 4 6 74 
	




Number of Sample Firms  216 217 205 202 203 201 198 191 191 177 185 185 184 2,555 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 1 reports the sample selection. Starting with all listed firms on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in the period 2001–2013, I subtract listed firms not domiciled in Sweden, 
firms not reporting under IFRS in the period 2005-2013, financial firms, and observations with missing variables. This results in the final sample of 2,555 firm years, for 












		 		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
	




Panel A: # of Sample Firms  216 217 205 202 203 201 198 191 191 177 185 185 184 2,555 
	
	
Total Deal Value (>50% stake in target) 48,909 79,816 36,314 36,041 52,797 57,872 175,477 46,098 34,382 52,585 58,164 69,517 34,838 782,816 
	
	
Total Outflow of Cash  37,323 18,104 30,201 27,739 42,679 49,132 158,45 38,48 27,957 43,44 51,959 59,527 25,488 610,486 
	
	
Total Acquired Goodwill 32,296 41,275 22,385 18,251 35,907 21,806 103,59 28,113 14,513 31,475 33,164 30,051 32,883 445,715 
	
	
Total Other Goodwill Investments  5,567 6,877 1,435 1,462 952 998 874 2,076 205 80 37 83 244 20,896 
	
	
Total Divested Goodwill  227.6 1,596 1,379 536 378 4,913 3,471 3,541 1,182 328 178 1,586 991 20,312 
	
	
Total Goodwill Write-offs  21,063 30,225 20,318 13,901 1,066 6,722 3,605 4,271 6,931 5,893 10,314 9,718 2,685 136,715 
	
	
Total Goodwill Impairments  4,761 13,376 2,461 491 913 6,722 3,605 4,271 6,931 5,893 10,314 9,718 2,685 72,144 
	
	
Total Goodwill 234,523 243,018 226,484 225,199 279,256 267,365 370,701 413,767 411,852 405,072 401,084 403,655 425,821 4307,806 
	




Panel B: # of Goodwill Firms  163 156 152 154 156 155 161 156 156 142 149 153 149 2,003 
	
	
Goodwill to Total Assets  14.9% 15.4% 15.1% 15.8% 17.3% 18.3% 20.9% 21.8% 22.8% 22.6% 21.8% 22.5% 22.7% 19.3% 
	
	
Goodwill to Equity 36.5% 40.1% 42.3% 42.6% 42.1% 48.9% 52.1% 64.4% 60.1% 57.5% 50.3% 55% 52.3% 49.5% 
	
	
Goodwill Write-offs to Goodwill 49.8% 29.2% 29.2% 27.5% 3% 4.4% 1.8% 2.5% 3.5% 3.3% 18.9% 2.2% 2.3% 13.8% 
	
	
Goodwill Impairments to Goodwill 19.9% 5.1% 8% 3.5% 1.8% 4.4% 1.8% 2.5% 3.5% 3.3% 18.9% 2.2% 2.3% 5.9% 
	




Panel C: # of Acquiring Firms 84 80 93 77 94 89 107 88 65 65 70 70 58 1,040 
	
	
Average Deal Value  582 998 390 468 561 650 1,639 523 528 809 830 979 600 751 
	
	
Average Outflow of Cash 464.8 229 328 364 469 558 1,494 442 436 665 731 827 425 592 
	
	
Average Acquired Goodwill 383 516 240 235 381 244 968 319 223 478 435 415 291 409 
	
	
Average Goodwill/Deal Value  0.72 0.77 0.67 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.72 
	
	
Average Goodwill write-offs  184.7 308 182 162 8.4 72 25 44.6 26.2 14 100 115 30.8 99 
	
	
Average Goodwill impairments  23.4 134 21 5 7.5 72 25 44.6 26.2 14 100 115 30.8 46 
	
	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 2 shows descriptive information about the sample firms included in this study. In panel A, I report the total values in MSEK for all sample firms. In Panel B, I report 





		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	  
N Mean  St. Dev Min. p25 Median p75 Max. 
		          	
	
Purchase_Price 1,037 754.89 3106.01 0.02 21 82.52 327 56,527 
	
	
Materialityt  1,037 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.11 1.13 
	
	
IFRS 1,037 0.68 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
	
	
ΔROAt-1; t+1 1,013 0.00 0.13 -1.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 1.42 
	
	
ΔSALEt-1; t+1 1,018 0.32 0.83 -1.17 0.00 0.16 0.43 7.53 
	
	
RETt+1 952 0.17 0.63 -0.85 -0.22 0.09 0.43 3.74 
	
	
ARETt+1 952 0.09 0.53 -0.87 -0.22 0.01 0.26 3.69 
	
	
TQt+1 953 1.63 0.88 0.62 1.14 1.42 1.89 10.16 
	
	
CAPEXt+1 998 0.23 0.19 -0.11 0.08 0.18 0.33 1.40 
	
	
GDWL_PPAt 1,037 0.58 0.32 0.00 0.37 0.61 0.80 1.31 
	
	
SIZEt-1 1,034 7.86 2.06 3.47 6.37 7.48 9.17 12.29 
	
	
AvΔSALEt-2,t-1 1,019 691.03 2290.61 -3962.37 -32.13 118.39 621.82 9245.1 
	
	
RETt-1 930 0.21 0.66 -0.85 -0.16 0.12 0.45 3.74 
	
	
ROAt-1 1,030 0.00 0.15 -1.92 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.58 
	
	
MTBt-1 930 2.80 2.43 0.28 1.44 2.22 3.41 19.20 
	
	




       	
	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 3 shows the mean, median, standard deviation and the minimum and maximum value of the most relevant variables in 











Table 4 shows the mean and median differences between the variables under the amortization approach and the impairment-only 
approach, using a two-tailed test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix.   
	
	 	
















	             	
	  
N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
      
		             	
	
Purchase_Price 333 577.9 55.136 
 







Materialityt  333 0.110 0.031 
 







ΔROAt-1; t+1 225 -0.364 -0.740 
 







ΔSALEt-1; t+1 327 0.260 0.133 
 







RETt+1 237 0.269 0.156 
 







ARETt+1 327 0.171 0.067 
 







TQt+1 327 1.681 1.420 
 







CAPEXt+1 322 0.240 0.195 
 







GDWL_PPAt 333 0.625 0.630 
 







SIZEt-1 332 7.594 7.187 
 
702 7.989 7.632 
 
-0.394***  0.445*** 
	
	
AvΔSALEt-2,t-1 328 492.7 81.352 
 







RETt-1 245 0.229 0.110 
 







ROAt-1 329 0.000 0.000 
 







MTBt-1 245 2.437 1.804 
 
685 2.936 2.371 
 
-0.499***  0.567*** 
	
	
LEVt-1 244 0.570 0.563 
 
685 0.625 0.604 
 
-0.054***  0.041*** 
	
	
                      









		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
	   
  




ΔROAt-1; t+2  
  
		          	
	   
Coef. t-stat p-value  
 
Coef. t-stat p-value  




-.0543 -1.56 0.120 
 





-.0135  -0.85 0.396  
 





 .0546*   1.69  0.092 
 





-.0079  -0.29  0.773  
 





 .0018   0.87  0.384 
 
 .0017   0.87 0.385  
	
	
ΔSALEt;t+1 or t+1, t+2  
 
-1.32e-06  -1.51 0.132 
 





 .0109*  1.79  0.075 
 





 .0362***   4.04  0.000  
 





-.0049 -0.62  0.538  
 





 .0034  0.12  0.901 
 





-.4325*** -5.64  0.000  
 
-.6539*** -10.96 0.000 
	
	
ΔROAt-2; t-1  
 
-.2098***  -2.62 0.010  
 





-.0189  -0.76  0.446 
 
-.0485**  -2.54  0.012  




-.0278 -0.64  0.520  
 
-.0096  -0.26  0.796  
		          	
	
Year Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes 
   
   Yes 
  	
	
Industry Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes     
 





   837 
   





   0.043 
   
   0.066 
  	
	
            
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 5 shows the result of the multivariate OLS regression testing the relation between the adoption of 
the impairment-only approach and goodwill’s representation of future operating performance. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized on both axes at the one-percent level. 
There are no signs of multicollinearity; all independent variables have a VIF score below 3.  
	
ΔROAt-1; t+1 or ΔROAt-1; t+2 = α0 + α1GDWL_PPAt + α2IFRSt + α3GDWL_PPAt * IFRSt + α4Materialityt + 
α5SIZEt-1 + α6ΔSALEt; t+1 or t+1; t+2 + α7RETt + α8RETt+1 + α9MTBt-1 + α10LEVt-1 + 
α11ROAt-1 + α12ΔROAt-2; t-1 + α13GDWL_Act-1 + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed 









		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
	   
  




ΔSALEt-1; t+2  
  
		          	
	   
Coef. t-stat p-value  
 
Coef. t-stat p-value  
	




-.0210  -0.18  0.858  
 





-.1547  -1.03  0.306  
 





 .1111   0.80  0.428  
 





 1.251***   5.91  0.000  
 





-.0527*** -4.07  0.000  
 





 .4251***   4.21  0.000  
 





 .2049***  4.18 0.000  
 





 .0692**  2.25  0.026 
 





 .0140   0.13  0.897  
 





-.3023  -0.87  0.386  
 
-1.018  -1.16  0.248  
	
	
ΔSALEt-2; t-1  
 
 .1605  0.99  0.324  
 





 .1155   1.30  0.196 
 
 .0435  0.49  0.623  




 .2563  1.35  0.178  
 
-.6278 -1.26 0.210 
		          	
	
Year Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes 
   
   Yes 
  	
	
Industry Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes     
 





   843 
   





   0.051 
   
   0.050 
  	
	
            
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 6 shows the result of the multivariate OLS regression testing the relation between the adoption of 
the impairment-only approach and goodwill’s representation of future sales growth. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized on both axes at the one-percent level. There are 
no signs of multicollinearity; all independent variables have a VIF score below 3. 
	
ΔSALEt-1; t+1 or ΔSALEt-1; t+2 = β0 + β1GDWL_PPAt + β2IFRSt + β3GDWL_PPAt * IFRSt + β4Materialityt + 
β5SIZEt-1 + β6RETt + β7RETt+1 + β8MTBt-1 + β9LEVt-1 + β10ROAt-1 + β11ΔSALEt-2; t-1 + 


















		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	









	          	
	   
Coef. t-stat p-value  
 
Coef. t-stat p-value  




 .0017   0.03  0.980 
 





 .0904  0.54 0.589  
 





-.0146 -0.17  0.864  
 





 .0686  0.80  0.424 
 





-.0115 -1.29  0.199  
 





 .0889***  4.09  0.000  
 





 .3053***  3.02 0.003 
 





 .3861**  2.31 0.022 
 
 .3806**  2.27  0.024  
	
	
ΔROAt; t+1  
 
 .9653***  2.82 0.005  
 
 .9965***  3.03  0.003 




-.0909  -0.46 0.645 
 
-.4443 -2.26 0.025 
	
	          	
	
Year Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes 
   
   Yes 
  	
	
Industry Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes     
 





   843 
   





   0.257 
   
   0.257 
  	
	
            
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 7 shows the results of the multivariate OLS regression testing the relation between the adoption 
of the impairment-only approach and goodwill’s representation of future stock returns. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized on both axes at the one-percent level. There are 
no signs of multicollinearity; all independent variables have a VIF score below 3. 
	
RETt+1 or ARETt+1 = δ0 + b1GDWL_PPAt + δ2IFRSt + δ3GDWL_PPAt * IFRSt + δ4Materialityt + δ5SIZEt+1 + 
δ6MTBt+1 + δ7LEVt+1 + δ8ROAt+1 + δ9ΔROAt; t+1 + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed 






















		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
	    
Tobin’s q 





	   
      
 
      
	
	          	
	   
Coef. t-stat p-value  
 
Coef. t-stat p-value  
	




 .0828   0.79  0.433 
 





-.5254*** -3.80  0.000 
 





-.0014  -1.18 0.240  
 





-.5114***  -3.80 0.000 
 





-.0396  -1.60  0.110  
 





 .0001***   2.86  0.005  
 





 .0249   0.12  0.906 
 





-.2473 -0.58 0.563  
 





-.1630 -0.53  0.599  
 





-.4750***  -3.34  0.001 
 





 .3413***   5.23  0.000 
 
 .3885***   5.57 0.000  




 2.388  3.89 0.000 
 
 2.073   3.24 0.001  
	
	          	
	
Year Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes 
   
   Yes 
  	
	
Industry Fixed Effects  
 
   Yes     
 





   829 
   





   0.039 
   
   0.044 
  	
	
            
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 8 shows the results of the multivariate OLS regression testing the relation between the adoption 
of the impairment-only approach and goodwill’s representation of future Tobin’s q. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized on both axes at the one-percent level. There are 
no clear signs of multicollinearity; all independent variables have a VIF score below 3. 
	
TQt+1 = λ0 + λ1 GDWL_PPAt + λ2 IFRSt + λ3 GDWL_PPAt * IFRSt + λ4 Materialityt + λ5 SIZEt+1 + λ6 ΔSALEt;t+1 
+ λ7 LEVt+1 + λ8 ROAt+1 + λ9 CAPEXt+1 + λ10 GDWL_Act-1 + λ11 TQt-1 + Year fixed 


















		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
	          	
	   
  
ΔROAt-1; 




t+2    
		          	
	   
Coef. t-stat p-value  
 
Coef. t-stat p-value  




-1.043 -0.66 0.510 
 





-3.958** -2.57 0.011 
 





 2.308  1.19 0.236 
 





-1.605 -1.27 0.206 
 





.3130   1.54 0.126 
 
 .3306  0.92 0.357 
	
	
ΔSALEt;t+1 or t+1, t+2  
 
-.0001 -0.58 0.562 
 





.5581  0.97 0.334 
 





 1.530**  2.43 0.016 
 





.1698  1.52 0.132 
 





-1.258 -0.84 0.403 
 





.5790   0.69 0.494 
 
-.06743 -0.08 0.936 
	
	
ΔROAt-2; t-1  
 
.0221   0.53 0.598 
 





 1.891**   1.62 0.107 
 







 3.108 1.46   0.147	




-2.146 -0.88 0.381 
 
-2.146 -0.88 0.381 
		          	
	
Year Fixed Effects  
 
Yes 




Industry Fixed Effects  
 
Yes     
 

















            
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table 9 shows the results of the multivariate OLS regression testing the relation between the adoption 
of the Impairment-only approach and goodwill’s representation of future operating performance, after 
controlling for discretionary accruals. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All continuous variables are 
winsorized on both axes at the one-percent level. There are no signs of multicollinearity; all 
independent variables have a VIF score below 3. 
	
ΔROAt-1; t+1 or ΔROAt-1; t+2 = α0 + α1GDWL_PPAt + α2IFRSt + α3GDWL_PPAt * IFRSt + α4Materialityt + 
α5SIZEt-1 + α6ΔSALEt; t+1 or t+1; t+2 + α7RETt + α8RETt+1 + α9MTBt-1 + α10LEVt-1 + 
α11ROAt-1 + α12ΔROAt-2; t-1 + α13GDWL_Act-1 + α14ΔDACC + Year fixed effects + 














































In this study, I investigate whether the usefulness of goodwill impairments depends on the firm’s 
industry-specific growth opportunities. There are at least two main reasons why this may be the case. 
First, SFAS 142 only requires the testing of goodwill impairment when the reporting unit depreciates 
in value, suggesting that goodwill is only tested when other assets are depreciating. Second, investors 
are more inclined to investigate managers’ accounting in periods of diminishing economic outlook, 
making managers more prone to present underlying economics. Using two tests related to the 
usefulness of accounting, I find no evidence that firms with diminishing industry-specific growth 
opportunities are more likely to impair goodwill. However, I do find that goodwill impairments by 
firms with diminishing industry-specific growth opportunities provide investors with more value-
relevant information. Overall, these results indicate (1) that the delayed reporting of impaired 
goodwill does not reflect a fair application of SFAS 142, but (2) that goodwill impairments are useful 
to investors when the firm’s industry-specific growth opportunities are diminishing. 
 







Does	 the	 usefulness	 of	 fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting	 depend	 on	 the	 firm’s	
industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities?	 While	 prior	 research	 suggests	 reduced	
usefulness	by	providing	evidence	that	 impairments	 tend	to	 lag	economic	 impairments	




appreciate	 in	value.	 If	 this	 is	 the	case,	 then	a	 fair	application	of	SFAS	142	should	only	




industry-specific	 growth	opportunities	 by	 exploring	 goodwill-impairment	 choices	 and	
their	relevance	to	investors.		
There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 arguments	 why	 the	 usefulness	 of	 goodwill	 impairments	
would	 depend	 on	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities,	 regardless	 of	
whether	the	manager	acts	opportunistically	or	not.	Assuming	that	the	manager	intends	
to	present	underlying	economics,	 the	SFAS	142	requirement	 that	 testing	 for	 impaired	
goodwill	 shall	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 if	 the	 reporting	 unit	 is	 impaired	 suggests	 that	
goodwill	accounting	may	 lag	behind	the	underlying	economics	 in	periods	of	economic	
growth.	This	is	because	other	assets	than	goodwill	at	the	reporting-unit	 level	typically	
appreciate	 (depreciate)	 in	 value	 during	 periods	 when	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	
growth	opportunities	are	improving	(diminishing).	Thus,	goodwill	is	less	(more)	likely	
to	 be	 reported	when	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 improving	
(diminishing).	 In	addition,	SFAS	142	requires	the	manager	to	test	whether	goodwill	 is	
impaired	more	than	annually	if	adverse	events	arise.	This	suggests	that	the	manager	has	




1 	I	 define	 the	 concept	 of	 diminishing	 growth	 opportunities	 as	 a	 period	 when	 the	 outlook	 for	




If	 the	manager,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 intends	 to	misuse	 the	 discretion	 provided	 by	
SFAS	142,	it	may	not	be	possible	to	opportunistically	delay	goodwill	impairments	when	





that	 the	 firm	 is	 only	 allowed	 to	 recognize	 depreciations,	 but	 prohibited	 from	
recognizing	appreciations	and	reversals,	the	manager	may	not	impair	goodwill	if	future	
appreciations	 are	 plausible.	 Thus,	 in	 times	 of	 diminishing	 industry-specific	 growth	
opportunities,	 the	 manager	 should	 perceive	 future	 appreciations	 as	 less	 plausible.	
Overall,	 these	 arguments	 suggest	 that	 the	 manager	 is	 less	 likely	 to	 opportunistically	
delay	goodwill	impairments	in	times	of	diminishing	growth	opportunities.		
Based	on	 the	 aforementioned	 arguments,	 I	 expect	 that	 the	usefulness	 of	 goodwill	
impairments	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities.	
Specifically,	I	predict	that	firms	with	diminishing	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	
(1)	 are	more	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 than	 are	 firms	with	 non-diminishing	 industry-
specific	 growth	 opportunities,	 and,	 thus,	 (2)	 will	 provide	 more	 value-relevant	
information	 to	 investors.	 To	 test	 these	 predictions,	 I	 exploit	 the	 periods	 prior	 to	 and	
after	 the	 start	 of	 the	 financial	 crises	 in	 2007–2008	 and	 the	 European	 sovereign	 debt	
crisis	in	2010	as	possible	and	observable	sources	of	variation	in	the	manager’s	decision	
to	impair	goodwill,	focusing	on	banks/financial	institutions	and	pharmaceuticals.2	This	
is	 a	 suitable	 setting	because	 the	 core	business	of	banks	and	 financial	 institutions	was	
severely	affected	by	the	financial	crises	due	to	 fluctuating	financial	markets	(Adrian	&	
Shin,	2008),	whereas	the	core	business	of	the	pharmaceuticals	should	not	have	directly	
been	affected	by	the	turmoil	 following	the	 financial	crises	due	to	 inelastic	demand	for	
their	services	and	products.3		
																																																								




insensitive	 to	market	 fluctuations	 (Myers	 &	 Howe,	 1997;	 Harrington,	 2012).	 Thus,	 firms	 in	 the	 sector	





growth	 opportunities	 (i.e.,	 Banks	 &	 Financials)	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	
relative	 to	Pharmaceuticals.	To	do	so,	 I	use	an	OLS	specification	where	 the	dependent	
variable	 takes	 the	 value	 of	 1	 if	 the	 firm	 reports	 impaired	 goodwill,	 and	 0	 otherwise.	
After	 controlling	 for	 firm-specific	 growth	 opportunities,	 I	 find	 that	 a	 firm’s	 industry-
specific	growth	opportunities	have	no	significant	impact	on	the	likelihood	of	impairing	
goodwill.	 In	one	case,	 I	 find	some	evidence	suggesting	 that,	during	 the	European	debt	
crisis,	banks	and	financial	institutions	were	less	likely	to	impair	goodwill.	Although	the	
research	design	of	 the	 first	 test	 is	unable	 to	determine	whether	Banks	&	Financials	or	
Pharmaceuticals	 are	 managing	 goodwill	 impairments,	 these	 findings	 suggest	 that	
delayed	goodwill	impairments,	as	found	in	prior	literature,	are	not	due	to	an	overall	fair	
application	of	SFAS	142.	Thus,	I	am	unable,	solely	using	the	OLS	estimations,	to	clearly	
determine	whether	 the	 usefulness	 of	 goodwill	 impairments	 to	 investors	 improved	 as	
the	firm’s	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	diminished.	
Accordingly,	I	test	whether	goodwill	impairments	by	BANKS	&	FINANCIALS	provide	
more	 useful	 information	 to	 investors	 relative	 to	 PHARMACEUTICALS,	 using	 a	 value-
relevance	specification.	I	find	that	goodwill	impairments	are	negatively	and	significantly	
associated	 with	 abnormal	 stock	 returns	 when	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	
opportunities	 are	 not	 diminishing.	However,	when	 the	 firms	 industry-specific	 growth	
opportunities	 are	 diminishing,	 I	 find	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	 are	 positively	 and	
significantly	associated	with	 stock	abnormal	 returns.	These	 two	 findings	 indicate	 that	
investors	 attach	 higher	 valuation	 weight	 to	 goodwill	 impairments	 when	 the	 firm’s	
industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 diminishing.	 In	 other	 words,	 goodwill	





no	 convincing	 evidence	 that	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 related	 to	
reported	goodwill	impairment	amounts.	Thus,	the	goodwill-impairment	decision	cannot	
be	linked	to	investors’	higher	valuation	weight	to	goodwill	impairments	found	in	the	of	
value-relevance	 tests.	 Hence,	 the	 results	 indicate	 that	 industry-specific	 economic	





uncertainty	during	 the	period	2008–2011	 for	both	model	 specifications,	 and	 find	 that	
the	main	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 this	 change.	 I	 also	 test	 the	 robustness	 of,	 for	 example,	
unwillingness	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 and	 financial	 leverage.	 No	 alternative	 specifications	
change	the	main	results	of	this	paper.	Finally,	I	test	and	find	that	the	significance	of	the	
results	 improves	 if	 the	sample	 is	refined	by	only	 including	financial	 institutions	 in	the	
second	financial	crisis,	which	strengthens	the	conclusion	that	goodwill	impairments	by	
firms	 in	 an	 industry	 with	 diminishing	 growth	 opportunities	 provide	 more	 value-
relevant	information	to	investors.		
This	 study	provides	 insights	 into	 the	 usefulness	 of	 fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting	
and	 its	 relationship	 to	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	opportunities.	Prior	 studies	
have	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 usefulness	 of	 fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting	 without	
considering	the	effect	of	the	macroeconomic	environment	(e.g.,	Jarva,	2009;	Ramanna	&	
Watts,	 2012;	 Muller,	 Neamtiu	 &	 Riedl,	 2012).	 This	 paper	 extends	 our	 knowledge	 by	
providing	evidence	that	the	usefulness	of	fair-value	goodwill	to	investors	does	depend	
to	 some	 extent	 on	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities.	 Thus,	 the	 main	




reporting	 of	 goodwill	 or	 whether	 firms	 in	 industries	 with	 non-diminishing	 growth	
opportunities	 opportunistically	 accelerate	 the	 impairment	 of	 goodwill	 when	 other	
industries	 are	 suffering	 from	 diminishing	 growth	 opportunities.	 Thus,	 future	 studies	
should	further	explore	the	underlying	economics	of	goodwill	impairment	by	firms	with	
diminishing	growth	opportunities.	However,	 the	 findings	of	 this	 study	are	based	on	a	
sample	 of	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions,	which	may	 not	 be	 representative	 of	 other	








develops	 the	 hypotheses.	 Section	 3	 presents	 the	 sample	 selection	 and	 the	 research	





A	 fundamental	 idea	 behind	 the	 Financial	 Accounting	 Standards	 Board’s	 (FASB)	
Conceptual	 Framework	 for	 Financial	 Reporting	 is	 that	 accounting	 information	 should	
present	 underlying	 economics	 and	 thus	 mitigate	 information	 asymmetries	 between	
managers	and	users	such	as	 investors.	 In	 line	with	this	reasoning,	the	FASB	advocates	
fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 managers,	 by	 disclosing	 their	
estimations	 of	 future	 superior	 earnings	 related	 to	 acquisitions,	 will	 better	 convey	
concurrent	private	 information	 to	 investors	 (FASB,	1999).	Another	 argument	 for	 fair-
value	 goodwill	 accounting	 was	 that	 it	 would	 make	 the	 initial	 valuation	 of	 goodwill	
uniform	 by	 only	 permitting	 the	 purchase	 method.	 The	 U.S.	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	
Commission	(SEC),	 in	particular,	had	expressed	concerns	about	the	previous	option	of	





SFAS	 147,	 banks	 were	 also	 required	 to	 test	 goodwill	 on	 a	 fair-value	 basis,	 thereby	
making	fair-value	goodwill	accounting	pursuant	to	SFAS	141	and	142	mandatory	for	all	















implication	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting	 is	 that	 the	 subsequent	
treatment	of	goodwill	is	entirely	based	on	impairment	tests	instead	of	systematic	yearly	
amortizations.		








the	 supposition	 that	 managers’	 goodwill	 accounting	 will	 be	 unreliable.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	with	 the	 additional	 discretion	provided	by	 SFAS	141	 and	142,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	
non-opportunistic	managers	to	provide	users	with	credible	information	about	goodwill	





based	 on	 the	 purchase	 method,	 goodwill	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
purchase	price	and	the	fair	value	of	purchased	net	assets.	SFAS	142	requires	managers,	
at	 least	annually,	 to	test	goodwill	 for	 impairment	at	the	reporting	unit	 level	on	a	fixed	
date	initially	chosen	by	the	manager.	The	impairment	test	is	divided	into	two	separate	
steps;	 Step	 one	 compares	 the	 fair	 value	 of	 the	 reporting	 unit,	 including	 capitalized	
goodwill,	with	its	carrying	amount	(i.e.	book	value);	Step	two	is	only	considered	if	 the	
carrying	 amount	 exceeds	 the	 fair	 value	 of	 the	 reporting	 unit	 in	 step	 one,	 since	 it	
indicates	a	need	for	 further	 investigation.	 Impaired	goodwill	should	be	reported	if	 the	
investigation	in	step	two	indicates	that	the	book	value	of	goodwill	exceeds	its	fair	value.	
One	 important	 feature	 related	 to	 SFAS	 142	 is	 that	 the	 valuation	 of	 goodwill	 is	
asymmetric	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 firms	 are	 only	 allowed	 to	 report	 depreciations,	 but	 are	







In	 contrast	 to	 the	 FASB’s	 expectations,	 most	 prior	 research	 provides	 evidence	
suggesting	 that	managers	 opportunistically	 delay	 goodwill	 impairments	 (e.g.,	 Churyk,	
2004;	 Hayn	 &	 Hughes,	 2006;	 Bens,	 Heltzer	 &	 Segal,	 2007;	 Ramanna	 &	Watts,	 2012;	
Muller	 et	 al.	 20012).	 Li	 &	 Sloan	 (2017),	 for	 instance,	 find	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	
tend	 to	 peak	 when	 operating	 margins	 are	 unusually	 low,	 implying	 that	 managers’	
accounting	 choices	 depend	 on	 investors’	 understanding	 of	 the	 underlying	 value	 of	
goodwill.	 Moreover,	 Muller	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 find	 that	 managers	 of	 goodwill-impairment	
firms	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 earn	 abnormal	 returns	 on	 insider	 trading	 prior	 to	
announcements	of	 impairment,	suggesting	that	managers	understand	and	deliberately	
delay	goodwill	impairments	in	pursuit	of	private	gain.		
Although	 most	 prior	 research	 finds	 that	 managers	 tend	 to	 misuse	 SFAS	 142,	 no	
prior	 study	 has	 investigated	 how	 diminishing	 growth	 opportunities	 affect	 goodwill	
accounting	 choices	 and	 their	 relevance	 to	 investors.	 There	 are	 at	 least	 two	 key	
arguments	why	goodwill	impairments	could	better	reflect	underlying	economics	when	





Because	SFAS	142	only	requires	managers	 to	 test	whether	goodwill	 is	 impaired	 if	
the	reporting	unit	is	impaired,	goodwill	may,	assuming	that	managers	are	acting	in	the	
best	 interest	 of	 information	 users,	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 concurrently	 reflect	 underlying	
economics	 when	 other	 assets	 than	 goodwill	 are	 depreciating.	 In	 other	 words,	 since	
other	assets	than	goodwill	at	the	reporting	unit	level	typically	depreciate	(appreciate)	in	
value	 during	 periods	 when	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	
diminishing	(improving),	the	firm	is	more	(less)	likely	under	these	conditions	to	test	for	







Another	 argument	 for	 why	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 firms	 in	 industries	 with	
diminishing	growth	opportunities	could	better	reflect	the	underlying	economics	is	that	
managers	 are	 unable	 to	 act	 from	 opportunistic	 motives	 when	 overall	 growth	
opportunities	 are	 diminishing.	 For	 example,	 Povel	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 provide	 proofs	 that,	
since	 investors	 are	 more	 inclined	 to	 investigate	 accounting	 information	 reported	 by	
firms	 with	 diminishing	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities,	 managers	 are	 more	




are	 plausible.	 Consequently,	 goodwill	 impairments	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 concurrently	
reflect	 underlying	 economics	 when	 the	 firm’s	 overall	 growth	 opportunities	 are	
diminishing,	 since	 managers	 are	 forced	 by	 the	 investors’	 strengthened	 monitoring	
activity	to	impair	goodwill.	
Accordingly,	 regardless	 of	whether	 goodwill	 impairments	 are	 delayed	 because	 of	
the	 complexity	 of	 the	 impairment-test	 procedure	 under	 SFAS	 142	 or	 because	 of	
managerial	opportunism,	I	expect	diminishing	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	to	
have	 an	 impact	 on	 goodwill	 accounting	 choices.	 Specifically,	 I	 predict	 that	 firms	 are	
more	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 if	 their	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	
diminishing,	 since	 (1)	 other	 assets	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 delay	 the	 impairment	 test	 of	
goodwill,	 or	 (2)	 opportunistic	 managers	 are	 forced	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 as	 investors	
strengthen	 their	 monitoring	 activity.	 These	 arguments	 lead	 to	 the	 first	 research	
hypothesis,	stated	in	alternative	form:	
H1:	Firms	with	diminishing	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	are	more	
likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 than	are	 firms	with	non-diminishing	 industry-
specific	growth	opportunities.	
Because	 accounting	 will	 only	 provide	 relevant	 information	 to	 investors	 when	 it	
reflects	underlying	economics,	I	expect	the	value	relevance	of	goodwill	to	increase	when	
the	firm’s	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	are	diminishing.	This	is	because,	when	
the	manager	 impairs	 goodwill	 based	 on	 underlying	 economics,	 this	will	 interact	with	










The	 recent	 financial	 crises	 provide	 an	 opportunity	 to	 test	 whether	 goodwill	
impairments	convey	more	useful	information	to	investors	if	the	firm’s	industry-specific	
growth	opportunities	are	diminishing.	What	makes	the	financial	crisis	a	suitable	setting	
is	 that	at	 least	 two	 industries	are	disparately	affected	by	 its	repercussions.	Banks	and	
financial	 institutions	 were	 severely	 affected	 by	 the	 financial	 crisis	 since	 their	 core	
business	 depends	 on	 resilient	 financial	 markets	 (Adrian	 &	 Shin,	 2008).	 The	 core	
business	of	the	pharmaceutical	 industry,	on	the	other	hand,	was	probably	not	affected	
by	 the	 turmoil	 following	 the	 start	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 due	 to	 inelastic	 demand	 for	
pharmaceutical	services	and	products.		
Thus,	 while	 demand	 for	 products	 and	 services	 of	 the	 banks	 and	 financial	
institutions	has	traditionally	been	cyclical	(Levine	&	Zervos,	1998),	the	pharmaceutical	
industry’s	products	and	services	are	relatively	insensitive	to	market	fluctuations	(Myers	
&	 Howe,	 1997;	 Harrington,	 2012).	 In	 addition,	 due	 to	 increased	 operating	 costs	 as	 a	
result	 of	 regulatory	 and	 legislative	 changes	 (Standard	 &	 Poor’s,	 2012),	 investors	 in	
banks	and	 financial	 institutions	are	more	 likely	 to	be	prone	 to	 investigate	each	 firm’s	





during	 the	 period	 2002–2012	 and	 that	 belong	 to	 one	 of	 the	 following	 four	 sectors:	
Banks;	 Financial	 Services;	 Healthcare	 Equipment	 and	 Services;	 and	 Pharmaceuticals	








on	 the	 three	major	U.S.	 stock	markets	 (i.e.	New	York	 stock	exchange,	NYSE	MKT,	 and	
NASDAQ).	 I	 mitigate	 survivorship	 bias	 by	 including	 companies	 categorized	 in	
Datastream	as	either	dead,	suspended,	or	delisted	 if	 they	show	any	sign	of	being	active	
during	 any	 year	 in	 the	 studied	 period.	 All	 components	 related	 to	 financial	 reporting	
information	and	abnormal	stock	returns	were	retrieved	from	Worldscope.	
In	 addition,	 I	 restrict	 the	 sample	 by	 only	 including	 data	 from	 2003–2012.	 The	
reason	 why	 I	 do	 not	 include	 the	 year	 when	 fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting	 was	
implemented	(i.e.,	2001	for	pharmaceuticals	and	2002	for	banks)	is,	(1)	that	2001	and	
2002	may	 include	accounting	choices	associated	with	 the	aftermath	of	 the	bursting	of	
the	 IT	bubble,	which	would	 include	crisis-accounting	choices	 in	my	period	of	 stability	
and	 certainty.	 (2)	 and,	more	 importantly,	 that	 banks	were	not	 allowed	 to	 report	 fair-
value	 goodwill	 impairments	 prior	 to	 2002.	 Thus,	 by	 excluding	 2002,	 I	 also	 avoid	
comparing	 the	 transition	 year	 to	 fair-value	 goodwill	 accounting	 for	 banks	 to	
pharmaceuticals’	non-transition-year	of	 fair-value	goodwill	accounting.6	Because	some	
firm-years	 include	capitalized	goodwill	but	report	goodwill	 impairments	as	#NA,	 I	use	
SEC’s	 database	 EDGAR	 to	 manually	 investigate	 and	 correct	 for	 all	 #NA	 that	 are	
equivalent	 to	 non-goodwill	 impairment.	 After	 adjusting	 for	 delisted	 firms	 and	
bankruptcies,	this	leads	to	a	final	sample	of	777	firm-years,	including	262	firm-years	for	





















with	 pharmaceuticals;	 and	 the	 other	 compares	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 with	
pharmaceuticals.	 Following	 prior	 studies	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 reporting	 goodwill	
impairments	(e.g.,	Jarva,	2009),	I	use	a	sample	of	impairment	firms	and	non-impairment	
firms	 that	 are	 either	 banks/financial	 institutions	 or	 pharmaceuticals.	 By	 including	 all	
firms	 in	 the	 industries	 chosen	 for	 this	 study	 and	 using	 their	 impairment	 decisions	
(impairment	 versus	 non-impairment)	 as	 the	 dependent	 variable	 and	 controlling	 for	
firm-level	characteristics,	I	assess	whether	banks	and	financial	institutions	significantly	
changed	 the	 likelihood	 of	 impairing	 goodwill	 during	 the	 financial	 crises	 relative	 to	
pharmaceuticals.				
The	 dependent	 variable	 (D_IMPGW)	 is	 an	 indicator	 variable	 equal	 to	 1	 if	 firm	 i	
impairs	goodwill	 in	year	t	during	the	sample	period	2003–2012,	and	0	otherwise.	The	
primary	variables	of	interest	are	the	indicator	variables	BF,	CRISIS	1,	and	CRISIS	2,	and	
the	 interaction	 variables	 CRISIS	 1	 _BF,	 and	 CRISIS	 2	 _BF.	 BF	 is	 intended	 to	 capture	
whether	 banks	 (BANKS	 sample)	 and	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 (BANKS	 &	
FINANCIALS	 sample)	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 than	 the	 pharmaceuticals	
during	the	sample	period,	2003–2011.	CRISIS	1	and	CRISIS	2	are	intended	to	capture	the	





and	 uncertain	 period	 with	 a	 negative	 economic	 outlook	 for	 most	 industries	 (Casu	 &	
Chiaramonte,	2012).	CRISIS	1	 is	an	 indicator	variable	equal	to	1	for	2008–2009,	and	0	
otherwise;	CRISIS	2	 is	an	 indicator	variable	equal	 to	1	 for	2011,	and	0	otherwise.	The	
reason	I	do	not	include	the	second	half	of	2007	is,	first	that,	as	acknowledged	by	Povel	
et	al.	 (2004),	 investors	 tend	not	 to	 immediately	 respond	 to	new	economic	conditions,	











for	 ϕ1.	 The	 indicator	 variables	 CRISIS	 1	 and	 CRISIS	 2	 are	 intend	 to	 measure	 the	
likelihood	 of	 goodwill	 impairments	 due	 to	 financial	 turbulence	 during	 the	 first	 and	
second	financial	crises.	Because	economic	turbulence	will	attract	reinforced	monitoring	
activity,	 I	 predict	positive	 coefficients	 for	ϕ2,	 and	ϕ3.	The	 interaction	variables	CRISIS	
1_BF	and	CRISIS	2_BF	are	intended	to	measure	the	likelihood	of	whether	banks	(BANKS	
sample)	and	banks	and	financial	institutions	(BANKS	&	FINANCIALS	sample)	change	the	
frequency	 of	 goodwill-impairments	 as	 a	 direct	 effect	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Based	 on	
hypothesis	H1,	I	predict	that	the	coefficients	ϕ4	and	ϕ5	will	be	significant	and	positive.	
I	 also	 include	 variables	 to	 control	 for	 other	 potential	 determinants	 related	 to	 the	
frequency	of	goodwill	 impairments.	First,	 I	 include	firm	size	(SIZE)	to	control	 for	size-
effects,	 defined	 as	 the	 logarithm	 of	 the	 beginning-of-the-period	 market	 value	 of	 the	
firm’s	equity.	Based	on	prior	 literature	 (e.g.,	Ramanna	&	Watts,	2012),	 I	 expect	 larger	
firms	to	be	more	likely	to	impair	goodwill,	leading	to	a	predicted	positive	sign	for	ϕ6.	In	
addition,	I	include	the	goodwill-to-total-assets	ratio	(GW_TA),	defined	as	the	beginning-
of-the-period	 capitalized	 goodwill	 scaled	 by	 the	 beginning-of-the-period	 total	 assets.	
Based	 on	 prior	 studies	 (e.g.,	Muller	 et	 al,	 2012),	 I	 predict	 that	 companies	with	 larger	
goodwill	 balances	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill,	 especially	 during	 periods	 of	
diminishing	growth	opportunities,	leading	to	a	predicted	positive	sign	for	ϕ7.		
I	 further	 include	 book-to-market	 ratio	 (BTM)	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 firm-specific	 growth	
opportunities.	 The	 reason	 for	 including	 BTM	 and	 controlling	 for	 firm-specific	
opportunities	is	to	avoid	biased	conclusions	about	industry-specific	behavior	relating	to	
the	 financial	 crisis,	 which	 in	 reality	 are	 related	 to	 firm-specific	 behavior.	 In	 the	
literature,	firms	with	book-to-market	ratios	above	one	are	expected	to	impair	goodwill	
(e.g.,	Ramanna	&	Watts,	2012),	I	capture	this	effect	with	the	indicator	variable	(D_BTM),	
taking	 the	value	of	1	 if	BTM	 is	above	1,	and	0	otherwise	(Jarva,	2009).	Thus,	 I	predict	
13	
	
positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 coefficients	 (ϕ8	 and	 ϕ9)	 for	 the	 BTM	 variables.	
Moreover,	I	use	earnings	before	goodwill	impairments	(PRE_Et)	to	measure	the	general	





and	 0	 otherwise.	 D_RETURNt*Rt-1	 is	 the	 past	 year	 control	 for	 information	 about	
economically	impaired	goodwill.	The	underlying	logic	of	using	negative	stock	return	is	
that	 it	 should	 signal	 information	 about	 economically	 impaired	 goodwill,	 and,	 thus,	
D_RETURNt	 controls	 for	 information	 about	 economically	 impaired	 goodwill	 (Jarva,	





value	 weight	 to	 goodwill	 impairments	 when	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	
opportunities	 are	 diminishing	 (i.e.,	 hypothesis	 H2).	 To	 measure	 the	 relevance	 of	
goodwill	 impairment	 before	 and	 after	 the	 financial	 crises	 in	 2008–2009	 and	 2011,	
respectively,	 I	 estimate	 the	 following	 panel-data	 regression,	 focusing	 on	 the	 yearly	
change	in	abnormal	return	and	goodwill	impairments.	The	main	reason	why	I	focus	on	
















one	 comparing	 banks	 with	 pharmaceuticals	 (BANKS	 sample),	 the	 other	 comparing	
banks	and	financial	institutions	with	pharmaceuticals	(BANKS	&	FINANCIALS	sample).		
The	dependent	variable	ABRET	 is	defined	as	the	difference	between	the	dividend-
adjusted	 stock	 return	 of	 firm	 i	 and	 the	 corresponding	 dividend-adjusted	 return	 of	 its	
sector.	To	calculate	the	return	of	each	sector,	I	use	FTSE	USA	indices	for	banks,	financial	
services,	 healthcare	 equipment	 and	 services,	 and	 pharmaceuticals	 and	 biotechnology,	
focusing	on	the	yearly	change	in	the	value-weighted	industry	market	index.	In	order	to	
avoid	hindsight	bias,	 I	calculate	the	stock	return	as	the	yearly	change	as	of	 the	first	of	
April.	 The	 indicator	 variables	 CRISIS	 1	 and	 CRISIS	 2	 control	 for	 whether	 abnormal	
returns	 were	 affected	 by	 the	 financial	 crises	 in	 2008–2009	 and	 2011.10	Although	 a	




Since	 model	 2	 is	 based	 on	 the	 change	 in	 abnormal	 return	 measures,	 I	 follow	
Hamberg	and	Beisland	(2011)	by	extracting	year-to-year	change	in	goodwill	(ΔGWIMP)	
from	the	year-to-year	change	 in	reported	earnings	(ΔEARN).	Since	model	 (2)	assumes	
abnormal	 returns	 to	 be	 a	 function	 of	 the	 year-to-year	 change	 in	 earnings	 before	
goodwill	 impairments,	 I	 predict	 that	 the	 sign	 for	 γ3	 will	 be	 positive.	 However,	 since	




financial	 institutions	 in	 the	periods	CRISIS	1	and	CRISIS	2	(i.e.,	ΔIMP_BF_	CRISIS	1	and	
ΔIMP_BF_	CRISIS	 1).	 The	 variables	 are	 based	 on	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 year-to-
year	 change	 in	 goodwill	 impairments	 ΔGWIMP,	 the	 indicator	 variable	 for	 financial	
institutions	and/or	banks	(BF)	and	the	two	periods	of	financial	crisis	(i.e.,	CRISIS	1	and	
CRISIS	2).	The	purpose	of	these	interaction	variables	is	to	distinguish	whether	goodwill	
impairments	 by	 banks	 and/or	 financial	 institutions	 reduce	 the	 negative	 association	
between	abnormal	 returns	 and	goodwill	 impairments	during	periods	when	 the	 firm’s	





only	 provide	 information	 about	 underlying	 economics	 to	 investors	 when	 the	 firm’s	
industry-specific	growth	opportunities	are	diminishing,	I	predict	that	ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS	1	
and	 ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS	 2	 will	 be	 positively	 associated	 with	 abnormal	 returns.	 That	 is,	 I	
expect	the	signs	of	γ5	and	γ6	to	be	positive.	
I	 also	 include	 a	 number	 of	 control	 variables.	 First,	 I	 control	 for	 goodwill	
impairments	 by	 banks/financial	 institutions	 ΔIMP_BF,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 goodwill	
impairments	 during	 the	 first	 and	 second	 financial	 crisis	 (i.e.,	 ΔIMP_CRISIS	 1	 and	
ΔIMP_CRISIS	 2)	 to	 avoid	 drawing	 wrong	 conclusions	 about	 the	 primary	 variable	 of	
interest.	I	do	not	have	any	expected	signs	for	γ7,	γ8,	and	γ9.	I	control	for	the	relevance	of	
banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 during	 the	 first	 and	 second	 financial	 crises	 (i.e.,	
BF_CRISIS	1	and	BF_CRISIS	2),	 in	which	connection	I	have	no	expectation	of	regarding	
the	relation	to	abnormal	returns	(i.e.,	γ10	and	γ11)	
Since	 losses	 are	 a	poor	predictor	 of	 future	performance	of	 going	 concerns	 (Hayn,	
2010;	Ball	&	Shivakumar,	2006)11,	I	use	the	dichotomous	variable	(D_EARN)	to	control	
for	negative	earnings.	D_EARN	 takes	 the	value	of	1	 if	net	profit	of	 firm	 i	 is	negative	 in	
year	t,	and	0	otherwise.	 I	 further	 interact	D_NEARN	with	firm-years	and	with	negative	
earnings	 (NEG_EARN),	 resulting	 in	 (D_NEARN_EARN)	 (Francis,	 Schipper	 &	 Vincent,	
2003).	Since	losses	have	a	negative	impact	on	returns,	I	predict	that	the	coefficient	γ12	of	
D_NEARN	will	be	negatively	associated	with	abnormal	returns,	whereas	the	coefficient	





Table	 1	 presents	 descriptive	 information	 about	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	
banks/financials	 and	pharmaceuticals.	 Panel	A	 reveals	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	 are	
reported	more	frequently	during	the	period	following	the	financial	crisis;	roughly	80%	
(99	of	122)	of	all	goodwill	impairments	were	reported	in	the	second	half	of	the	sample	
period,	 i.e.,	 2008–2012.	Banks	and	Financial	 Services	 firms	appear	 to	 impair	goodwill	
more	 frequently	 in	 the	 two	years	 immediately	 following	 the	start	of	 the	 first	 financial	
																																																								
11	Since	 accrual	 accounting	 requires	 the	 firm	 to	 continue	 in	 future	 periods	 (i.e.,	 the	 going-concern	









impairment	 amounts	 range	 from	 USD	 57	 thousand	 to	 around	 USD	 250	 million;	 (ii)	
Financial	 Services	 reported	 a	 total	 of	 38	 impairments	 (12	 before	 the	 start	 of	 the	
financial	 crisis),	 and	 the	 reported	 goodwill	 impairment	 amounts	 range	 from	USD	 1.3	
million	to	USD	1	billion;	(iii)	Pharmaceuticals	and	Biotechnology	reported	a	total	of	13	
impairments	 (2	before	 the	 start	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis),	 ranging	 in	 amounts	 from	USD	
565	 thousand	 to	 USD	 400	 million;	 (iv)	 Healthcare	 Equipment	 and	 Services	 firms	




101	 sample	 firms,	 86	 reported	 impaired	 goodwill	 at	 least	 once	 during	 the	 period.	
Consistent	with	prior	studies	(e.g.	Muller	et	al.,	2012),	the	majority	(63	firms,	or	73%	of	




Table	2	presents	univariate	 comparisons	 for	 the	 three	 samples	 (BANKS;	BANKS	&	
FINANCIALS;	and	PHARMACEUTICALS).	The	change	in	goodwill	impairments	(ΔGWIMP)	
is	 larger	 among	 pharmaceuticals	 than	 among	 banks	 or	 banks/financial	 institutions	
(B&F).	 From	 the	 start	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 change	 in	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	
banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 (ΔIMP_BF_UNCER)	 seems	 to	 have	 increased.	 The	
indicator	 variable	 for	 negative	 earnings	 (D_EARN)	 reveals	 that	 earnings	 below	 0	 are	
more	 common	 in	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 (35%	 of	 the	 observations),	 whereas	
roughly	 20%	 of	 the	 sampled	 firm-years	 of	 banks	 and	 banks/financial	 institutions	
reported	earnings	below	0.	The	total	reported	amount	of	negative	earnings	adjusted	by	





assets	 (GW_TA)	 than	 banks	 and	 financials.	 However,	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	
are,	 based	 on	 their	 book-to-market	 ratio	 (BTM),	 more	 likely	 on	 average	 to	 impair	
goodwill	 than	 are	 pharmaceuticals,	 which	 suggests	 that	 the	 banking/financial	
industries’	goodwill	is	under	more	pressure.	The	frequency	of	firms	with	a	BTM	above	




Table	 3	 presents	 the	 results	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 goodwill	 impairment	 reporting	
frequency	 (D_IMPGW)	 from	 the	 OLS	 regression,12	consisting	 of	 two	 subsamples	 –	
BANKS,	and	BANKS	&	FINANCIALS.	Note	that	the	variable	BF	is	the	indicator	variable	for	





I	 start	 the	analysis	by	 comparing	banks	with	pharmaceuticals	 in	Table	3	 (column	
BANKS,	 N=	 409)	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 goodwill	 impairments	 (D_IMPGW).	 After	
controlling	for	firm-specific	characteristics	and	other	variables	that	prior	literature	has	
found	 relevant	 to	 explaining	 the	 likelihood	of	 goodwill	 impairments,	 I	 find	 conflicting	
results	 as	 regards	 whether	 firms	 with	 diminishing	 industry-specific	 growth	
opportunities	are	more	 (or	 less)	 likely	 to	 report	 impaired	goodwill.	 Specifically,	 I	 find	
that	banks’	BF	in	general	and	during	the	first	financial	crisis	CRISIS	1_BF	are	positively	
associated	 with	 impairing	 goodwill,	 while,	 during	 the	 second	 financial	 crisis,	 CRISIS	
2_BF	is	negatively	associated	with	the	likelihood	of	impairing	goodwill.	However,	CRISIS	




13	Tables	 8	 and	 9	 report	 the	 pairwise	 correlations	 between	 the	 independent	 variables.	 The	 interaction	
variables	 (CRISIS	1_BF	and	CRISIS	2_BF)	are	correlated	with	other	variables,	and	have	 the	 “highest”	VIF	
scores	 of	 2.48	 and	 2.34,	 respectively,	 in	 the	 BANKS	&	 FINANCIALS	 sample.	 In	 the	 BANKS	 sample,	 the	





of	 the	 firm	SIZE	 are	positively	associated	with	goodwill	 impairments	at	 the	10%-level	
and	1%-level,	 respectively,	while	PRE_E	 is	negatively	associated	with	the	 likelihood	of	
impairing	goodwill	at	the	1%-level.	Moreover,	D_RETURN*R	 is	negatively	associated	at	
the	1%-level.	
Turning	 to	 the	 BANKS	 &	 FINANCIALS	 sample	 in	 Table	 3	 (N=	 516),	 I	 find	 some	
evidence	suggesting	that	firms	with	diminishing	industry-specific	growth	opportunities	
are	 less	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill.	 In	 particular,	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 (i.e.,	
firms	with	diminishing	industry-specific	growth	opportunities)	are	less	likely	to	impair	
goodwill	 in	 the	 second	 financial	 crisis	 CRISIS_2*BF.	 However,	 banks	 and	 financial	
institutions	 BF	 are	 not	 more	 (or	 less)	 likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill.	 Similar	 to	 the	 first	
analysis	 of	 the	 BANK	 sample,	 the	 first	 financial	 crisis	 is	 positively	 but	 insignificantly	




larger	 goodwill	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 report	 impairments.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 firm,	 SIZE,	 is	
positively	associated	with	reporting	impaired	goodwill	at	the	10%-level,	while	negative	
returns	 in	 period	 t	 seem	 to	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 impairing	 goodwill,	 and	
D_RETUNRN*Rt	 is	 negatively	 associated	 at	 the	 1%-level,	 indicating	 that	 a	 current	
negative	return	has	an	impact	on	the	likelihood	of	impairing	goodwill.				
Overall,	 I	 find	 no	 convincing	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 firms	 with	 diminishing	
industry-specific	growth	opportunities	are	more	likely	to	impair	goodwill	than	are	firms	
in	 industries	with	non-diminishing	growth	opportunities.	 In	 fact,	 I	 find	some	evidence	
that	banks	and	financial	are	 less	 likely	to	 impair	goodwill	during	the	second	period	of	











Table	 4	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 the	 assessment	 of	whether	 goodwill	 impairments	
provide	 more	 value-relevant	 information	 to	 investors	 when	 reported	 by	 banks	 and	
financial	institutions	in	CRISIS	1	and	CRISIS	2.	As	in	section	4.2,	the	first	column	focuses	
on	 the	 value	 relevance	 of	 reported	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 banks	 relative	 to	
pharmaceuticals	(i.e.,	 the	BANKS	column),	and	the	second	column	compares	 the	value	





Focusing	 on	 the	 sample	 that	 compares	 goodwill	 impairment	 by	 banks	 and	
pharmaceuticals	(column	BANKS,	N	=	471),	the	periods	of	crisis,	CRISIS	1	and	CRISIS	2,	
are	both	negatively	associated	with	abnormal	returns	at	the	10%-level,	suggesting	that	
investors	 in	 firms	 with	 diminishing	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 put	 less	
weight	 on	 their	 valuation.	 Earnings	 before	 impaired	 goodwill	 (ΔEARN_IMP)	 are	
positively	associated	(t-statistic	=	2.20)	with	abnormal	returns,	which	is,	ceteris	paribus,	
consistent	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 higher	 earnings	 attract	 more	 investments	 relative	 to	
other	firms	in	the	industry/sector.	The	coefficient	of	the	indicator	variable	for	negative	
earnings	(D_EARN)	is	significantly	negative	(t-statistic	=	-3.43),	which	is	consistent	with	
the	 expectation	 that	 losses	 make	 a	 firm	 less	 attractive	 to	 investors	 relative	 to	 other	
firms	 in	 the	 industry/	 sector.	 Goodwill	 impairments	 (ΔGWIMP)	 are	 negatively	









However,	 the	 VIF	 scores	 show	 no	 strong	 signs	 of	 problems	 with	 multicollinearity,	 suggesting	 that	
regression	 coefficients	 can	 be	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	 value	 relevance	 of	 goodwill	 impairments.	 In	 the	
BANKS	sample,	ΔGWIMP	has	the	highest	VIF	score	of	2.79,	and	most	of	 the	 interaction	variables	have	a	
VIF	score	of	around	2.	In	the	BANKS	&	FINANCIALS	sample	ΔGWIMP	has	the	highest	VIF	score	of	4.98.	The	




0.701,	 t-statistic	=	3.58).	ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS	2,	 however,	 is	not	 associated	with	abnormal	
returns	 (coefficient	 =	 0.603,	 t-statistic	 =	 1.57).	 These	 findings	 are	 in	 line	 with	 my	
prediction	 that	 investors	 attach	more	 value	 to	 goodwill	 impairments	when	 the	 firm’s	
industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 diminishing,	 indicating	 that	 goodwill	
impairments	under	these	conditions	are	more	useful	to	investors.		
Table	4	(the	BANKS	&	FINANCIALS	 column,	N	=	581)	reveals	similar	results	as	 for	
the	 sample	 consisting	 of	 banks	 versus	 pharmaceuticals	 (BANKS).	 However,	 the	
interaction	 variable	 D_NEARN_EARN	 is	 now	 positively	 significant,	 as	 predicted.	
Furthermore,	 goodwill	 impairments	 ΔGWIMP	 are	 now	 negatively	 associated	 with	
abnormal	 returns	 at	 the	 1%-level.	 Interestingly,	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 banks	 and	
financial	 institutions	 during	 CRISIS	 1	ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS	 1	 are	 still	 positively	 associated	
with	 abnormal	 returns	 (t-statistic	 =	 4.24).	 However,	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 banks	
and	 financial	 institutions	 (ΔGWIMP_BF_CRISIS	 2)	 during	 CRISIS	 2	 are	 now	 positively	
associated	with	abnormal	returns	(t-stat	=	1.90),	but	only	at	 the	10%-level.	The	 latter	
finding	 is	 consistent	with	my	 expectation	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	 are	more	 value-
relevant	 when	 a	 firm’s	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 diminishing.	 By	 including	 financial	




Overall,	 I	 find	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 firms	 with	 diminishing	 industry-
specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 positively	 associated	 with	 abnormal	 returns	 at	 the	
1%-level.	This	finding	indicates	that	goodwill	 impairments	reduce	the	uncertainty	and	
the	 information	 asymmetry	 between	 managers	 and	 investors	 when	 banks’	 industry-
specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 diminishing.	 In	 addition,	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	
banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 in	 the	 first	 and	 second	 financial	 crisis	 (CRISIS	 1	 and	
CRISIS	2)	are	positively	associated	with	abnormal	returns	at	the	1%-level	and	the	10%-
level,	 respectively.	 These	 results	 further	 strengthen	 the	 above	 conclusion,	 which	










could,	 in	 addition	 to	 increasing	 the	 frequency	 of	 reported	 goodwill	 impairments,	 also	












the	 dependent	 variable	 D_IMPGW	 with	 the	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 reported	 goodwill	
impairment	amounts	T_IMPGW.	Second,	the	primary	variables	of	interest	are,	as	above,	
the	 indicator	 variables	BF,	CRISIS	1	and	CRISIS	2,	 and	 the	 interaction	 variables	CRISIS	
1_BF	 and	CRISIS	2_BF.	BF	 is	 intended	 to	 capture	whether	 banks	 (BANKS	 sample)	 and	
banks	and	financial	institutions	(BANKS	&	FINANCIALS	sample)	report	smaller	goodwill	
impairment	 amounts	 relative	 to	 pharmaceuticals	 during	 the	 whole	 sample	 period.	 I	
predict	 no	 sign	 for	 the	 coefficients	 ψ4	 and	 ψ5	since	 firms	 with	 diminishing	 industry-
specific	 growth	 opportunities	 may	 report	 smaller	 or	 larger	 goodwill	 impairment	
amounts.	 I	 include	 the	 same	 control	 variables	 as	 in	 model	 1,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	
D_RETURN,	 D_RETURNt*Rt,	D_RETURNt-1	 and	 	 D_RETURNt*Rt-1.	 Furthermore,	 I	 expect	
the	 signs	 of	 the	 remaining	 coefficients	 in	 model	 3	 to	 correspond	 to	 the	 respective	
coefficients	in	model	1.	That	is,	I	expect	the	same	signs	for	ψi	as	for	ϕi	(i.e.,	ϕ0-	ϕ3,	and		
ϕ6-	ϕ11).		
Table	5	presents	 the	results	 from	the	OLS	regression	on	 the	amounts	of	 impaired	





Starting	with	 the	BANKS	 sample	 in	 Table	 4	 (N	 =	 63),	 I	 find	 that	 banks	 in	 the	 second	
financial	crisis	(CRISIS_2*BF)	are	negatively	associated	with	the	reporting	of	 impaired	
goodwill	 amounts	 at	 the	 10%-level,	 suggesting	 that	 banks	 report	 smaller	 amounts	 of	
goodwill	 relative	 to	 pharmaceuticals.	 Although	 the	 coefficient	 is	 negative	 for	 the	
variable	measuring	banks’	reporting	of	goodwill	impairment	amounts	in	the	first	crisis,	
the	 result	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 The	 coefficient	 for	 CRISIS	 1	 and	 CRISIS	 2	 is	
positive	but	not	statistically	significant.	The	positive	coefficient	for	GW_TA,	at	the	1%-





to	 that	 in	 the	 BANKS	 sample.	 That	 is,	 I	 find	 that	 banks	 and	 financials	 in	 the	 second	
period	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (CRISIS	 2)	 are	 negatively	 associated	 with	 reporting	
goodwill	 impairment	 amounts,	 indicating	 that	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 report	
smaller	goodwill	impairment	amounts.	There	are	some	exceptions,	however.	Compared	
to	 the	 BANKS	 sample,	 for	 instance,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 firm	 (SIZE)	 is	 now	 positively	
associated	 with	 reported	 goodwill	 impairment	 amounts.	 In	 addition,	 focusing	 on	 the	
variables	 of	 interest,	 I	 find	 that	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 during	 CRISIS	 2	 are	
positively	 associated	 with	 reporting	 goodwill	 impairment	 amounts	 compared	 to	
pharmaceuticals.	 Altogether,	 the	 variables	 indicate	 that	 firms	 with	 diminishing	
industry-specific	opportunities	during	CRISIS	2	are	more	likely	to	impair	goodwill.	The	
coefficient	 of	 D_BTM	 is	 positive	 and	 significant	 at	 the	 5%-level,	 indicating	 that	 firms	
expected	to	impair	goodwill	report	larger	goodwill	impairment	amounts.	
Overall,	 I	 find	 that	 firms	with	 diminishing	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	











There	 is	 a	 possibility	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 time	 frame	 of	 diminishing	 growth	
opportunities	is	inaccurate.	Therefore,	as	an	alternative	to	CDS	spreads,	I	use	the	whole	
period	following	the	start	of	the	first	financial	crisis	until	the	end	of	the	second	financial	
crisis	 as	 a	 period	 of	 diminishing	 growth	 opportunities	 for	 banks	 and	 financial	












that	banks	and	 financial	 institutions	are	 less	 likely	 to	 impair	goodwill.	Altogether,	 the	
three	 variables	 indicate	 that	 the	 industry,	 the	 start	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 and,	 more	
importantly,	 industry-specific	 economic	opportunities	drive	 the	 likelihood	of	 goodwill	
impairments.	Although	my	statistical	analyses	suggest	that	the	fact	that	firms	are	either	
banks	 or	 financial	 institutions	 during	 the	 period	 following	 the	 financial	 crisis	 can	
explain	 the	 likelihood	of	goodwill	 impairments,	 I	 cannot	 find	any	evidence	 that	either	
industry	or	diminishing	growth	opportunities	have	any	effect	on	the	reported	goodwill	
impairment	 amounts.	 Also	 in	 the	BANKS	&	FINANCIALS	 sample,	 all	 three	 variables	 of	
interest	(BF,	UNCER,	and	BF_UNCER)	do	not	have	any	significant	impact	on	the	amount	










such	 as	 year	 controls.	 I	 also	 change	 the	 panel-data	 estimation	 to	 OLS.	 Non-tabulated	
results	 for	 the	variables	of	 interest	 reveal	 consistent	directional	evidence	and	 level	of	
significance,	 suggesting	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	by	banks	and	 financial	 institutions	
during	 periods	 of	 diminishing	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 positively	 associated	 with	
abnormal	returns.		
I	 also	 restrict	 the	 BANKS	 &	 FINANCIALS	 sample	 in	 model	 2,	 in	 Table	 4,	 to	 only	






















for	 the	 potential	 unwillingness	 to	 impair	 goodwill	 by	 taking	 the	 size	 of	 goodwill	 in	
relation	 to	 book	 value	 of	 equity	GW_BVE,	which	 controls	 for	managers’	 propensity	 to	
present	economically	 impaired	goodwill.	Taking	 the	 inverse	of	dividing	1	by	GW_BVE,	









the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities.	 There	 are	 two	main	 arguments	 for	
why	 this	 could	 be	 the	 case:	 (i)	 diminishing	 opportunities	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 delay	 the	
second	step	of	testing	goodwill	for	impairment	as	other	assets	are	likely	to	depreciate	in	
value,	and	(ii)	opportunistic	managers	of	a	firm	with	diminishing	growth	opportunities	
may	 no	 longer	 be	 able	 to	 delay	 goodwill	 impairments	 as	 investors	 strengthen	 their	
monitoring	activity	(Povel	et	al.,	2007).	Based	on	these	arguments,	I	predict	that	firms	in	
industries	with	diminishing	growth	opportunities	(1)	are	more	likely	to	impair	goodwill	
than	 are	 firms	 in	 industries	with	 non-diminishing	 growth	 opportunities,	 and	 (2)	 that	
their	goodwill	impairments	will	provide	value-relevant	information	to	investors.	
I	 use	 the	 periods	 prior	 to	 and	 following	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 European	






value-relevant	 to	 investors	 since	 their	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	
diminished	during	the	financial	crises.		
I	find	that	firms	in	industries	with	diminishing	growth	opportunities	are	not	more	
likely	 to	 impair	 goodwill.	 I	 find	 some	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 banks	 and	 financial	
institutions,	 at	 least	 during	 the	 second	 financial	 crisis,	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 impair	
goodwill.	 These	 results	 suggest	 that	 prior	 studies’	 findings	 of	 delayed	 goodwill	
impairments	are	probably	not	the	result	of	a	fair	application	of	SFAS	142,	as	only	banks	
and	 financial	 institutions	 would	 have	 impaired	 goodwill	 if	 the	 second	 step	 had	
previously	been	delayed	by	appreciating	other	assets.	However,	I	do	find	that	goodwill	
impairments	 by	 firms	 in	 industries	 with	 diminishing	 growth	 opportunities	 (i.e.,	
26	
	
banks/financial	 institutions)	 are	 value-relevant	 to	 investors.	 Overall,	 these	 results	
indicate	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	 by	 firms	 with	 industry-specific	 economic	 growth	
opportunities	have	an	 impact	on	 investors’	 valuations.	Thus,	 the	main	 takeaway	 from	
this	paper	 is	 that	 goodwill	 impairments	 are	more	useful	 to	 investors	when	 the	 firm’s	
industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	 are	 diminishing,	 but	 their	 usefulness	 cannot	
solely	be	ascribed	to	the	impairment	decision.	
Overall,	this	study	contributes	to	the	literature	by	providing	initial	evidence	that	the	








reflect	 underlying	 economics	 when	 the	 firm’s	 industry-specific	 growth	 opportunities	
are	diminishing,	 and	whether	 other	 firms	with	non-diminishing	 growth	opportunities	
misuse	 the	 crisis	 to	 accelerate	 goodwill	 impairments.	Moreover,	 these	 studies	 should	
include	 more	 industries	 with	 a	 more	 general	 identification	 of	 diminishing	 growth	














































































Appendix A: Growth Opportunities and the Decision to Impair Goodwill  
Dependent and experimental variables  
Variable  Definition  
D_IMPGWit An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports goodwill-impairment in 
year t during the sample period 2003-2012, and 0 otherwise (Dependent 
variable in model 1) 
T_IMPGWit Is a variable equal to the natural logarithm of goodwill impairments during 
the sample period 2003-2012 (Dependent variable in model 2) 
CRISIS 1_BFit+1     An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the financial and/or 
banking sector and if year t is either 2007 or 2008, and 0 otherwise. 
Treated as a leading variable. 
CRISIS 2_BFit+1     An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the financial and/or 
banking sector and if year t is 2010, and 0 otherwise. Treated as leading 
variable. 
  
Control and descriptive variables  
Variable  Definition  
CRISIS 1    An indicator variable equal to 1 for the years 2008–2009, and 0 otherwise 
CRISIS 2    An indicator variable equal to 1 for the year 2011, and 0 otherwise 
BFit An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to banks in the BANKS 
sample; and if firm i belongs to the banks or financial services sector in the 
BANKS & FINICIALS sample, and 0 otherwise; 
SIZEt-1                 The natural logarithm of the market value of the firm December 31 in year 
t, and is calculated as common shares outstanding times the share price 
April 1 
GW_TA t-1            Is the ratio of capitalized goodwill to total assets for firm i in year t-1 
BTMt-1                 Book value of common equity to market value of equity of the firm 
D_BTM t-1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if BTM is above 1, otherwise equal to 0 
PRE_Et                Earnings before goodwill impairment divided by the year-end market 
value 
LOSSt An indicator variable equal to 1 if PRE_E is below 0, otherwise equal to 0, 
divided by the year-end market value   
D_RETURN         An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s annual stock return is below 
0, otherwise 0 













Appendix B: Growth Opportunities and Value Relevance  
Dependent and experimental variables  
Variable  Definition  
ABRET The difference between raw stock return for firm i and the corresponding return of 
the value weighted industry market index. Raw return RETit is the change in the 
dividend-adjusted stock price (Pret) from April 1 in year t to April 1 in year t+1 
for firm i. 
ΔIMP_BF_ CRISIS 1 Interactions between change in the goodwill impairments, BF, and CRISIS 1 from 
year t-1 to t 
ΔIMP_BF_ CRISIS 2 Interactions between change in the goodwill impairments, BF, and CRISIS 2 from 
year t-1 to t 
  
Control and descriptive variables  
Variable  Definition  
ΔIMP_BF Interaction between change in the goodwill impairments and BF. 
BF_CRISIS 1 Interaction between BF and CRISIS 1 from year t-1 to t. 
BF_CRISIS 2 Interaction BF, and CRISIS 2 from year t-1 to t. 
ΔIMP_CRISIS 1 Interaction between change in the goodwill impairments and CRISIS 1 from year 
t-1 to t. 
ΔIMP_CRISIS 2 Interaction between change in the goodwill impairments and CRISIS 2 from year 
t-1 to t. 
CRISIS 1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if year t is 2007-2008, and 0 otherwise. Treated as 
a leading variable. 
CRISIS 2 An indicator variable equal to 1 if year t is 2010, and 0 otherwise. Treated as a 
leading variable. 
ΔEARN_IMP Change in earnings before goodwill impairments from year t-1 to t 
ΔGWIMP Change in goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t 
D_NEARN An indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings in year t is below 0, otherwise equal to 
0. 
D_NEARN_EARN An interaction variable between D_NEARN and income EARN, which means that 
the variable takes the value of negative earnings, and otherwise 0 
 
 
Appendix C: Additional Variables for the Robustness Tests 
Variable  Definition  
Tobin’s Q   Measured as the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total 
assets of firm i 
LEVERAGE Total debt divided by total assets of firm i 
GW_BVE   The size of goodwill in relation to book value of equity of firm i 
UNCER An indicator variable equal to 1 if year t is 2008-2011, and 0 otherwise, of 
firm i 
BF_UNCER Interactions between BF, and UNCER from year t-1 to t of firm i 
ΔGWIMP_BF_UNCER Interactions between the change in goodwill impairments, BF, and UNCER from 







Descriptive Information about Goodwill Impairments   
Panel A: Yearly goodwill impairments by sector 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total % 
Banks  0 0 0 0 2 7 14 4 3 2 32 26% 
Financial Inst.  2 3 3 1 3 10 3 5 6 2 38 31% 
Pharma. & Biotech  0 0 1 1 0 2 3 2 3 1 13 11% 
Health Care E&S  2 1 1 2 1 8 8 4 10 2 39 32% 
Total  4 4 5 4 6 27 28 15 22 7 122 100% 
% 3% 3% 4% 3% 5% 22% 23% 12% 18% 6% 100%  
Panel B: Goodwill impairments by within-firm frequency for each sector 
  
Impairments Reported 































 Banks  21 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 26  30% 
 Financial Institutions  14 5 2 0 0 0 0 1 22 25% 
 Pharma. & Biotech  4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 9% 
 Health Care E&S 24 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 30 35% 
 Total number of firms 63 17 4 0 1 0 0 1 86 100% 
 Percent of sample 73% 20% 5% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 100%  
 
          
This table presents descriptive statistics with a special focus on goodwill impairments. Panel A presents the number of firms in each sector 
reporting goodwill impairments under SFAS 142 during the period 2003–2012. Panel B presents the frequency of goodwill impairments for 





Descriptive Information about the Industries – Selected Variables 
 Mean  Median 
 
 N 
 BANK B&F PHARM  BANK B&F PHARM  BANK B&F PHARM 
            
ΔIMP_BF_ NegOut -.0011 -.0006 -  0 0 -  330 570 - 
ΔGWIMP .00002 -.0003 .0018  0 0 0  330 570 440 
ΔEARN_IMP -.0206 .0145 .0070  -.0032 -.0032 .00091    209 319 263 
D_EARN .2454 .2543 .3522  0 0 0  330 570 440 
D_NEARN_EARN  -.0993 -.1265 -.168  0 0 0  236 369 295 
GW_TA t-1 .0161 .0922 .2047  .00916  .0194  .17945   207 377 315 
SIZEt-1 11.69 12.33 13.18  11.72 12.190 13.06  237 372 314 
D_RETURNt .5269 .495 .479  1 0 0  241 384 334 
D_RETURNt*Rt -.1254 -.113 -.134  0 0 0  330 570 440 
D_RETURNt-1 .5680 .537 .5  1 1 1/0  213 335 308 
D_RETURNt*Rt-1 -.1144 -.106 -.133  0 0 0  329 569 440 
BTMt-1 1.128 1.003 .5381  .9525 .83441 .4849   237 372 314 
D_BTM t-1 .4556 .390 .165  0 0 0  237 372 314 
            
This table presents the distribution of the regression variables for banks (BANKS), banks and financial-industry firms (B&F), 





 Table 3 
 Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Goodwill Impairments –Frequency   
  BANKS  BANKS & FINANCIALS 
Variables Expected Sign D_IMPGW 
  Logistic 
D_IMPGW 
     OLS 
 D_IMPGW 
  Logistic 
D_IMPGW 
    OLS 


































































































































       
Year Controls   Included  Included  Included  Included 
N 
AdjR2 
 356 409 
0.297 
 450 516 
0.235 
Prob chi2  0.000   0.000  
Pseudo R2  0.253   0.213  
This table provides estimates of the OLS (D_IMPGW) regressions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
D_IMPGWit = ϕ0 + ϕ1 CRISIS 1 it + ϕ2 CRISIS 2 it + ϕ3 BFit + ϕ4 CRISIS 1_BFit + ϕ5 CRISIS 2_BFit  + ϕ6 SIZEt-1 + ϕ7 GW_TA t-1                   
+ ϕ8 BTMt-1 + ϕ9 D_BTM t-1+ ϕ10 PRE_Et+ ϕ11 LOSSt + ϕ12 D_RETURNt + ϕ13 D_RETURNt*Rt                                     
+ ϕ14 D_RETURNt-1      + ϕ15 D_RETURNt*Rt-1 + ε it 
D_IMPGWit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i impairs goodwill in year t during the sample period 2003-2012, and 0 otherwise. 
CRISIS 1 it is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the years 2008-2009, and 0 otherwise; CRISIS 2 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the 
year 2011, and 0 otherwise. BFit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the financial services sector and/or banking sector, 
and 0 otherwise. CRISIS 1_BFit and CRISIS 2_BFit are an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the financial and/or banking sector 
and if year t is within 2008-2012 or 2011, and 0 otherwise. SIZEt-1 is the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm on December 31 
in year t, and is calculated as the common shares outstanding times the share price on April 1. GW_TA t-1 is the ratio of capitalized goodwill 
to total assets for firm i in year t-1. BTMt-1 is the book value of common equity to market value of equity. D_BTM t-1 is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if BTM is above one, otherwise equal to 0. PRE_Et is earnings before goodwill impairment divided by the year-end market value. 
LOSSt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if PRE_E is below 0, otherwise equal to 0, divided by the year-end market value. D_RETURN is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s annual stock return is below 0, otherwise 0. D_RETURN*R is the indicator variable D_RETURN 
times the firm’s negative annual stock return. In the second test, (D_IMPGW) replaces (D_IMPGW). D_IMPGW is an indicator variable 





 Table 4 
 Diminishing Growth Opportunities and the Value Relevance of Goodwill Impairments 





t-Stat  Coefficient 
Estimate 
t-Stat 
ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 1 + 0.701*** 
(0.196) 
3.58  0.368*** 
(0.0867) 
4.24 
ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 2 + 0.603 
(0.384) 
1.57  0.595* 
(0.313) 
1.90 
CRISIS 1 ? -0.227* 
(0.130) 







-1.86  -0.268** 
(0.109) 
-2.47 
ΔGWIMP - -0.237 
(0.148) 
-1.61  -0.255*** 
(0.0732) 
-3.49 
BF_CRISIS 1 ? 0.519*** 
(0.099) 
5.23  0.446*** 
(0.102) 
4.36 
BF_CRISIS 2 ? 0.065 
(0.113) 
0.56  0.0523 
(0.107 
0.49 
ΔIMP_CRISIS 1 ? 0.184 
(0.202) 
0.91  0194 
(0195) 
0.99 
ΔIMP_CRISIS 2 ? 0.635** 
(0.270) 
2.35  0592** 
(0.286) 
2.07 
ΔIMP_BF ? -0.087*** 
(0.027) 
-3.19  -0.178 
(0.171) 
-1,04 
ΔEARN_IMP + 0.0315** 
(0.0144) 
2.20  -0.0154 
(0.0278) 
-0.55 
D_EARN - -0.184*** 
(0.0535) 
-3.43  -0.140*** 
(0.0482) 
-2.90 
D_NEARN_EARN  + 0.0374 
(0.0323) 
1.16  0.0955* 
(0.0539) 
1.77 
INTERCEPT  0.395*** 
(0.106) 
3.71  0.449*** 
(0.107) 
4.17 
       
Firm Fixed Effects  Included   Included  
Year Fixed Effects  Included   Included  
Adj. R-Square  0.140   0.125  
Firm-years  471   581  
Number of Firms  77   101  
This table provides panel-data estimates of the value-relevance regressions of managers’ goodwill accounting choices during crisis 1 and 
crisis 2. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Both models are strongly balanced. No indications of problems with multicollinearity; all variables have a VIF score below 2. The sample 
is winsorized by 1%. 
ABRETit = γ0 + γ1 CRISIS 1 + γ2 CRISIS 1 + γ3 ΔEARN_IMPit  + γ4 ΔGWIMPit + γ5 ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 1  
+ γ6 ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 2 + γ7 ΔIMP_BF + γ8 ΔIMP_CRISIS 1 + γ9 ΔIMP_CRISIS 2 + γ10 BF_CRISIS 1 
+ γ11 BF_CRISIS 2 + γ12 D_NEARN + γ13 D_NEARN_EARN + εit 
 
ABRET is the difference between raw stock return for firm i and the corresponding return of the value weighted market index. Raw return 
RETit is the change in the dividend-adjusted stock price (Pret) from April 1 in year t to April 1 in year t+1 for firm i. CRISIS 1 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if year t is either 2008 or 2009, and 0 otherwise. CRISIS 2 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if year t is 2011, and 0 
otherwise. BF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the banking/financial industry, otherwise equal to 0. ΔEARN_IMP is the 
change in earnings before goodwill impairments from year t-1 to t. ΔGWIMP is the change in goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t. 
ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 1 is the change in the interactions between goodwill impairments, BF, and CRISIS 1 from year t-1 to t (the same 
reasoning applies to ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 2). D_NEARN is an indication variable equal to 1 if earnings in year t are below 0. 












 Table 5 
 Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Goodwill impairments –Amounts 
  BANKS  BANKS & FINANCIALS 
Variables Expected Sign T_IMPGW 
     OLS 
  T_IMPGW 
    OLS 
 
CRISIS_1*BF + -0.896  
(0.842) 
  -.5228 
(.715) 
 
CRISIS_2*BF + -2.199* 
(1.151) 
  -1.512* 
(0.787) 
 
CRISIS 1 ? .46329 
(0.544) 
  1.401 
(0.464) 
 
CRISIS 2 ? .51411 
(0.544) 
  1.475* 
(0.681) 
 
BF ? .61280 
(0.731) 
  .0828 
(0.591) 
 
GW_TA t-1 + 5.4827*** 
1.1913 
  4.538*** 
(0.881) 
 
LOSSt + -0.365 
(1.502) 
  0.1705 
(1.417) 
 
PRE_Et + 0.0846 
(0.767) 
  -.1853 
(1.419) 
 
SIZEt-1 + 1.1334*** 
(0.191) 
  .9213*** 
(0.135) 
 
BTMt-1 + 1.5439** 
(0.633) 
  .45071 
(0.355) 
 
D_BTM t-1 + .46423 
(0.676) 







  -4.992*** 
(1.787) 
 
       
Year Controls   Included    Included  
N  63   100  
Adj. R-Square  0.685   0.609  
       
This table provides estimates of the OLS (T_IMPGW) regressions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
T_IMPGWit = ψ0 + ψ1 CRISIS 1 + ψ2 CRISIS 2 + ψ3 BFit + ψ4 CRISIS 1_BFit + ψ5 CRISIS 2_BFit + ψ6 SIZEt-1+ ψ7 GW_TA t-1 + ψ8 BTMt-1 
+ ψ9 D_BTM t-1+ ψ10 PRE_Et+ ψ11 LOSSt + ψ12 D_RETURNt + ψ13 D_RETURNt*Rt + ψ14 D_RETURNt-1                      
+ ψ15 D_RETURNt*Rt-1 + ε it 
T_IMPGWit is a variable equal to the natural logarithm of impaired goodwill during the sample period 2003-2012. CRISIS 1 it is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for the years 2008-2009, and 0 otherwise. BFit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the financial services 
sector and/or banking sector, and 0 otherwise. UNCER_BFit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the financial and/or 
banking sector and if year t is within 2008-2012, and 0 otherwise. SIZEt-1 is the natural logarithm of market value of the firm on December 
31 in year t, and is calculated as the common shares outstanding times the share price April 1. GW_TA t-1 is the ratio of capitalized goodwill 
to total assets for firm i in year t-1. BTMt-1 is the book value of common equity to market value of equity. D_BTM t-1 is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if BTM is above 1, otherwise equal to 0. PRE_Et is earnings before goodwill impairment divided by the year-end market value. 














Table 6: Alternative Time Frame 
  Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Value Relevance of Goodwill Impairments 
  BANKS  BANKS & FINANCIALS 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient 
Estimate 
t-Statistic  Coefficient Estimate t-Statistic 
ΔIMP_BF_ UNCER + 0.762*** 
(0.174) 
4.36  0.290* 
(0.153) 
1.90 
UNCER ? -0.165 
(0.116) 
-1.42  -0.177 
(0.113) 
-1.57 
BF_ UNCER ? 0.054 
(0.062) 
0.88  0.0677 
(0.654) 
1.04 
ΔIMP_BF ? -2.34*** 
(0.315) 
-7.43  -1.389 
(0.694) 
-1.44 
ΔIMP_UNCER ? -1.595*** 
(0.232) 
-6.86  -1.648 
(0.208) 
-7.91 
ΔGWIMP - -0.347*** 
(0.128) 
-2.70  -0.331** 
(0.133) 
-2.49 
ΔEARN_IMP + 0.033** 
(0.013) 
2.47  -0.0165 
(0.030) 
-0.55 
D_EARN - -0.165*** 
(0.052) 
-3.20  -0.124** 
(0.049) 
-2.54 
D_NEARN_EARN  + 0.0334 
(0.028) 
0.23  0.0872* 
(0.048) 
1.83 
INTERCEPT  0.168 
(0.115) 
1.45  0.170 
(0.114) 
1.49 
       
Firm Fixed Effects  Included   Included  
Year Fixed Effects   Included   Included  
Adj. R-Square  0.187   0.118  
Firm-years  471   581  
Number of Firms  77   101  
This table provides panel data estimates of the value-relevance regressions of managers’ goodwill accounting choices during the period of 
financial uncertainty from 2008 to 2012. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Both models are strongly balanced. No indications of problems with multicollinearity; all variables have a 
VIF score below 5. The dependent variable is winsorized by 1%.  
 
ABRETit = γ0 + γ1 UNCER + γ2 BF + γ3  ΔEARN_IMPit  + γ4 ΔGWIMPit+ γ5 ΔIMP_BF_UNCER + γ6 BF_UNCER + γ7 ΔIMP_BF  
+ γ8 ΔIMP_UNCER + γ9  D_NEARN+ γ10 D_NEARN_EARN  + εit 
 
ABRET is the difference between raw stock return for firm i and the corresponding return of the value weighted market index. Raw return 
RETit is the change in the dividend-adjusted stock price (Pret) from April 1 in year t to April 1 in year t+1 for firm i. UNCER is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if year t is 2008-2012, and 0 otherwise. BF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the banking/financial 
industry, otherwise equal to 0. ΔEARN_IMP is the change in earnings before goodwill impairments from year t-1 to t. ΔGWIMP is the 
change in goodwill impairment from year t-1 to t. BF_UNCER is the interaction between BF and the period of uncertainty. ΔIMP_BF is the 
interaction between change in goodwill impairments and BF. ΔIMP_UNCER is the interaction between change in goodwill impairments and 
UNCER. ΔIMP_BF_UNCER is the interaction between change in goodwill impairments, BF, and UNCER from year t-1 to t. D_NEARN is 
an indication variable equal to 1 if earnings in year t are below 0. D_NEARN_EARN  is an interaction variable equal to all earnings below 0, 














 Table 7: Alternative Time Frame  
 Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Goodwill Impairments –Frequency /Amounts 
  BANKS  BANKS & FINANCIALS 
Variables Expected Sign D_IMPGW 
    OLS  
T_IMPGW 
   OLS 
 D_IMPGW 
   OLS 
T_IMPGW 
    OLS 
























































































  -0.0425 
(0.0432) 
 
D_RETURNt*Rt ? -0.592*** 
(0.140) 
  -0.5498*** 
(0.1246) 
 
D_RETURNt-1 ? -0.0072 
(0.0290) 
  -0.0053 
(0.0296) 
 
D_RETURNt*Rt-1 ? -0.169 
(0.122) 
  -0.1429 
(0.1077) 
 
       
Year controls  Included    Included  
N  409 57  516 100 
Adj. R-Square  0.277 0.721  0.227 0.612 
Prob chi2  0.000     
Likelihood ratio 
statistics 
 -125.77     
Pseudo R2  0.2431     
This table provides estimates of the OLS (D_IMPGW) and OLS (T_IMPGW) regressions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
D_IMPGWit = ψ0 + ψ1 UNCER + ψ2 BFit + ψ3 UNCER_BFit  + ψ4 SIZEt-1+ ψ5 GW_TA t-1 + ψ6 BTMt-1+ ψ7 D_BTMt-1 
+ ψ8 PRE_Et+ ψ9 LOSSt + ψ10 D_RETURNt + ψ11 D_RETURNt*Rt + ψ12 D_RETURNt-1 + ψ13 D_RETURNt*Rt-1 + ε it 
T_IMPGWit = ψ0 + ψ1 UNCER + ψ2 BFit + ψ3 UNCER_BFit  + ψ4 SIZEt-1+ ψ5 GW_TA t-1 + ψ6 BTMt-1+ ψ7 D_BTMt-1 
+ ψ8 PRE_Et+ ψ9 LOSSt + ε it 
 
D_IMPGWit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i impairs goodwill in year t during the sample period 2003-2012, and 0 otherwise. 
T_IMPGWit is a variable equal to the natural logarithm of goodwill impairments during the sample period 2003-2012. 
UNCER it is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the years 2008-2012, and 0 otherwise. BFit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i 
belongs to the financial services sector and/or banking sector, and 0 otherwise. UNCER_BFit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i 
belongs to the financial and/or banking sector and if year t is within 2008-2012, and 0 otherwise. SIZEt-1 is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the firm on December 31 in year t, and is calculated as the common shares outstanding times the share price April 1. 
GW_TA t-1 is the ratio of capitalized goodwill to total assets for firm i in year t-1. BTMt-1 is the book value of common equity to market 
value of equity. D_BTM t-1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if BTM is above 1, otherwise equal to 0. PRE_Et is earnings before goodwill 
impairment divided by the year-end market value. LOSSt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if PRE_E is below 0, otherwise equal to 0, 
divided by the year-end market value. D_RETURN is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s annual stock return is below 0, 
otherwise 0. D_RETURN*R is the indicator variable D_RETURN times the firms’ negative annual stock return. In the second test, 
(D_IMPGW) replaces (D_IMPGW). D_IMPGW is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i  impairs goodwill in year t during the sample 




 Table 8: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Goodwill Impairments –Frequency (BANKS sample) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
                              
(1) BF 
              
(2) CRISIS 1 0.000 
                            
(3) CRISIS 2 0.000 -0.167*** 
                          
(4) GW_TA t-1 -0.585*** 0.035 -0.021 
                          
(5) PRE_Et -0.191*** 0.039 0.006 0.227*** 
                         
(6) LOSSt 0.059* -0.011 -0.028 -0.109** 0.147*** 
                        
(7) BTMt-1 0.237*** 0.066 0.061 -0.074 -0.066 0.0129  
                       
(8) D_BTM t-1 0.316*** 0.097** 0.088** -0.151*** -0.084** -0.0188  0.4761*** 
                     
(9) D_RETURNt 0.047 0.231*** 0.139*** 0.083* -0.025 -0.1011** 0.0139 -0.0319 
                     
(10) D_RETURNt*Rt 0.018 -0.327*** -0.151*** (0.054 0.0797** 0.1635*** 0.0070 0.0022 -0.6698*** 
                   
(11) D_RETURNt-1 -0.111** -0.254*** 0.039 -0.040 0.0416 0.0147  -0.2302*** -0.2891*** 0.0047 0.0523 
                   
(12) D_RETURNt*Rt-1 0.039 -0.316*** 0.032 0.019 0.0663* 0.1008*** -0.2374*** -0.3734*** 0.0206 0.1422*** 0.6544*** 
                 
(13) CRISIS_1*BF 0.354*** 0.612*** -0.102*** -0.233*** -0.0764** -0.0486  0.1073** 0.1975*** 0.2200*** -0.1755*** -0.1825*** -0.1728*** 
                
(14) CRISIS_2*BF 0.244*** -0.106*** 0.635*** -0.163*** -0.0522 -0.0522  0.1046** 0.1659*** 0.0611 -0.0766** 0.0203 0.0083 -0.0648* 
               
(15) SIZEt-1 -0.384*** -0.013 -0.035 0.355*** 0.5821*** -0.0355  -0.2181*** -0.3973*** -0.0082 0.0999** 0.1895*** 0.3232*** -0.1429*** -0.1291*** 
                              
 














    Table 9: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
    Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Goodwill Impairments –Frequency (BANKS & FINANCIALS sample) 
 
               Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
               (1) BF 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	               (2) CRISIS 1 -0.0000 
                            (3) CRISIS 2 0.0000 -0.1667*** 
                          (4) GW_TA t-1 -0.3382*** 0.0424 -0.0299 
                          (5) PRE_Et -0.1283*** -0.0030 0.0247 0.1360*** 
                         (6) LOSSt -0.0364 -0.0878*** 0.0034 0.0195 0.2850*** 
                        (7) BTMt-1 0.1862*** 0.0823** 0.0622 -0.0651 -0.0977** -0.0498 
                       (8) D_BTM t-1 0.2469*** 0.1231*** 0.0778** -0.1695*** -0.1079*** -0.1045*** 0.4876*** 
                      (9) D_RETURNt 0.0157 0.2086*** 0.1513*** 0.0559 -0.0492 -0.0864** -0.0023  -0.0307 
                     (10) D_RETURNt*Rt 0.0451 -0.3081*** -0.1455*** -0.0107 0.0814*** 0.0551* 0.0248  0.0058 -0.6768*** 
                   (11) D_RETURNt-1 -0.0731** -0.2804*** 0.0486 -0.0434 0.0534 0.0438 -0.2129*** -0.2920*** -0.0003 0.0491 
                   (12) D_RETURNt*Rt- 0.0580* -0.3343*** 0.0269 0.0292 0.0642** 0.0308 -0.2212*** -0.3773*** 0.0405 0.1340*** 0.6689*** 
                  (13) CRISIS_1*BF 0.3134*** 0.7134*** -0.1189*** -0.1004*** -0.0864*** -0.1333*** 0.1141*** 0.1982*** 0.1798*** -0.1786*** -0.2227*** -0.2227*** 
                (14) CRISIS_2*BF 0.2149*** -0.1223*** 0.7337*** -0.1022*** -0.0050 -0.0086 0.0904** 0.1255***  0.0917** -0.0818*** 0.0401 0.0147 -0.0872*** 
               (15) SIZEt-1 -0.2205*** -0.0123 -0.0174 0.3215*** 0.5781*** -0.0488 -0.2070*** -0.3818*** -0.0068 0.0711* 0.1984*** 0.3050*** -0.0747* -0.0596) 
                              Table 9 shows the pairwise correlations of the independent variables. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 












             Table 10: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
                 Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Value Relevance of Goodwill Impairments (BANKS sample) 
              
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
                            
(1) BF 
                           
(2) CRISIS 1 0.0000 
                          
(3) CRISIS 2 0.0000 -0.1667*** 
                        
(4) D_EARN -0.1157*** 0.1285*** 0.0715** 
                        
(5) ΔEARN_IMP -0.0118 -0.0180 -0.0004 -0.1017** 
                       
(6) ΔGWIMP -0.0051 0.1618*** 0.0421 0.1468*** 0.0211 
                      
(7) ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 1 0.0753** 0.1305*** -0.0217 0.1092*** (-0.0047) 0.3706*** 
                     
(8) ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 2 -0.0406 0.0176 -0.1054*** -0.0048 -0.0142 0.1217*** 0.0023  
                    
(9) ΔIMP_BF 0.0001 0.1188*** -0.0281 0.0480 0.0135 0.5070*** 0.5317*** 0.2397*** 
                   
(10) BF_CRISIS 2 0.2443*** -0.1058*** 0.5348*** 0.0414 0.0041 -0.0223 -0.0138 -0.1661*** -0.0416 
                  
(11) BF_CRISIS 1 0.3536*** 0.6124*** -0.1021*** 0.1406*** -0.0222 0.0842** 0.2131*** 0.0108 0.1698*** -0.0648* 
                 
(12) ΔIMP_CRISIS 1 -0.0133 0.2086*** -0.0348 0.1751*** 0.0070 0.6384*** 0.4800*** 0.0037 0.4275*** -0.0221 0.1042*** 
                
(13) ΔIMP_CRISIS 2 -0.0587 -0.0193 0.1160*** 0.0721** 0.0106 0.3425*** -0.0025 0.3564*** 0.0850** -0.0697* -0.0118 -0.0040 
               
(14) D_NEARN_EARN  0.0403 -0.0307 -0.0054 -0.2180*** 0.5984*** -0.0906** -0.0719* -0.0155 -0.0296 -0.0063 -0.0175 -0.1151*** -0.0474 
                            
Table 10 shows the pairwise correlations of the independent variables. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All 













 Table 11: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
    Diminishing Growth Opportunities and Value Relevance of Goodwill Impairments (BANKS & FINANCIALS sample) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
                            
(1) BF 
                           
(2) CRISIS 1 0.0000 
                          
(3) CRISIS 2 0.0000 -0.1667*** 
                        
(4) D_EARN -0.1062*** 0.1517*** 0.0722** 
                        
(5) ΔEARN_IMP 0.0026 0.0049 -0.0161 -0.1039** 
                      
(6) ΔGWIMP -0.0042 0.1299*** 0.0240 0.1342*** -0.0814** 
                     
(7) ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 1 0.0426 0.0970*** -0.0162 0.1044*** -0.1590*** 0.5238*** 
                     
(8) ΔIMP_BF_CRISIS 2 -0.0209 0.0119 -0.0715** 0.0011 -0.0073 0.0786** 0.0012  
                    
(9) ΔIMP_BF -0.0007 0.0891*** -0.0071 0.0775** -0.0995** 0.6505*** 0.5336*** 0.0923*** 
                   
(10) BF_CRISIS 2 0.2149*** -0.1223*** 0.6337*** 0.0476 -0.0151 -0.0087 -0.0119 -0.0974*** -0.0093 
                  
(11) BF_CRISIS 1 0.3134*** 0.6134*** -0.1189*** 0.1584*** 0.0118 0.0945*** 0.1360*** 0.0085 0.1125*** -0.0872** 
                
(12) ΔIMP_CRISIS 1 0.0017 0.1507*** -0.0251 0.1479*** -0.1387*** 0.6702*** 0.6222*** 0.0018 0.5557*** -0.0184 0.1101*** 
                
(13) ΔIMP_CRISIS 2 -0.0582* -0.0177 0.1063*** 0.0654** 0.0080 0.2106*** -0.0017 0.3739*** 0.0344 -0.0471 -0.0126 -0.0027 
               
(14) D_NEARN_EARN  0.0244 -0.0757* -0.0010 -0.2337*** 0.5312*** -0.2040*** -0.2634*** -0.0128 -0.1894*** -0.0021 -0.0803** -0.2709*** -0.0410 
                            
Table 11 shows the pairwise correlations of the independent variables. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
